U.S.T.E.
STEVENS POINT

THE MODERN LIBRARY

OF THE WORLD'S BEST BOOKS

HUMAN NATURE AND CONDUCT

The publishers will be pleased to send, upon request, an illustrated catalogue setting forth the purpose and ideals of The Modern Library, and describing in detail each volume in the series.

¶Every reader of books will find titles he has been looking for, attractively printed, and at an unusually low price

HUMAN NATURE AND CONDUCT

AN INTRODUCTION TO SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY

BY

JOHN DEWEY

WITH A NEW INTRODUCTION

BY

JOHN DEWEY

THE MODERN LIBRARY

PUBLISHERS NEW YORK

Copyright, 1922, *By* HENRY HOLT & CO.

Introduction Copyright, 1930, *by*
THE MODERN LIBRARY



Manufactured in the United States of America
Bound for THE MODERN LIBRARY *by H. Wolff*

BF
57
.D4
Q,3

FOREWORD TO THE MODERN LIBRARY EDITION

In the eighteenth century, the word Morals was ed in English literature with a meaning of broad eep. It included all the subjects of distinctively hu- ane import, all of the social disciplines as far as they e intimately connected with the life of man and as ey bear upon the interests of humanity. The pages at follow are intended as a contribution, from one int of view, to Morals thus conceived. The particular int of view taken is that of the structure and work- gs of human nature, of psychology when that term used also in its wider sense.

Were it not for one consideration, the volume might said to be an essay in continuing the tradition of vid Hume. But it happens that in the usual inter- etation of Hume, he is treated simply as a writer o carried philosophical skepticism to its limit. There sufficient ground in Hume for this way of looking his work. But it is one-sided. No one can read the roductory remarks with which he prefaced his two ef philosophical writings without realizing that he l also a constructive aim. To a considerable extent al and temporal controversies incident to the period which he wrote led to an excessive emphasis on the ptical import of his conclusions. He was so anxious

V.2

to oppose certain views current and influential in his own day that his original positive aim got obscured and overlaid as he proceeded. In a period in which these other views were themselves dim and unimportant his thought might well have taken a happier turn.

His constructive idea is that a knowledge of human nature provides a map or chart of all humane and social subjects, and that with this chart in our possession we can find our way intelligently about through all the complexities of the phenomena of economics, politics, religious beliefs, etc. Indeed, he went further, and held that human nature gives also the key to the sciences of the physical world, since when all is said and done they are also the products of the workings of the human mind. It is likely that in enthusiasm for a new idea, Hume carried it too far. But there is to my mind an inexpugnable element of truth in his teachings. Human nature is at least a contributing factor to the *form* which even natural science takes, although it may not give the key to its *content* in the degree which Hume supposed.

But in the social subjects, he was on safer ground. Here at least we are in the presence of facts in which human nature is truly central and where a knowledge of human nature is necessary to enable us to thread our way through the tangled scene. If Hume erred in his use of his key, it was because he failed to note the reaction of social institutions and conditions upon the ways in which human nature expresses itself. He saw the part played by the structure and opera-

ns of our common nature in shaping social life. He iled to see with equal clearness the reflex influence of e latter upon the shape which a plastic human nature kes because of its social environment. He emphasized bit and custom, but he failed to see that custom is sentially a fact of associated living whose force is minant in forming the habits of individuals.

To point out this relative failure is only to say that thought and wrote before the rise of anthropology d allied sciences. There was in his day little intima- on of the pervasive and powerful influence of what thropologists call culture in shaping the concrete anifestations of every human nature subject to its fluence. It was a great achievement to insist upon the iiform workings of a common human structure amid e diversity of social conditions and institutions. What e growth of knowledge since his time enables us to ld is that this diversity operates to create different titudes and dispositions in the play of ultimately entical human factors.

It is not easy to keep a balance between the two des of the scene. There always tend to be two schools, ne emphasizing original and native human nature; the her depending upon the influence of the social en- ronment. Even in anthropology, there are those who rry back social phenomena to processes of diffusion, ose who whenever they find common beliefs and in- itutions in different parts of the world assume some rlier contact and intercourse in which borrowing ok place. Then there are those who prefer to dwell

upon the identity of human nature at all times and places and to carry back the interpretation of cultural phenomena to this inherent unity of human nature. When this volume was first produced, there was a tendency, especially among psychologists, to insist upon native human nature untouched by social influences and to explain social phenomena by reference to traits of original nature called "instincts." Since that date (1922), the pendulum has undoubtedly swung in the opposite direction. The importance of culture as a formative medium is more generally recognized. Perhaps the tendency to-day in many quarters is to overlook the basic identity of human nature amid its different manifestations.

At all events, difficulty persists in securing and maintaining an equilibrium with reference to intrinsic human nature on one side and social customs and institutions on the other. There are doubtless many shortcomings in the pages which follow, but they are to be interpreted in the light of an endeavor to keep the two forces in balance. There is, I hope, due emphasis upon the power of cultural habitude and trend in diversifying the forms assumed by human nature. But there is also an attempt to make clear that there are always intrinsic forces of a common human nature at work; forces which are sometimes stifled by the encompassing social medium but which also in the long course of history are always striving to liberate themselves and to make over social institutions so that the latter may form a freer, more transparent and more con-

nial medium for their operation. "Morals" in its ad sense is a function of the interaction of these o forces.

JOHN DEWEY.

w York City,
c., 1929.

PREFACE

In the spring of 1918 I was invited by Leland Stanford Junior University to give a series of three lectures upon the West Memorial Foundation. One of the topics included within the scope of the Foundation is Human Conduct and Destiny. This volume is the result, as, according to the terms of the Foundation, the lectures are to be published. The lectures as given have, however, been rewritten and considerably expanded. An Introduction and Conclusion have been added. The lectures should have been published within two years from delivery. Absence from the country rendered strict compliance difficult; and I am indebted to the authorities of the University for their indulgence in allowing an extension of time, as well as for so many courtesies received during the time when the lectures were given.

Perhaps the sub-title requires a word of explanation. The book does not purport to be a treatment of social psychology. But it seriously sets forth a belief that an understanding of habit and of different types of habit is the key to social psychology, while the operation of impulse and intelligence gives the key to individualized mental activity. But they are secondary to habit so that mind can be understood in the concrete only as a system of beliefs, desires and purposes which are formed in the interaction of biological aptitudes with a social environment.

J. D.

February, 1921.

CONTENTS

PAGE

NTRODUCTION 1
Contempt for human nature; pathology of goodness; freedom; value of science.

PART ONE

THE PLACE OF HABIT IN CONDUCT

ECTION I: HABITS AS SOCIAL FUNCTIONS . . 13
Habits as functions and arts; social complicity; subjective factor.

ECTION II: HABITS AND WILL 24
Active means; ideas of ends; means and ends; nature of character.

ECTION III: CHARACTER AND CONDUCT . . . 43
Good will and consequences; virtues and natural goods; objective and subjective morals.

ECTION IV: CUSTOM AND HABIT 58
Human psychology is social; habit as conservative; mind and body.

ECTION V: CUSTOM AND MORALITY 75
Customs as standards; authority of standards; class conflicts.

ECTION VI: HABIT AND SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY . . 84
Isolation of individuality; newer movements.

PART TWO

THE PLACE OF IMPULSE IN CONDUCT

CTION I: IMPULSES AND CHANGE OF HABITS . . 89
Present interest in instincts; impulses as re-organizing.

PAGE

SECTION II: PLASTICITY OF IMPULSE 95
Impulse and education; uprush of impulse; fixed codes.

SECTION III: CHANGING HUMAN NATURE . . . 106
Habits the inert factor; modification of impulses; war a social function; economic regimes as social products; nature of motives.

SECTION IV: IMPULSE AND CONFLICT OF HABITS . 125
Possibility of social betterment; conservatism.

SECTION V: CLASSIFICATION OF INSTINCTS . . 131
False simplifications; "self-love"; will to power; acquisitive and creative.

SECTION VI: NO SEPARATE INSTINCTS . . . 149
Uniqueness of acts; possibilities of operation; necessity of play and art; rebelliousness.

SECTION VII: IMPULSE AND THOUGHT . . . 169

PART THREE

THE PLACE OF INTELLIGENCE IN CONDUCT

SECTION I: HABIT AND INTELLIGENCE . . . 17
Habits and intellect; mind, habit and impulse.

SECTION II: THE PSYCHOLOGY OF THINKING . . 18
The trinity of intellect; conscience and its alleged separate subject-matter.

SECTION III: THE NATURE OF DELIBERATION . 18
Deliberation as imaginative rehearsal; preference and choice; strife of reason and passion; nature of reason.

SECTION IV: DELIBERATION AND CALCULATION . 19
Error in utilitarian theory; place of the pleasant; hedonistic calculus; deliberation and prediction.

SECTION V: THE UNIQUENESS OF GOOD . . . 21
Fallacy of a single good; applied to utilitarianism; profit and personality; means and ends.

PAGE

CTION VI: THE NATURE OF AIMS 223
Theory of final ends; aims as directive means; ends as justifying means; meaning well as an aim; wishes and aims.

CTION VII: THE NATURE OF PRINCIPLES . . 238
Desire for certainty; morals and probabilities; importance of generalizations.

CTION VIII: DESIRE AND INTELLIGENCE . . 248
Object and consequence of desire; desire and quiescence; self-deception in desire; desire needs intelligence; nature of idealism; living in the ideal.

CTION IX: THE PRESENT AND FUTURE . . . 265
Subordination of activity to result; control of future; production and consummation; idealism and distant goals.

PART FOUR

CONCLUSION

CTION I: THE GOOD OF ACTIVITY 278
Better and worse; morality a process; evolution and progress; optimism; Epicureanism; making others happy.

CTION II: MORALS ARE HUMAN 295
Humane morals; natural law and morals; place of science.

CTION III: WHAT IS FREEDOM? 303
Elements in freedom; capacity in action; novel possibilities; force of desire.

CTION IV: MORALITY IS SOCIAL 314
Conscience and responsibility; social pressure and opportunity; exaggeration of blame; importance of social psychology; category of right; the community as religious symbol.

INTRODUCTION

"Give a dog a bad name and hang him." Human ature has been the dog of professional moralists, and onsequences accord with the proverb. Man's nature as been regarded with suspicion, with fear, with sour ooks, sometimes with enthusiasm for its possibilities ut only when these were placed in contrast with its ctualities. It has appeared to be so evilly disposed iat the business of morality was to prune and curb ; it would be thought better of if it could be replaced y something else. It has been supposed that morality ould be quite superfluous were it not for the inherent eakness, bordering on depravity, of human nature. ome writers with a more genial conception have at- ributed the current blackening to theologians who have iought to honor the divine by disparaging the human. Theologians have doubtless taken a gloomier view of ian than have pagans and secularists. But this ex- lanation doesn't take us far. For after all these the- logians are themselves human, and they would have een without influence if the human audience had not omehow responded to them.

Morality is largely concerned with controlling human ature. When we are attempting to control anything e are acutely aware of what resists us. So moralists ere led, perhaps, to think of human nature as evil

because of its reluctance to yield to control, its rebelliousness under the yoke. But this explanation only raises another question. Why did morality set up rules so foreign to human nature? The ends it insisted upon, the regulations it imposed, were after all outgrowths of human nature. Why then was human nature so averse to them? Moreover rules can be obeyed and ideals realized only as they appeal to something in human nature and awaken in it an active response. Moral principles that exalt themselves by degrading human nature are in effect committing suicide. Or else they involve human nature in unending civil war, and treat it as a hopeless mess of contradictory forces.

We are forced therefore to consider the nature and origin of that control of human nature with which morals has been occupied. And the fact which is forced upon us when we raise this question is the existence of classes. Control has been vested in an oligarchy. Indifference to regulation has grown in the gap which separates the ruled from the rulers. Parents, priests, chiefs, social censors have supplied aims, aims which were foreign to those upon whom they were imposed, to the young, laymen, ordinary folk; a few have given and administered rule, and the mass have in a passable fashion and with reluctance obeyed. Everybody knows that good children are those who make as little trouble as possible for their elders, and since most of them cause a good deal of annoyance they must be naughty by nature. Generally speaking, good people have been those who did what they were told to do, and lack of

ger compliance is a sign of something wrong in their ture.

But no matter how much men in authority have rned moral rules into an agency of class supremacy, y theory which attributes the origin of rule to de- erate design is false. To take advantage of condi- ns after they have come into existence is one thing; create them for the sake of an advantage to accrue quite another thing. We must go back of the bare ct of social division into superior and inferior. To y that accident produced social conditions is to per- ive they were not produced by intelligence. Lack of derstanding of human nature is the primary cause disregard for it. Lack of insight always ends in spising or else unreasoned admiration. When men d no scientific knowledge of physical nature they ther passively submitted to it or sought to control it agically. What cannot be understood cannot be anaged intelligently. It has to be forced into subjec- on from without. The opaqueness of human nature reason is equivalent to a belief in its intrinsic irregu- rity. Hence a decline in the authority of social igarchy was accompanied by a rise of scientific interest human nature. This means that the make-up and orking of human forces afford a basis for moral ideas d ideals. Our science of human nature in comparison th physical sciences is rudimentary, and morals hich are concerned with the health, efficiency and ppiness of a development of human nature are rrespondingly elementary. These pages are a dis-

cussion of some phases of the ethical change involved in positive respect for human nature when the latter is associated with scientific knowledge. We may anticipate the general nature of this change through considering the evils which have resulted from severing morals from the actualities of human physiology and psychology. There is a pathology of goodness as well as of evil; that is, of that sort of goodness which is nurtured by this separation. The badness of good people, for the most part recorded only in fiction, is the revenge taken by human nature for the injuries heaped upon it in the name of morality. In the first place, morals cut off from positive roots in man's nature is bound to be mainly negative. Practical emphasis falls upon avoidance, escape of evil, upon not doing things, observing prohibitions. Negative morals assume as many forms as there are types of temperament subject to it. Its commonest form is the protective coloration of a neutral respectability, an insipidity of character. For one man who thanks God that he is not as other men there are a thousand to offer thanks that they are as other men, sufficiently as others are to escape attention. Absence of social blame is the usual mark of goodness for it shows that evil has been avoided. Blame is most readily averted by being so much like everybody else that one passes unnoticed. Conventional morality is a drab morality, in which the only fatal thing is to be conspicuous. If there be flavor left in it, then some natural traits have somehow escaped being subdued. To be so good as to attract notice is

be priggish, too good for this world. The same sychology that brands the convicted criminal as for-ver a social outcast makes it the part of a gentleman ot to obtrude virtues noticeably upon others.

The Puritan is never popular, not even in a society f Puritans. In case of a pinch, the mass prefer to be ood fellows rather than to be good men. Polite vice preferable to eccentricity and ceases to be vice. Morals that professedly neglect human nature end by mphasizing those qualities of human nature that are ost commonplace and average; they exaggerate the erd instinct to conformity. Professional guardians of orality who have been exacting with respect to them-lves have accepted avoidance of conspicuous evil as nough for the masses. One of the most instructive ings in all human history is the system of concessions, lerances, mitigations and reprieves which the Catholic urch with its official supernatural morality has de-sed for the multitude. Elevation of the spirit above erything natural is tempered by organized leniency r the frailties of flesh. To uphold an aloof realm of rictly ideal realities is admitted to be possible only r a few. Protestantism, except in its most zealous rms, has accomplished the same result by a sharp paration between religion and morality in which a gher justification by faith disposes at one stroke of ily lapses into the gregarious morals of average nduct.

There are always ruder forceful natures who can-t tame themselves to the required level of colorless

conformity. To them conventional morality appears as an organized futility; though they are usually unconscious of their own attitude since they are heartily in favor of morality for the mass as making it easier to manage them. Their only standard is success, putting things over, getting things done. Being good is to them practically synonymous with ineffectuality; and accomplishment, achievement is its own justification. They know by experience that much is forgiven to those who succeed, and they leave goodness to the stupid, to those whom they qualify as boobs. Their gregarious nature finds sufficient outlet in the conspicuous tribute they pay to all established institutions as guardians of ideal interests, and in their denunciations of all who openly defy conventionalized ideals. Or they discover that they are the chosen agents of a higher morality and walk subject to specially ordained laws. Hypocrisy in the sense of a deliberate covering up of a will to evil by loud-voiced protestations of virtue is one of the rarest of occurrences. But the combination in the same person of an intensely executive nature with a love of popular approval is bound, in the face of conventional morality, to produce what the critical term hypocrisy.

Another reaction to the separation of morals from human nature is a romantic glorification of natural impulse as something superior to all moral claims. There are those who lack the persistent force of the executive will to break through conventions and to use them for their own purposes, but who unite sensitiveness with

tensity of desire. Fastening upon the conventional ement in morality, they hold that all morality is a nventionality hampering to the development of indiduality. Although appetites are the commonest things human nature, the least distinctive or individualized, ey identify unrestraint in satisfaction of appetite th free realization of individuality. They treat subction to passion as a manifestation of freedom in the gree in which it shocks the bourgeois. The urgent ed for a transvaluation of morals is caricatured by e notion that an avoidance of the avoidances of conntional morals constitutes positive achievement. While the executive type keeps its eyes on actual condions so as to manipulate them, this school abrogates bjective intelligence in behalf of sentiment, and withraws into little coteries of emancipated souls.

There are others who take seriously the idea of orals separated from the ordinary actualities of huanity and who attempt to live up to it. Some become ngrossed in spiritual egotism. They are preoccupied ith the state of their character, concerned for the urity of their motives and the goodness of their souls. he exaltation of conceit which sometimes accompanies is absorption can produce a corrosive inhumanity hich exceeds the possibilities of any other known form selfishness. In other cases, persistent preoccupation ith the thought of an ideal realm breeds morbid disntent with surroundings, or induces a futile withrawal into an inner world where all facts are fair to e eye. The needs of actual conditions are neglected,

or dealt with in a half-hearted way, because in the light of the ideal they are so mean and sordid. To speak of evils, to strive seriously for change, shows a low mind. Or, again, the ideal becomes a refuge, an asylum, a way of escape from tiresome responsibilities. In varied ways men come to live in two worlds, one the actual, the other the ideal. Some are tortured by the sense of their irreconcilability. Others alternate between the two, compensating for the strains of renunciation involved in membership in the ideal realm by pleasureable excursions into the delights of the actual.

If we turn from concrete effects upon character to theoretical issues, we single out the discussion regarding freedom of will as typical of the consequences that come from separating morals from human nature. Men are wearied with bootless discussion, and anxious to dismiss it as a metaphysical subtlety. But nevertheless it contains within itself the most practical of all moral questions, the nature of freedom and the means of its achieving. The separation of morals from human nature leads to a separation of human nature in its moral aspects from the rest of nature, and from ordinary social habits and endeavors which are found in business, civic life, the run of companionships and recreations. These things are thought of at most as places where moral notions need to be applied, not as places where moral ideas are to be studied and moral energies generated. In short, the severance of morals from human nature ends by driving morals inwards from the public open out-of-doors air and light of day into the

scurities and privacies of an inner life. The signifi-
nce of the traditional discussion of free will is that
reflects precisely a separation of moral activity from
ture and the public life of men.

One has to turn from moral theories to the general
man struggle for political, economic and religious
erty, for freedom of thought, speech, assemblage and
ed, to find significant reality in the conception of
edom of will. Then one finds himself out of the
flingly close atmosphere of an inner consciousness and
the open-air world. The cost of confining moral
edom to an inner region is the almost complete sev-
nce of ethics from politics and economics. The for-
r is regarded as summed up in edifying exhortations,
d the latter as connected with arts of expediency
arated from larger issues of good.

In short, there are two schools of social reform. One
ses itself upon the notion of a morality which springs
m an inner freedom, something mysteriously cooped
within personality. It asserts that the only way
change institutions is for men to purify their own
rts, and that when this has been accomplished,
nge of institutions will follow of itself. The other
ool denies the existence of any such inner power, and
so doing conceives that it has denied all moral free-
n. It says that men are made what they are by the
ces of the environment, that human nature is purely
lleable, and that till institutions are changed, nothing
be done. Clearly this leaves the outcome as hope-
as does an appeal to an inner rectitude and benevo-

lence. For it provides no leverage for change of environment. It throws us back upon accident, usually disguised as a necessary law of history or evolution, and trusts to some violent change, symbolized by civil war, to usher in an abrupt millennium. There is an alternative to being penned in between these two theories. We can recognize that all conduct is *interaction* between elements of human nature and the environment, natural and social. Then we shall see that progress proceeds in two ways, and that freedom is found in that kind of interaction which maintains an environment in which human desire and choice count for something. There are in truth forces in man as well as without him. While they are infinitely frail in comparison with exterior forces, yet they may have the support of a foreseeing and contriving intelligence. When we look at the problem as one of an adjustment to be intelligently attained, the issue shifts from within personality to an engineering issue, the establishment of arts of education and social guidance.

The idea persists that there is something materialistic about natural science and that morals are degraded by having anything seriously to do with material things. If a sect should arise proclaiming that men ought to purify their lungs completely before they ever drew a breath it ought to win many adherents from professed moralists. For the neglect of sciences that deal specifically with facts of the natural and social environment leads to a side-tracking of moral forces into an unreal privacy of an unreal self. It is impossible to

how much of the remediable suffering of the world due to the fact that physical science is looked upon merely physical. It is impossible to say how much the unnecessary slavery of the world is due to the ception that moral issues can be settled within con- nce or human sentiment apart from consistent dy of facts and application of specific knowledge industry, law and politics. Outside of manu- turing and transportation, science gets its chance war. These facts perpetuate war and the hardest, st brutal side of modern industry. Each sign of regard for the moral potentialities of physical nce drafts the conscience of mankind away from cern with the interactions of man and nature which st be mastered if freedom is to be a reality. It di- ts intelligence to anxious preoccupation with the un- lities of a purely inner life, or strengthens reliance n outbursts of sentimental affection. The masses rm to the occult for assistance. The cultivated le contemptuously. They might smile, as the say- goes, out of the other side of their mouths if they lized how recourse to the occult exhibits the prac- l logic of their own beliefs. For both rest upon a aration of moral ideas and feelings from knowable ts of life, man and the world.

t is not pretended that a moral theory based upon lities of human nature and a study of the specific nections of these realities with those of physical nce would do away with moral struggle and defeat. would not make the moral life as simple a matter as

wending one's way along a well-lighted boulevard. A action is an invasion of the future, of the unknown Conflict and uncertainty are ultimate traits. Bu morals based upon concern with facts and deriving guidance from knowledge of them would at least locat the points of effective endeavor and would focus avail able resources upon them. It would put an end to th impossible attempt to live in two unrelated worlds. I would destroy fixed distinction between the huma and the physical, as well as that between the moral an the industrial and political. A morals based on stud of human nature instead of upon disregard for i would find the facts of man continuous with those o the rest of nature and would thereby ally ethics wit physics and biology. It would find the nature an activities of one person coterminous with those of othe human beings, and therefore link ethics with the stud of history, sociology, law and economics.

Such a morals would not automatically solve mora problems, nor resolve perplexities. But it would enabl us to state problems in such forms that action coul be courageously and intelligently directed to their solu tion. It would not assure us against failure, but i would render failure a source of instruction. It woul not protect us against the future emergence of equall serious moral difficulties, but it would enable us to ap proach the always recurring troubles with a fund o growing knowledge which would add significant valu to our conduct even when we overtly failed—as w should continue to do. Until the integrity of moral

human nature and of both with the environment is
gnized, we shall be deprived of the aid of past
erience to cope with the most acute and deep prob-
s of life. Accurate and extensive knowledge will
tinue to operate only in dealing with purely tech-
l problems. The intelligent acknowledgment of
continuity of nature, man and society will alone
re a growth of morals which will be serious without
g fanatical, aspiring without sentimentality,
pted to reality without conventionality, sensible
out taking the form of calculation of profits, ideal-
without being romantic.

PART ONE

THE PLACE OF HABIT IN CONDUCT

I

Habits may be profitably compared to physiologi functions, like breathing, digesting. The latter are, be sure, involuntary, while habits are acquired. B important as is this difference for many purposes should not conceal the fact that habits are like fu tions in many respects, and especially in requiring cooperation of organism and environment. Breathi is an affair of the air as truly as of the lungs; digesti an affair of food as truly as of tissues of stoma Seeing involves light just as certainly as it does eye and optic nerve. Walking implicates the grou as well as the legs; speech demands physical air a human companionship and audience as well as vo organs. We may shift from the biological to the ma ematical use of the word function, and say that natu operations like breathing and digesting, acquired o like speech and honesty, are functions of the surrou ings as truly as of a person. They are things done the environment by means of organic structures acquired dispositions. The same air that under c tain conditions ruffles the pool or wrecks buildi

r other conditions purifies the blood and conveys ght. The outcome depends upon what air acts n. The social environment acts through native im- es and speech and moral habitudes manifest them s. There are specific good reasons for the usual ibution of acts to the person from whom they im- iately proceed. But to convert this special ref- ce into a belief of exclusive ownership is as mis- ing as to suppose that breathing and digesting are plete within the human body. To get a rational s for moral discussion we must begin with recogniz- that functions and habits are ways of using and rporating the environment in which the latter has say as surely as the former.

We may borrow words from a context less technical n that of biology, and convey the same idea by say- that habits are arts. They involve skill of sensory motor organs, cunning or craft, and objective erials. They assimilate objective energies, and tuate in command of environment. They require r, discipline, and manifest technique. They have ginning, middle and end. Each stage marks prog- in dealing with materials and tools, advance in con- ng material to active use. We should laugh at any who said that he was master of stone working, but the art was cooped up within himself and in no wise ndent upon support from objects and assistance tools.

morals we are however quite accustomed to such tuity. Moral dispositions are thought of as be-

longing exclusively to a self. The self is thereby isola
from natural and social surroundings. A whole sch
of morals flourishes upon capital drawn from restri
ing morals to character and then separating charac
from conduct, motives from actual deeds. Recogniti
of the analogy of moral action with functions and a
uproots the causes which have made morals subject
and "individualistic." It brings morals to earth, a
if they still aspire to heaven it is to the heavens *of*
earth, and not to another world. Honesty, chasti
malice, peevishness, courage, triviality, industry, ir
sponsibility are not private possessions of a pers
They are working adaptations of personal capacit
with environing forces. All virtues and vices are hab
which incorporate objective forces. They are int
actions of elements contributed by the make-up of
individual with elements supplied by the out-door wo
They can be studied as objectively as physiologi
functions, and they can be modified by change of eit
personal or social elements.

If an individual were alone in the world, he wo
form his habits (assuming the impossible, namely, t
he would be able to form them) in a moral vacu
They would belong to him alone, or to him only in
erence to physical forces. Responsibility and vir
would be his alone. But since habits involve the s
port of environing conditions, a society or some spec
group of fellow-men, is always accessory before
after the fact. Some activity proceeds from a m
then it sets up reactions in the surroundings. Oth

prove, disapprove, protest, encourage, share and re-
t. Even letting a man alone is a definite response.
ıvy, admiration and imitation are complicities. Neu-
ılity is non-existent. Conduct is always shared; this
the difference between it and a physiological process.
is not an ethical "ought" that conduct *should* be
ial. It *is* social, whether bad or good.

Washing one's hands of the guilt of others is a way
sharing guilt so far as it encourages in others a
ious way of action. Non-resistance to evil which
es the form of paying no attention to it is a way
promoting it. The desire of an individual to keep
own conscience stainless by standing aloof from
dness may be a sure means of causing evil and thus
creating personal responsibility for it. Yet there are
cumstances in which passive resistance may be the
st effective form of nullification of wrong action,
in which heaping coals of fire on the evil-doer may
the most effective way of transforming conduct. To
ıtimentalize over a criminal—to "forgive" because
a glow of feeling—is to incur liability for production
criminals. But to suppose that infliction of retribu-
e suffering suffices, without reference to concrete
nsequences, is to leave untouched old causes of crim-
lity and to create new ones by fostering revenge and
ıtality. The abstract theory of justice which de-
nds the "vindication" of law irrespective of in-
ruction and reform of the wrong-doer is as much a
usal to recognize responsibility as is the sentimental
sh which makes a suffering victim out of a criminal.

Courses of action which put the blame exclusively on a person as if his evil will were the sole cause of wrong-doing and those which condone offense on account of the share of social conditions in producing bad disposition, are equally ways of making an unreal separation of man from his surroundings, mind from the world. Causes for an act always exist, but causes are not excuses. Questions of causation are physical not moral except when they concern future consequences. It is as causes of future actions that excuses and accusations alike must be considered. At present we give way to resentful passion, and then "rationalize" our surrender by calling it a vindication of justice. Our entire tradition regarding punitive justice tends to prevent recognition of social partnership in producing crime; it falls in with a belief in metaphysical free-will. By killing an evil-doer or shutting him up behind stone walls, we are enabled to forget both him and our part in creating him. Society excuses itself by laying the blame on the criminal; he retorts by putting the blame on bad early surroundings, the temptations of others, lack of opportunities, and the persecutions of officers of the law. Both are right, except in the wholesale character of their recriminations. But the effect on both sides is to throw the whole matter back into antecedent causation, a method which refuses to bring the matter to truly moral judgment. For morals has to do with acts still within our control, acts still to be performed. No amount of guilt on the part

f the evil-doer absolves us from responsibility for the nsequences upon him and others of our way of treating him, or from our continuing responsibility for the nditions under which persons develop perverse habits. We need to discriminate between the physical and the oral question. The former concerns what *has* happened, and how it happened. To consider this question indispensable to morals. Without an answer to it we annot tell what forces are at work nor how to direct ur actions so as to improve conditions. Until we now the conditions which have helped form the characters we approve and disapprove, our efforts to create ne one and do away with the other will be blind and alting. But the moral issue concerns the future. It is rospective. To content ourselves with pronouncing idgments of merit and demerit without reference to ne fact that our judgments are themselves facts which ave consequences and that their value depends upon *eir* consequences, is complacently to dodge the moral sue, perhaps even to indulge ourselves in pleasurable assion just as the person we condemn once indulged mself. The moral problem is that of modifying the actors which now influence future results. To change ne working character or will of another we have to ter objective conditions which enter into his habits. ur own schemes of judgment, of assigning blame and raise, of awarding punishment and honor, are part these conditions.

In practical life, there are many recognitions of the

part played by social factors in generating personal traits. One of them is our habit of making social classifications. We attribute distinctive characteristics to rich and poor, slum-dweller and captain of industry, rustic and suburbanite, officials, politicians, professors, to members of races, sets and parties. These judgments are usually too coarse to be of much use. But they show our practical awareness that personal traits are functions of social situations. When we generalize this perception and act upon it intelligently we are committed by it to recognize that we change character from worse to better only by changing conditions—among which, once more, are our own ways of dealing with the one we judge. We cannot change habit directly: that notion is magic. But we can change it indirectly by modifying conditions, by an intelligent selecting and weighting of the objects which engage attention and which influence the fulfilment of desires.

A savage can travel after a fashion in a jungle. Civilized activity is too complex to be carried on without smoothed roads. It requires signals and junction points; traffic authorities and means of easy and rapid transportation. It demands a congenial, antecedently prepared environment. Without it, civilization would relapse into barbarism in spite of the best of subjective intention and internal good disposition. The eternal dignity of labor and art lies in their effecting that permanent reshaping of environment which is the substantial foundation of future security and progress. In

viduals flourish and wither away like the grass of the lds. But the fruits of their work endure and make ssible the development of further activities having ller significance. It is of grace not of ourselves that lead civilized lives. There is sound sense in the old gan notion that gratitude is the root of all virtue. yalty to whatever in the established environment kes a life of excellence possible is the beginning of progress. The best we can accomplish for posterity to transmit unimpaired and with some increment of aning the environment that makes it possible to intain the habits of decent and refined life. Our lividual habits are links in forming the endless chain humanity. Their significance depends upon the en-ronment inherited from our forerunners, and it is lanced as we foresee the fruits of our labors in the rld in which our successors live.

For however much has been done, there always re-ains more to do. We can retain and transmit our own ritage only by constant remaking of our own environ-nt. Piety to the past is not for its own sake nor for e sake of the past, but for the sake of a present so cure and enriched that it will create a yet better ture. Individuals with their exhortations, their eachings and scoldings, their inner aspirations and ntiments have disappeared, but their habits endure, cause these habits incorporate objective conditions in emselves. So will it be with *our* activities. We may sire abolition of war, industrial justice, greater

equality of opportunity for all. But no amount of preaching good will or the golden rule or cultivation of sentiments of love and equity will accomplish the results. There must be change in objective arrangements and institutions. We must work on the environment not merely on the hearts of men. To think otherwise is to suppose that flowers can be raised in a desert or motor cars run in a jungle. Both things can happen and without a miracle. But only by first changing the jungle and desert.

Yet the distinctively personal or subjective factors in habit count. Taste for flowers may be the initial step in building reservoirs and irrigation canals. The stimulation of desire and effort is one preliminary in the change of surroundings. While personal exhortation advice and instruction is a feeble stimulus compared with that which steadily proceeds from the impersonal forces and depersonalized habitudes of the environment yet they may start the latter going. Taste, appreciation and effort always spring from some accomplished objective situation. They have objective support; they represent the liberation of something formerly accomplished so that it is useful in further operation. A genuine appreciation of the beauty of flowers is not generated within a self-enclosed consciousness. It reflects a world in which beautiful flowers have already grown and been enjoyed. Taste and desire represent a prior objective fact recurring in action to secure perpetuation and extension. Desire for flowers comes after actual enjoyment of flowers. But it comes

fore the work that makes the desert blossom, it comes fore *cultivation* of plants. Every ideal is preceded by actuality; but the ideal is more than a repetition inner image of the actual. It projects in securer and der and fuller form some good which has been pre-ously experienced in a precarious, accidental, fleeting y.

II

It is a significant fact that in order to appreciate the peculiar place of habit in activity we have to betake ourselves to bad habits, foolish idling, gambling, addiction to liquor and drugs. When we think of such habits, the union of habit with desire and with propulsive power is forced upon us. When we think of habits in terms of walking, playing a musical instrument, typewriting, we are much given to thinking of habits as technical abilities existing apart from our likings and as lacking in urgent impulsion. We think of them as passive tools waiting to be called into action from without. A bad habit suggests an inherent tendency to action and also a hold, command over us. It makes us do things we are ashamed of, things which we tell ourselves we prefer not to do. It overrides our formal resolutions, our conscious decisions. When we are honest with ourselves we acknowledge that a habit has this power because it is so intimately a part of ourselves. It has a hold upon us because we are the habit.

Our self-love, our refusal to face facts, combined perhaps with a sense of a possible better although unrealized self, leads us to eject the habit from the thought of ourselves and conceive it as an evil power which has somehow overcome us. We feed our conceit by recalling that the habit was not deliberately formed: we never intended to become idlers or gamblers or rouès.

id how can anything be deeply ourselves which de-
loped accidentally, without set intention? These
aits of a bad habit are precisely the things which are
st instructive about all habits and about ourselves.
ey teach us that all habits are affections, that all
ve projectile power, and that a predisposition
rmed by a number of specific acts is an immensely
re intimate and fundamental part of ourselves than
vague, general, conscious choices. All habits are
mands for certain kinds of activity; and they con-
tute the self. In any intelligible sense of the word
l, they *are* will. They form our effective desires and
y furnish us with our working capacities. They
e our thoughts, determining which shall appear and
strong and which shall pass from light into
curity.

We may think of habits as means, waiting, like tools
a box, to be used by conscious resolve. But they
e something more than that. They are active means,
ans that project themselves, energetic and dominat-
g ways of acting. We need to distinguish between
terials, tools and means proper. Nails and boards
e not strictly speaking means of a box. They are
ly materials for making it. Even the saw and ham-
r are means only when they are employed in some
tual making. Otherwise they are tools, or potential
ans. They are actual means only when brought in
njunction with eye, arm and hand in some specific
eration. And eye, arm and hand are, correspond-
ly, means proper only when they are in active opera-

tion. And whenever they are in action they are cooperating with external materials and energies. Without support from beyond themselves the eye stares blankly and the hand moves fumblingly. They are means only when they enter into organization with things which independently accomplish definite results. These organizations are habits.

This fact cuts two ways. Except in a contingent sense, with an "if," neither external materials nor bodily and mental organs are in themselves means. They have to be employed in coordinated conjunction with one another to be actual means, or habits. This statement may seem like the formulation in technical language of a common-place. But belief in magic has played a large part in human history. And the essence of all hocus-pocus is the supposition that results can be accomplished without the joint adaptation to each other of human powers and physical conditions. A desire for rain may induce men to wave willow branches and to sprinkle water. The reaction is natural and innocent. But men then go on to believe that their act has immediate power to bring rain without the cooperation of intermediate conditions of nature. This is magic; while it may be natural or spontaneous it is not innocent. It obstructs intelligent study of operative conditions and wastes human desire and effort in futilities.

Belief in magic did not cease when the coarser forms of superstitious practice ceased. The principle of magic is found whenever it is hoped to get results

thout intelligent control of means; and also when it supposed that means can exist and yet remain inert d inoperative. In morals and politics such expecta- ons still prevail, and in so far the most important ases of human action are still affected by magic. We ink that by feeling strongly enough about something, wishing hard enough, we can get a desirable result, ch as virtuous execution of a good resolve, or peace ong nations, or good will in industry. We slur over e necessity of the cooperative action of objective nditions, and the fact that this cooperation is as- red only by persistent and close study. Or, on the her hand, we fancy we can get these results by ternal machinery, by tools or potential means, with- t a corresponding functioning of human desires and pacities. Often times these two false and contradic- ry beliefs are combined in the same person. The man o feels that *his* virtues are his own personal accom- ishments is likely to be also the one who thinks that passing laws he can throw the fear of God into hers and make them virtuous by edict and prohib- ory mandate.

Recently a friend remarked to me that there was one perstition current among even cultivated persons. hey suppose that if one is told what to do, if the ght *end* is pointed to them, all that is required in der to bring about the right act is will or wish on e part of the one who is to act. He used as an illus- ation the matter of physical posture; the assumption that if a man is told to stand up straight, all that

is further needed is wish and effort on his part, and the deed is done. He pointed out that this belief is on a par with primitive magic in its neglect of attention to the means which are involved in reaching an end. And he went on to say that the prevalence of this belief, starting with false notions about the control of the body and extending to control of mind and character, is the greatest bar to intelligent social progress. It bars the way because it makes us neglect intelligent inquiry to discover the means which will produce a desired result, and intelligent invention to procure the means. In short, it leaves out the importance of intelligently controlled habit.

We may cite his illustration of the real nature of a physical aim or order and its execution in its contrast with the current false notion.* A man who has a bad habitual posture tells himself, or is told, to stand up straight. If he is interested and responds, he braces himself, goes through certain movements, and it is assumed that the desired result is substantially attained and that the position is retained at least as long as the man keeps the idea or order in his mind. Consider the assumptions which are here made. It is implied that the means or effective conditions of the realization of a purpose exist independently of established habit and even that they may be set in motion in opposition to habit. It is assumed that means are there so that the failure to stand erect is wholly a matter of failure of purpose and desire. It needs paralysis of

* I refer to Alexander, "Man's Supreme Inheritance."

broken leg or some other equally gross phenomenon
make us appreciate the importance of objective
nditions.

Now in fact a man who *can* stand properly does so,
id only a man who can, does. In the former case,
its of will are unnecessary, and in the latter useless.
man who does not stand properly forms a habit of
anding improperly, a positive, forceful habit. The
mmon implication that his mistake is merely nega-
ve, that he is simply failing to do the right thing, and
at the failure can be made good by an order of will
absurd. One might as well suppose that the man
io is a slave of whiskey-drinking is merely one who
ils to drink water. Conditions have been formed for
oducing a bad result, and the bad result will occur
long as those conditions exist. They can no more
dismissed by a direct effort of will than the condi-
ons which create drought can be dispelled by whistling
r wind. It is as reasonable to expect a fire to go out
ien it is ordered to stop burning as to suppose that
man can stand straight in consequence of a direct
tion of thought and desire. The fire can be put out
ly by changing objective conditions; it is the same
th rectification of bad posture.

Of course something happens when a man acts upon
s idea of standing straight. For a little while, he
ands differently, but only a different kind of badly.
e then takes the unaccustomed feeling which accom-
nies his unusual stand as evidence that he is now
anding right. But there are many ways of standing

badly, and he has simply shifted his usual way to a compensatory bad way at some opposite extreme. When we realize this fact, we are likely to suppose that it exists because control of the *body* is physical and hence is external to mind and will. Transfer the command inside character and mind, and it is fancied that an idea of an end and the desire to realize it will take immediate effect. After we get to the point of recognizing that habits must intervene between wish and execution in the case of bodily acts, we still cherish the illusion that they can be dispensed with in the case of mental and moral acts. Thus the net result is to make us sharpen the distinction between non-moral and moral activities, and to lead us to confine the latter strictly within a private, immaterial realm. But in fact, formation of ideas as well as their execution depends upon habit. *If* we could form a correct idea without a correct habit, then possibly we could carry it out irrespective of habit. But a wish gets definite form only in connection with an idea, and an idea gets shape and consistency only when it has a habit back of it. Only when a man can already perform an act of standing straight does he know what it is like to have a right posture and only then can he summon the idea required for proper execution. The act must come before the thought, and a habit before an ability to evoke the thought at will. Ordinary psychology reverses the actual state of affairs.

Ideas, thoughts of ends, are not spontaneously generated. There is no immaculate conception of mean

gs or purposes. Reason pure of all influence from or habit is a fiction. But pure sensations out of ich ideas can be framed apart from habit are equally titious. The sensations and ideas which are the -tuff" of thought and purpose are alike affected by bits manifested in the acts which give rise to sen- tions and meanings. The dependence of thought, or e more intellectual factor in our conceptions, upon ior experience is usually admitted. But those who tack the notion of thought pure from the influence experience, usually identify experience with sensa- ns impressed upon an empty mind. They there- re replace the theory of unmixed thoughts with that of re unmixed sensations as the stuff of all conceptions, irposes and beliefs. But distinct and independent nsory qualities, far from being original elements, are e products of a highly skilled analysis which disposes immense technical scientific resources. To be able to ngle out a definitive sensory element in any field is idence of a high degree of previous training, that is, well-formed habits. A moderate amount of observa- n of a child will suffice to reveal that even such gross scriminations as black, white, red, green, are the re- lt of some years of active dealings with things in the urse of which habits have been set up. It is not such simple matter to have a clear-cut sensation. The tter is a sign of training, skill, habit.

Admission that the idea of, say, standing erect is pendent upon sensory materials is, therefore equiva- nt to recognition that it is dependent upon the

habitual attitudes which govern concrete sensory materials. The medium of habit filters all the material that reaches our perception and thought. The filter is not, however, chemically pure. It is a reagent which adds new qualities and rearranges what is received. Our ideas truly depend upon experience, but so do our sensations. And the experience upon which they both depend is the operation of habits—originally of instincts. Thus our purposes and commands regarding action (whether physical or moral) come to us through the refracting medium of bodily and moral habits. Inability to think aright is sufficiently striking to have caught the attention of moralists. But a false psychology has led them to interpret it as due to a necessary conflict of flesh and spirit, not as an indication that our ideas are as dependent, to say the least, upon our habits as are our acts upon our conscious thought and purposes.

Only the man who can maintain a correct posture has the stuff out of which to form that idea of standing erect which can be the starting point of a right act. Only the man whose habits are already good can know what the good is. Immediate, seemingly instinctive feeling of the direction and end of various lines of behavior is in reality the feeling of habits working below direct consciousness. The psychology of illusions of perception is full of illustrations of the distortion introduced by habit into observation of objects. The same fact accounts for the intuitive element in judgments of action, an element which is valuable or the

erse in accord with the quality of dominant habits. r, as Aristotle remarked, the untutored moral per- tions of a good man are usually trustworthy, those a bad character, not. (But he should have added t the influence of social custom as well as personal it has to be taken into account in estimating who he good man and the good judge.)

What is true of the dependence of execution of an a upon habit is true, then, of the formation and lity of the idea. Suppose that by a happy chance ight concrete idea or purpose—concrete, not simply rect in words—has been hit upon: What happens n one with an incorrect habit tries to act in accord h it? Clearly the idea can be carried into execution y with a mechanism already there. If this is de- tive or perverted, the best intention in the world will ld bad results. In the case of no other engine does suppose that a defective machine will turn out good ds simply because it is invited to. Everywhere else recognize that the design and structure of the agency ployed tell directly upon the work done. Given a l habit and the "will" or mental direction to get a d result, and the actual happening is a reverse or king-glass manifestation of the usual fault—a com- nsatory twist in the opposite direction. Refusal recognize this fact only leads to a separation of mind n body, and to supposing that mental or "psychi- " mechanisms are different in kind from those of lily operations and independent of them. So deep ted is this notion that even so "scientific" a theory

as modern psycho-analysis thinks that mental habit can be straightened out by some kind of purely psychical manipulation without reference to the distortion of sensation and perception which are due to bad bodily sets. The other side of the error is found in the notion of "scientific" nerve physiologists that it is only necessary to locate a particular diseased cell or local lesion independent of the whole complex of organic habits, in order to rectify conduct.

Means are means; they are intermediates, middle terms. To grasp this fact is to have done with the ordinary dualism of means and ends. The "end" is merely a series of acts viewed at a remote stage; and a means is merely the series viewed at an earlier one. The distinction of means and end arises in surveying the *course* of a proposed *line* of action, a connected series in time. The "end" is the last act thought of; the means are the acts to be performed prior to it in time. To *reach* an end we must take our mind off from it and attend to the act which is next to be performed. We must make that the end. The only exception to this statement is in cases where customary habit determines the course of the series. Then all that is wanted is a cue to set it off. But when the proposed end involves any deviation from usual action, or any rectification of it—as in the case of standing straight—then the main thing is to find some act which is different from the usual one. The discovery and performance of this unaccustomed act is the "end" to which we must devote all attention. Otherwise we shall

ply do the old thing over again, no matter what is conscious command. The only way of accomplish- this discovery is through a flank movement. We st stop even thinking of standing up straight. To ık of it is fatal, for it commits us to the operation of established habit of standing wrong. We must find act within our power which is disconnected from any ught about standing. We must start to do another ng which on one side inhibits our falling into the tomary bad position and on the other side is the inning of a series of acts which may lead into the rect posture.* The hard-drinker who keeps think- of not drinking is doing what he can to initiate the s which lead to drinking. He is starting with the nulus to his habit. To succeed he must find some itive interest or line of action which will inhibit the nking series and which by instituting another course action will bring him to his desired end. In short, man's true aim is to discover some course of action, ing nothing to do with the habit of drink or stand- erect, which will take him where he wants to go. e discovery of this other series is at once his means his end. Until one takes intermediate acts seri- ly enough to treat them as ends, one wastes one's e in any effort at change of habits. Of the inter- liate acts, the most important is the *next* one. The t or earliest means is the most important *end* to over.

*The technique of this process is stated in the book of Mr. xander already referred to, and the theoretical statement given orrowed from Mr. Alexander's analysis.

Means and ends are two names for the same realit
The terms denote not a division in reality but a di
tinction in judgment. Without understanding this fa
we cannot understand the nature of habits nor can v
pass beyond the usual separation of the moral ar
non-moral in conduct. "End" is a name for a seri
of acts taken collectively—like the term arm
"Means" is a name for the same series taken distri
utively—like this soldier, that officer. To think of th
end signifies to extend and enlarge our view of the a
to be performed. It means to look at the next act
perspective, not permitting it to occupy the entire fie
of vision. To bear the end in mind signifies that v
should not stop thinking about our *next* act until v
form some reasonably clear idea of the *course* of acti
to which it commits us. To attain a remote end mea
on the other hand to treat the end as a series of mean
To say that an end is remote or distant, to say in fa
that it is an end at all, is equivalent to saying th
obstacles intervene between us and it. If, however,
remains a distant end, it becomes a *mere* end, that is
dream. As soon as we have projected it, we must beg
to work backward in thought. We must change *wh*
is to be done into a *how*, the means whereby. T
end thus re-appears as a series of "what nexts," and t
what next of chief importance is the one nearest t
present state of the one acting. Only as the end
converted into means is it definitely conceived, or i
tellectually defined, to say nothing of being executab
Just as end, it is vague, cloudy, impressionistic. V

not *know* what we are really after until a *course* of ion is mentally worked out. Aladdin with his lamp ld dispense with translating ends into means, but no else can do so.

Now the thing which is closest to us, the means in our power, is a habit. Some habit impeded by umstances is the source of the projection of the end. s also the primary means in its realization. The it is propulsive and moves anyway toward some end, result, whether it is projected as an end-in-view or The man who can walk does walk; the man who talk does converse—if only with himself. How is statement to be reconciled with the fact that we not always walking and talking; that our habits n so often to be latent, inoperative? Such inactivity ls only of *overt*, visibly obvious operation. In uality each habit operates all the time of waking ; though like a member of a crew taking his turn the wheel, its operation becomes the dominantly racteristic trait of an act only occasionally or ely.

The habit of walking is expressed in what a man when he keeps still, even in dreams. The recog- on of distances and directions of things from his e at rest is the obvious proof of this statement. habit of locomotion is latent in the sense that it is ered up, counteracted, by a habit of seeing which is nitely at the fore. But counteraction is not sup- ssion. Locomotion is a potential energy, not in metaphysical sense, but in the physical sense in

which potential energy as well as kinetic has to be take account of in any scientific description. Everythin that a man who has the habit of locomotion does an thinks he does and thinks differently on that account This fact is recognized in current psychology, but i falsified into an association of sensations. Were it no for the continued operation of all habits in every act no such thing as character could exist. There woul be simply a bundle, an untied bundle at that, of isolate acts. Character is the interpenetration of habits. I each habit existed in an insulated compartment an operated without affecting or being affected by other character would not exist. That is, conduct would lac unity being only a juxtaposition of disconnected reac tions to separated situations. But since environment overlap, since situations are continuous and those re mote from one another contain like elements, a continu ous modification of habits by one another is constantl going on. A man may give himself away in a look o a gesture. Character can be read through the mediu of individual acts.

Of course interpenetration is never total. It is mo marked in what we call strong characters. Integratio is an achievement rather than a datum. A weak, u stable, vacillating character is one in which differe habits alternate with one another rather than embod one another. The strength, solidity of a habit is n its own possession but is due to reinforcement by th force of other habits which it absorbs into itsel Routine specialization always works against interpen

tion. Men with "pigeon-hole" minds are not in-quent. Their diverse standards and methods of igment for scientific, religious, political matters tes- to isolated compartmental habits of action. Char-er that is unable to undergo successfully the strain thought and effort required to bring competing dencies into a unity, builds up barriers between erent systems of likes and dislikes. The emotional ss incident to conflict is avoided not by readjust-nt but by effort at confinement. Yet the exception ves the rule. Such persons are successful in keeping erent ways of reacting apart from one another in sciousness rather than in action. Their character narked by stigmata resulting from this division.

The mutual modification of habits by one another bles us to define the nature of the moral situation. is not necessary nor advisable to be always consid-ng the interaction of habits with one another, that o say the effect of a particular habit upon char-er—which is a name for the total interaction. Such sideration distracts attention from the problem of ding up an effective habit. A man who is learning nch, or chess-playing or engineering has his hands with his particular occupation. He would be con-ed and hampered by constant inquiry into its effect n character. He would resemble the centipede who trying to think of the movement of each leg in re-on to all the others was rendered unable to travel. any given time, certain habits must be taken for nted as a matter of course. Their operation is not

a matter of moral judgment. They are treated a technical, recreational, professional, hygienic or ecc nomic or esthetic rather than moral. To lug in moral or ulterior effect on character at every point, is t cultivate moral valetudinarianism or priggish posing Nevertheless any act, even that one which passes ord narily as trivial, may entail such consequences for habi and character as upon occasion to require judgmen from the standpoint of the whole body of conduct. I then comes under moral scrutiny. To know when t leave acts without distinctive moral judgment an when to subject them to it is itself a large factor i morality. The serious matter is that this relativ pragmatic, or intellectual, distinction between the mora and non-moral, has been solidified into a fixed and absc lute distinction, so that some acts are popularly re garded as forever within and others forever without th moral domain. From this fatal error recognition of th relations of one habit to others preserves us. For i makes us see that character is the name given to th working interaction of habits, and that the cumulativ effect of insensible modifications worked by a particula habit in the body of preferences may at any momen require attention.

The word habit may seem twisted somewhat fro its customary use when employed as we have been usin it. But we need a word to express that kind of huma activity which is influenced by prior activity and that sense acquired; which contains within itself a ce tain ordering or systematization of minor elements

ion; which is projective, dynamic in quality, ready overt manifestation; and which is operative in some dued subordinate form even when not obviously inating activity. Habit even in its ordinary usage es nearer to denoting these facts than any other d. If the facts are recognized we may also use the ds attitude and disposition. But unless we have t made clear to ourselves the facts which have been forth under the name of habit, these words are more ly to be misleading than is the word habit. For the er conveys explicitly the sense of operativeness, ality. Attitude and, as ordinarily used, disposition gest something latent, potential, something which uires a positive stimulus outside themselves to be- e active. If we perceive that they denote positive ns of action which are released merely through oval of some counteracting "inhibitory" tendency, l then become overt, we may employ them instead of word habit to denote subdued, non-patent forms of latter.

n this case, we must bear in mind that the word osition means predisposition, readiness to act rtly in a specific fashion whenever opportunity is sented, this opportunity consisting in removal of pressure due to the dominance of some overt habit; that attitude means some special case of a pre- osition, the disposition waiting as it were to spring ough an opened door. While it is admitted that the d habit has been used in a somewhat broader sense n is usual, we must protest against the tendency in

psychological literature to limit its meaning to rep
tition. This usage is much less in accord with popul
usage than is the wider way in which we have used t
word. It assumes from the start the identity of hab
with routine. Repetition is in no sense the essence
habit. Tendency to repeat acts is an incident of ma
habits but not of all. A man with the habit of givi
way to anger may show his habit by a murderous atta
upon some one who has offended. His act is noneth
less due to habit because it occurs only once in his li
The essence of habit is an acquired predisposition
ways or modes of response, not to particular acts e
cept as, under special conditions, these express a wa
of behaving. Habit means special sensitiveness or a
cessibility to certain classes of stimuli, standing pred
lections and aversions, rather than bare recurrence
specific acts. It means will.

III

ıe dynamic force of habit taken in connection with ontinuity of habits with one another explains the of character and conduct, or speaking more con- ly of motive and act, will and deed. Moral the- have frequently separated these things from each r. One type of theory, for example, has asserted only will, disposition, motive count morally; that are external, physical, accidental; that moral good ferent from goodness in act since the latter is meas- by consequences, while moral good or virtue is in- ic, complete in itself, a jewel shining by its own —a somewhat dangerous metaphor however. The type of theory has asserted that such a view is alent to saying that all that is necessary to be ous is to cultivate states of feeling; that a pre- is put on disregard of the actual consequences nduct, and agents are deprived of any objective ion for the rightness and wrongness of acts, being n back on their own whims, prejudices and private iarities. Like most opposite extremes in philo- c theories, the two theories suffer from a common ke. Both of them ignore the projective force of and the implication of habits in one another. e they separate a unified deed into two disjoined , an inner called motive and an outer called act.

The doctrine that the chief good of man is good w
easily wins acceptance from honest men. For commo
sense employs a juster psychology than either of t
theories just mentioned. By will, common-sense unde
stands something practical and moving. It unde
stands the body of habits, of active dispositions whi
makes a man do what he does. Will is thus not son
thing opposed to consequences or severed from the
It is a *cause* of consequences; it is causation in its pe
sonal aspect, the aspect immediately preceding actio
It hardly seems conceivable to practical sense that
will is meant something which can be complete witho
reference to deeds prompted and results occasione
Even the sophisticated specialist cannot prevent
lapses from such an absurdity back into common-sen
Kant, who went the limit in excluding consequences fr
moral value, was sane enough to maintain that a socie
of men of good will would be a society which in fa
would maintain social peace, freedom and cooperatio
We take the will for the deed not as a substitute f
doing, or a form of doing nothing, but in the se
that, other things being equal, the right dispositi
will produce the right deed. For a disposition mea
a tendency to act, a potential energy needing only o
portunity to become kinetic and overt. Apart fr
such tendency a "virtuous" disposition is either h
pocrisy or self-deceit.

Common-sense in short never loses sight wholly
the two facts which limit and define a moral situati
One is that consequences fix the moral quality of

The other is that upon the whole, or in the long but not unqualifiedly, consequences are what they because of the nature of desire and disposition. re there is a natural contempt for the morality of "good" man who does not show his goodness in results of his habitual acts. But there is also an sion to attributing omnipotence to even the best ood dispositions, and hence an aversion to applying criterion of consequences unreservedly. A holiness haracter which is celebrated only on holy-days is al. A virtue of honesty, or chastity or benevo- which lives upon itself apart from definite results umes itself and goes up in smoke. The separation notive from motive-force in action accounts both the morbidities and futilities of the professionally l, and for the more or less subconscious contempt morality entertained by men of a strong executive t with their preference for "getting things done." et there is justification for the common assump- that deeds cannot be judged properly without tak- heir animating disposition as well as their concrete equences into account. The reason, however, lies in isolation of disposition from consequences, but e need for viewing consequences broadly. *This* act ly one of a multitude of acts. If we confine our- s to the consequences of this one act we shall come with a poor reckoning. Disposition is habitual, stent. It shows itself therefore in many acts and any consequences. Only as we keep a running ac- t, can we judge disposition, disentangling its ten-

dency from accidental accompaniments. When o
we have got a fair idea of its tendency, we are able
place the particular consequences of a single act in
wider context of continuing consequences. Thus
protect ourselves from taking as trivial a habit whi
is serious, and from exaggerating into momentousn
an act which, viewed in the light of aggregate con
quences, is innocent. There is no need to aband
common-sense which tells us in judging acts first
inquire into disposition; but there is great need that
estimate of disposition be enlightened by a scient
psychology. Our legal procedure, for example, w
bles between a too tender treatment of criminality
a viciously drastic treatment of it. The vacillation
be remedied only as we can analyze an act in the li
of habits, and analyze habits in the light of educati
environment and prior acts. The dawn of truly
entific criminal law will come when each individual c
is approached with something corresponding to
complete clinical record which every competent ph
cian attempts to procure as a matter of course in d
ing with his subjects.

Consequences include effects upon character, u
confirming and weakening habits, as well as tang
obvious results. To keep an eye open to these eff
upon character may signify the most reasonable
precautions or one of the most nauseating of practi
It may mean concentration of attention upon perso
rectitude in neglect of objective consequences, a p
tice which creates a wholly unreal rectitude. Bu

mean that the survey of objective consequences ly extended in time. An act of gambling may be ged, for example, by its immediate overt effects, umption of time, energy, disturbance of ordinary tary considerations, etc. It may also be judged ts consequences upon character, setting up an en- ng love of excitement, a persistent temper of spec- ion, and a persistent disregard of sober, steady . To take the latter effects into account is equiv- t to taking a broad view of future consequences; these dispositions affect future companionships, tion and avocations, the whole tenor of domestic public life.

or similar reasons, while common-sense does not run that sharp opposition of virtues or moral goods natural goods which has played such a large part ofessed moralities, it does not insist upon an exact ity of the two. Virtues are ends because they are important means. To be honest, courageous, y is to be in the way of producing specific natural s or satisfactory fulfilments. Error comes into ies when the moral goods are separated from their equences and also when the attempt is made to e an exhaustive and unerring identification of the There is a reason, valid as far as it goes, for nguishing virtue as a moral good resident in char- alone, from objective consequences. As matter ct, a desirable trait of character does not always uce desirable results, while good things often hap- with no assistance from good will. Luck, accident,

contingency, plays its part. The act of a good cha
acter is deflected in operation, while a monomaniac
egotism may employ a desire for glory and power
perform acts which satisfy crying social needs. Refle
tion shows that we must supplement the conviction
the moral connection betweeen character or habit a
consequences by two considerations.

One is the fact that we are inclined to take the n
tions of goodness in character and goodness in resul
in too fixed a way. Persistent disparity between virt
ous disposition and actual outcome shows that we ha
misjudged either the nature of virtue or of succe
Judgments of both motive and consequences are sti
in the absence of methods of scientific analysis and co
tinuous registration and reporting, rudimentary a
conventional. We are inclined to wholesale judgmen
of character, dividing men into goats and sheep, i
stead of recognizing that all character is speckled, a
that the problem of moral judgment is one of discri
inating the complex of acts and habits into tendenc
which are to be *specifically* cultivated and condemne
We need to study consequences more thoroughly a
keep track of them more continuously before we sh
be in a position where we can pass with reasonable
surance upon the good and evil in either dispositi
or results. But even when proper allowances are ma
we are forcing the pace when we assume that there is
ever can be an exact equation of disposition and o
come. We have to admit the rôle of accident.

We cannot get beyond tendencies, and must perfo

ıtent ourselves with judgments of tendency. The nest man, we are told, acts upon "principle" and from considerations of expediency, that is, of par-ılar consequences. The truth in this saying is that is not safe to judge the worth of a proposed act its probable consequences in an isolated case. The rd "principle" is a eulogistic cover for the fact of *dency.* The word "tendency" is an attempt to ıbine two facts, one that habits have a certain causal acy, the other that their outworking in any partic-r case is subject to contingencies, to circumstances ch are unforeseeable and which carry an act one e of its usual effect. In cases of doubt, there is no ourse save to stick to "tendency," that is, to the bable effect of a habit in the long run, or as we say on the whole. Otherwise we are on the lookout for ceptions which favor our immediate desire. The uble is that we are not content with modest proba-ties. So when we find that a good disposition may rk out badly, we say, as Kant did, that the working-, the consequence, has nothing to do with the moral ılity of an act, or we strain for the impossible, and at some infallible calculus of consequences by which measure moral worth in each specific case.

Human conceit has played a great part. It has nanded that the whole universe be judged from the ndpoint of desire and disposition, or at least from t of the desire and disposition of the good man. The ct of religion has been to cherish this conceit by king men think that the universe invariably conspires

to support the good and bring the evil to naught. By a subtle logic, the effect has been to render morals unrea and transcendental. For since the world of actual ex perience does not guarantee this identity of characte and outcome, it is inferred that there must be som ulterior truer reality which enforces an equation tha is violated in this life. Hence the common notion of an other world in which vice and virtue of character pro duce their exact moral meed. The idea is equally found as an actuating force in Plato. Moral realities must b supreme. Yet they are flagrantly contradicted in world where a Socrates drinks the hemlock of the crim inal, and where the vicious occupy the seats of th mighty. Hence there must be a truer ultimate realit in which justice is only and absolutely justice. Some thing of the same idea lurks behind every aspiratio for realization of abstract justice or equality or lib erty. It is the source of all "idealistic" utopias an also of all wholesale pessimism and distrust of life

Utilitarianism illustrates another way of mistreatin the situation. Tendency is not good enough for th utilitarians. They want a mathematical equation o act and consequence. Hence they make light of th steady and controllable factor, the factor of dispos tion, and fasten upon just the things which are mos subject to incalculable accident—pleasures and pains— and embark upon the hopeless enterprise of judging a act apart from character on the basis of definite result An honestly modest theory will stick to the probabi ities of tendency, and not import mathematics int

orals. It will be alive and sensitive to consequences they actually present themselves, because it knows at they give the only instruction we can procure as the meaning of habits and dispositions. But it will ver assume that a moral judgment which reaches cer-inty is possible. We have just to do the best we can th habits, the forces most under our control; and shall have our hands more than full in spelling out ir general tendencies without attempting an exact lgment upon each deed. For every habit incorpo-tes within itself some part of the objective environ-nt, and no habit and no amount of habits can in-rporate the entire environment within itself or them-ves. There will always be disparity between them d the results actually attained. Hence the work of elligence in observing consequences and in revising d readjusting habits, even the best of good habits, n never be foregone. Consequences reveal unexpected tentialities in our habits whenever these habits are ercised in a different environment from that in which ey were formed. The assumption of a stably uniform vironment (even the hankering for one) expresses a tion due to attachment to old habits. The utilitarian eory of equation of acts with consequences is as much fiction of self-conceit as is the assumption of a fixed anscendental world wherein moral ideals are eternally d immutably real. Both of them deny in effect the evancy of time, of change, to morals, while time is the essence of the moral struggle.

We thus come, by an unexpected path, upon the old

question of the objectivity or subjectivity of morals Primarily they are objective. For will, as we have seen, means, in the concrete, habits; and habits incorporate an environment within themselves. They are adjustments *of* the environment, not merely *to* it. At the same time, the environment is many, not one; hence will, disposition, is plural. Diversity does not of itself imply conflict, but it implies the possibility of conflict and this possibility is realized in fact. Life, for example, involves the habit of eating, which in turn involves a unification of organism and nature. But nevertheless this habit comes into conflict with other habits which are also "objective," or in equilibrium with *their* environments. Because the environment is not all of one piece, man's house is divided within itself, against itself. Honor or consideration for others or courtesy conflicts with hunger. Then the notion of the complete objectivity of morals gets a shock. Those who wish to maintain the idea unimpaired take the road which leads to transcendentalism. The empirical world, they say, is indeed divided, and hence any natural morality must be in conflict with itself. This self-contradiction however only points to a higher fixed reality with which a true and superior morality is alone concerned. Objectivity is saved but at the expense of connection with human affairs. Our problem is to see what objectivity signifies upon a naturalistic basis; how morals are objective and yet secular and social. Then we may be able to decide in what crisis of experience morals be

me legitimately dependent upon character or self—
at is, "subjective."

Prior discussion points the way to the answer. A
ngry man could not conceive food as a good unless
had actually experienced, with the support of en-
oning conditions, food as good. The objective sat-
action comes first. But he finds himself in a situ-
ion where the good is denied in fact. It then lives in
agination. The habit denied overt expression asserts
elf in idea. It sets up the thought, the ideal, of
od. This thought is not what is sometimes called
ought, a pale bloodless abstraction, but is charged
th the motor urgent force of habit. Food as a good
now subjective, personal. But it has its source in
jective conditions and it moves forward to new ob-
ctive conditions. For it works to secure a change of
vironment so that food will again be present in fact.
od is a "subjective" good during a temporary tran-
ional stage from one object to another.

The analogy with morals lies upon the surface. A
bit impeded in overt operation continues nonetheless
operate. It manifests itself in desireful thought,
at is in an ideal or imagined object which embodies
thin itself the force of a frustrated habit. There is
erefore demand for a changed environment, a demand
ich can be achieved only by some modification and
arrangement of old habits. Even Plato preserves an
imation of the natural function of ideal objects when
insists upon their value as patterns for use in re-

organization of the actual scene. The pity is that h could not see that patterns exist only within and fo the sake of reorganization, so that they, rather tha empirical or natural objects, are the instrumental af fairs. Not seeing this, he converted a function o reorganization into a metaphysical reality. If we essa a technical formulation we shall say that morality be comes legitimately subjective or personal when activ ities which once included objective factors in their oper ation temporarily lose support from objects, and ye strive to change existing conditions until they regai a support which has been lost. It is all of a kin with the doings of a man, who remembering a pric satisfaction of thirst and the conditions under whic it occurred, digs a well. For the time being water i reference to his activity exists in imagination not i fact. But this imagination is not a self-generated, sel enclosed, psychical existence. It is the persistent op eration of a prior object which has been incorporate in effective habit. There is no miracle in the fact tha an object in a new context operates in a new way.

Of transcendental morals, it may at least be sa that they retain the intimation of the objective cha acter of purposes and goods. Purely subjective mora arise when the incidents of the temporary (though r current) crisis of reorganization are taken as comple and final in themselves. A self having habits and at tudes formed with the cooperation of objects ru ahead of immediately surrounding objects to effect new equilibration. Subjective morals substitutes a s

ays set over against objects and generating its
als independently of objects, and in permanent, not
nsitory, opposition to them. Achievement, any
ievement, is to it a negligible second best, a cheap
l poor substitute for ideals that live only in the
nd, a compromise with actuality made from physical
essity not from moral reasons. In truth, there is
a temporal episode. For a time, a self, a person,
rries in his own habits against the forces of the im-
diate environment, a good which the existing en-
onment denies. For this self moving temporarily, in
lation from objective conditions, between a good, a
npleteness, that has been and one that it is hoped
restore in some new form, subjective theories have
stituted an erring soul wandering hopelessly between
Paradise Lost in the dim past and a Paradise to be
gained in a dim future. In reality, even when a
rson is in some respects at odds with his environment
l so has to act for the time being as the sole agent
a good, he in many respects is still supported by
ective conditions and is in possession of undisturbed
ds and virtues. Men do die from thirst at times,
upon the whole in their search for water they are
tained by other fulfilled powers. But subjective
rals taken wholesale sets up a solitary self without
ective ties and sustenance. In fact, there exists a
fting mixture of vice and virtue. Theories paint a
ld with a God in heaven and a Devil in hell. Mor-
ts in short have failed to recall that a severance of
ral desire and purpose from immediate actualities

is an inevitable phase of activity when habits persist while the world which they have incorporated alters. Back of this failure lies the failure to recognize that in a changing world, old habits must perforce need modification, no matter how good they have been.

Obviously any such change can be only experimental. The lost objective good persists in habit, but it can recur in objective form only through some condition of affairs which has not been yet experienced and which therefore can be anticipated only uncertainly and inexactly. The essential point is that anticipation should at least guide as well as stimulate effort, that it should be a working hypothesis corrected and developed by events as action proceeds. There was a time when men believed that each object in the external world carried its nature stamped upon it as a form, and that intelligence consisted in simply inspecting and reading off an intrinsic self-enclosed complete nature. The scientific revolution which began in the seventeenth century came through a surrender of this point of view. It began with recognition that every natural object is in truth an event continuous in space and time with other events; and is to be *known* only by experimental inquiries which will exhibit a multitude of complicated, obscure and minute relationships. Any observed form or object is but a challenge. The case is not otherwise with ideals of justice or peace or human brotherhood, or equality, or order. They too are not things self-enclosed to be known by introspection, as objects were once supposed to be known by rational in-

nt. Like thunderbolts and tubercular disease and rainbow they can be known only by extensive and ute observation of consequences incurred in action. alse psychology of an isolated self and a subjective ality shuts out from morals the things important it, acts and habits in their objective consequences. the same time it misses the point characteristic of personal subjective aspect of morality: the signifi- ce of desire and thought in breaking down old dities of habit and preparing the way for acts that reate an environment.

IV

We often fancy that institutions, social custom, co lective habit, have been formed by the consolidation c individual habits. In the main this supposition is fals to fact. To a considerable extent customs, or wid spread uniformities of habit, exist because individua face the same situation and react in like fashion. Bu to a larger extent customs persist because individua form their personal habits under conditions set by pric customs. An individual usually acquires the moralit as he inherits the speech of his social group. Th activities of the group are already there, and son assimilation of his own acts to their pattern is a pr requisite of a share therein, and hence of having an part in what is going on. Each person is born a infant, and every infant is subject from the first breat he draws and the first cry he utters to the attentio and demands of others. These others are not ju persons in general with minds in general. They a beings with habits, and beings who upon the whc esteem the habits they have, if for no other reason th that, having them, their imagination is thereby lir ited. The nature of habit is to be assertive, insisten self-perpetuating. There is no miracle in the fact th if a child learns any language he learns the langua that those about him speak and teach, especially sin his ability to speak that language is a pre-condition

entering into effective connection with them, making
ts known and getting them satisfied. Fond parents
relatives frequently pick up a few of the child's
ntaneous modes of speech and for a time at least
y are portions of the speech of the group. But the
o which such words bear to the total vocabulary
se gives a fair measure of the part played by purely
vidual habit in forming custom in comparison with
part played by custom in forming individual habits.
persons have either the energy or the wealth to
d private roads to travel upon. They find it con-
ent, "natural," to use the roads that are already
e; while unless their private roads connect at some
it with the high-way they cannot build them even
hey would.

These simple facts seem to me to give a simple ex-
nation of matters that are often surrounded with
tery. To talk about the priority of "society" to
individual is to indulge in nonsensical metaphysics.
to say that some pre-existent association of human
gs is prior to every particular human being who is
n into the world is to mention a commonplace.
se associations are definite modes of interaction of
sons with one another; that is to say they form
toms, institutions. There is no problem in all his-
so artificial as that of how "individuals" manage
orm "society." The problem is due to the pleasure
n in manipulating concepts, and discussion goes
because concepts are kept from inconvenient con-
with facts. The facts of infancy and sex have

only to be called to mind to see how manufactured a the conceptions which enter into this particula problem.

The problem, however, of how those establishe and more or less deeply grooved systems of interactio which we call social groups, big and small, modify th activities of individuals who perforce are caught-u within them, and how the activities of component ind viduals remake and redirect previously established cu toms is a deeply significant one. Viewed from the stan point of custom and its priority to the formation habits in human beings who are born babies and gra ually grow to maturity, the facts which are now usuall assembled under the conceptions of collective mind group-minds, national-minds, crowd-minds, etc., et lose the mysterious air they exhale when mind thought of (as orthodox psychology teaches us to thi of it) as something which precedes action. It is di ficult to see that collective mind means anything mo than a custom brought at some point to explicit, e phatic consciousness, emotional or intellectual.*

* Mob psychology comes under the same principles, but in negative aspect. The crowd and mob express a disintegration habits which releases impulse and renders persons susceptib to immediate stimuli, rather than such a functioning of habi as is found in the mind of a club or school of thought or political party. Leaders of an organization, that is of an int action having settled habits, may, however, in order to put o some schemes deliberately resort to stimuli which will bre through the crust of ordinary custom and release impulses such a scale as to create a mob psychology. Since fear is normal reaction to the unfamiliar, dread and suspicion are t forces most played upon to accomplish this result, together wi vast vague contrary hopes. This is an ordinary technique excited political campaigns, in starting war, etc. But an assi

he family into which one is born is a family in a
ge or city which interacts with other more or less
grated systems of activity, and which includes a
rsity of groupings within itself, say, churches, po-
al parties, clubs, cliques, partnerships, trade-
ns, corporations, etc. If we start with the tradi-
al notion of mind as something complete in itself,
we may well be perplexed by the problem of how
mmon mind, common ways of feeling and believing
purposing, comes into existence and then forms
e groups. The case is quite otherwise if we
gnize that in any case we must start with grouped
on, that is, with some fairly settled system of inter-
on among individuals. The problem of origin and
elopment of the various groupings, or definite cus-
s, in existence at any particular time in any par-
lar place is not solved by reference to psychic
ses, elements, forces. It is to be solved by reference
facts of action, demand for food, for houses, for a

n like that of Le Bon of the psychology of democracy to the
hology of a crowd in overriding individual judgment shows
of psychological insight. A political democracy exhibits
verriding of thought like that seen in any convention or in-
tion. That is, thought is submerged in habit. In the crowd
mob, it is submerged in undefined emotion. China and Japan
bit crowd psychology more frequently than do western demo-
ic countries. Not in my judgment because of any essentially
ntal psychology but because of a nearer background of rigid
solid customs conjoined with the phenomena of a period of
sition. The introduction of many novel stimuli creates occa-
s where habits afford no ballast. Hence great waves of emo-
easily sweep through masses. Sometimes they are waves of
usiasm for the new; sometimes of violent reaction against
oth equally undiscriminating. The war has left behind it
mewhat similar situation in western countries.

mate, for some one to talk to and to listen to one tall for control of others, demands which are all intensifie by the fact already mentioned that each person begin a helpless, dependent creature. I do not mean of cours that hunger, fear, sexual love, gregariousness, sym pathy, parental love, love of bossing and of being or dered about, imitation, etc., play no part. But I d mean that these words do not express elements or force which are psychic or mental in their first intentio They denote *ways of behavior*. These ways of behavin involve interaction, that is to say, and prior grouping And to understand the existence of organized ways o habits we surely need to go to physics, chemistry an physiology rather than to psychology.

There is doubtless a great mystery as to why an such thing as being conscious should exist at all. Bu *if* consciousness exists at all, there is no mystery in i being connected with what it is connected with. Tha is to say, if an activity which is an interaction of var ous factors, or a grouped activity, comes to consciou ness it seems natural that it should take the form an emotion, belief or purpose that reflects the inte action, that it should be an "our" consciousness or "my" consciousness. And by this is meant both th it will be shared by those who are implicated in t associative custom, or more or less alike in them a and that it will be felt or thought to concern others well as one's self. A family-custom or organized hab of action comes into contact and conflict for examp with that of some other family. The emotions of ru

pride, the belief about superiority or being "as
d as other people," the intention to hold one's own
naturally *our* feeling and idea of *our* treatment and
ition. Substitute the Republican party or the
erican nation for the family and the general situ-
on remains the same. The conditions which de-
nine the nature and extent of the particular group-
in question are matters of supreme import. But
y are not as such subject-matter of psychology, but
the history of politics, law, religion, economics, in-
tion, the technology of communication and inter-
rse. Psychology comes in as an indispensable tool.
it enters into the matter of understanding these
ious special topics, not into the question of what
chic forces form a collective mind and therefore a
ial group. That way of stating the case puts the
t a long way before the horse, and naturally gathers
curities and mysteries to itself. In short, the pri-
y facts of social psychology center about collective
it, custom. In addition to the general psychology
abit—which *is* general not individual in any intel-
ble sense of that word—we need to find out just
different customs shape the desires, beliefs, pur-
es of those who are affected by them. The problem
social psychology is not how either individual or
ective mind forms social groups and customs, but
different customs, established interacting arrange-
ts, form and nurture different minds. From this
eral statement we return to our special problem,
ch is how the rigid character of past custom has

unfavorably influenced beliefs, emotions and purpose having to do with morals.

We come back to the fact that individuals begin thei career as infants. For the plasticity of the young pre sents a temptation to those having greater experienc and hence greater power which they rarely resist. I seems putty to be molded according to current designs That plasticity also means power to change prevailing custom is ignored. Docility is looked upon not as abil ity to learn whatever the world has to teach, but a subjection to those instructions of others which reflec *their* current habits. To be truly docile is to be eage to learn all the lessons of active, inquiring, expandin experience. The inert, stupid quality of current cus toms perverts learning into a willingness to follo where others point the way, into conformity, constric tion, surrender of scepticism and experiment. Whe we think of the docility of the young we first think o the stocks of information adults wish to impose an the ways of acting they want to reproduce. Then w think of the insolent coercions, the insinuating briberie the pedagogic solemnities by which the freshness o youth can be faded and its vivid curiosities dulle Education becomes the art of taking advantage of th helplessness of the young; the forming of habits b comes a guarantee for the maintenance of hedges c custom.

Of course it is not wholly forgotten that habits a abilities, arts. Any striking exhibition of acquire skill in physical matters, like that of an acrobat c

liard-player, arouses universal admiration. But we
e to have innovating power limited to technical mat-
s and reserve our admiration for those manifestations
t display virtuosity rather than virtue. In moral
tters it is assumed that it is enough if some ideal has
n exemplified in the life of a leader, so that it is now
part of others to follow and reproduce. For every
nch of conduct, there is a Jesus or Buddha, a Na-
eon or Marx, a Froebel or Tolstoi, whose pattern
action, exceeding our own grasp, is reduced to a
ctical copy-size by passage through rows and
ws of lesser leaders.

The notion that it suffices if the idea, the end, is
sent in the mind of some authority dominates formal
ooling. It permeates the unconscious education de-
ed from ordinary contact and intercourse. Where
lowing is taken to be normal, moral originality is
tty sure to be eccentric. But if independence were
rule, originality would be subjected to severe, ex-
imental tests and be saved from cranky eccentricity,
it now is in say higher mathematics. The regime
ustom assumes that the outcome is the same whether
individual understands what he is about or whether
goes through certain motions while mouthing the
ds of others—repetition of formulæ being esteemed
greater importance, upon the whole, than repetition
leeds. To say what the sect or clique or class says
he way of proving that one also understands and
oves what the clique clings to. In theory, democ-
y should be a means of stimulating original thought,

and of evoking action deliberately adjusted in advanc
to cope with new forces. In fact it is still so immatur
that its main effect is to multiply occasions for imita
tion. If progress in spite of this fact is more rapi
than in other social forms, it is by accident, since th
diversity of models conflict with one another an
thus give individuality a chance in the resulting chao
of opinions. Current democracy acclaims success mor
boisterously than do other social forms, and surround
failure with a more reverberating train of echoes. Bu
the prestige thus given excellence is largely adventi
tious. The achievement of thought attracts others no
so much intrinsically as because of an eminence due t
multitudinous advertising and a swarm of imitators.

Even liberal thinkers have treated habit as esser
tially, not because of the character of existing custom
conservative. In fact only in a society dominated b
modes of belief and admiration fixed by past custom i
habit any more conservative than it is progressive.
all depends upon its quality. Habit is an ability, a
art, formed through past experience. But whether a
ability is limited to repetition of past acts adopted t
past conditions or is available for new emergencie
depends wholly upon what kind of habit exists. Th
tendency to think that only "bad" habits are di
serviceable and that bad habits are conventionall
enumerable, conduces to make all habits more or le
bad. For what makes a habit bad is enslavement t
old ruts. The common notion that enslavement to goo
ends converts mechanical routine into good is

ation of the principle of moral goodness. It iden-
s morality with what *was* sometime rational, pos-
y in some prior experience of one's own, but more
bably in the experience of some one else who is now
dly set up as a final authority. The genuine heart
reasonableness (and of goodness in conduct) lies
ffective mastery of the conditions which *now* enter
action. To be satisfied with repeating, with trav-
ng the ruts which in other conditions led to good,
he surest way of creating carelessness about present
actual good.

'onsider what happens to thought when habit is
ely power to repeat acts without thought. Where
s thought exist and operate when it is excluded from
itual activities? Is not such thought of necessity
t out from effective power, from ability to control
ects and command events? Habits deprived of
ught and thought which is futile are two sides of the
ne fact. To laud habit as conservative while prais-
thought as the main spring of progress is to take
surest course to making thought abstruse and
levant and progress a matter of accident and catas-
phe. The concrete fact behind the current separa-
of body and mind, practice and theory, actualities
ideals, is precisely this separation of habit and
ght. Thought which does not exist within ordinary
its of action lacks means of execution. In lacking
lication, it also lacks test, criterion. Hence it is
demned to a separate realm. If we try to act upon
our actions are clumsy, forced. In fact, contrary

habits (as we have already seen) come into operation and betray our purpose. After a few such experiences it is subconsciously decided that thought is too precious and high to be exposed to the contingencies of action. It is reserved for separate uses; thought feeds only thought not action. Ideals must not run the risk of contamination and perversion by contact with actual conditions. Thought then either resorts to specialized and technical matters influencing action in the library or laboratory alone, or else it becomes sentimentalized.

Meantime there are certain "practical" men who combine thought and habit and who are effectual. Their thought is about their own advantage; and their habits correspond. They dominate the actual situation. They encourage routine in others, and they also subsidize such thought and learning as are kept remote from affairs. This they call sustaining the standard of the ideal. Subjection they praise as team-spirit, loyalty, devotion, obedience, industry, law-and-order. But the temper respect for law—by which they mean the order of the existing status—on the part of others with most skilful and thoughtful manipulation of it in behalf of their own ends. While they denounce as subversive anarchy signs of independent thought, of thinking for themselves, on the part of others lest such thought disturb the conditions by which they profit, they think quite literally *for* themselves, that is, *of* themselves. This is the eternal game of the practical men. Hence it is only by accident that the separate and endowed

hought " of professional thinkers leaks out into ac-
n and affects custom.

For thinking cannot itself escape the influence of
it, any more than anything else human. If it is not
art of ordinary habits, then it is a separate habit,
it alongside other habits, apart from them, as
ated and indurated as human structure permits.
ory is a possession of the theorist, intellect of the
llectualist. The so-called separation of theory and
ctice means in fact the separation of two kinds of
ctice, one taking place in the outdoor world, the
er in the study. The habit of thought commands
e materials (as every habit must do) but the ma-
als are technical, books, words. Ideas are objecti-
in action but speech and writing monopolize their
of action. Even then subconscious pains are
en to see that the words used are not too widely
erstood. Intellectual habits like other habits de-
id an environment, but the environment is the study,
ary, laboratory and academy. Like other habits
produce external results, possessions. Some men
uire ideas and knowledge as other men acquire mon-
y wealth. While practising thought for their own
ial ends they deprecate it for the untrained and
table masses for whom " habits," that is unthinking
tines, are necessities. They favor popular educa-
—up to the point of disseminating as matter of
noritative information for the many what the few
e established by thought, and up to the point of

converting an original docility to the new into a docility to repeat and to conform.

Yet all habit involves mechanization. Habit is impossible without setting up a mechanism of action physiologically engrained, which operates "spontaneously," automatically, whenever the cue is given. But mechanization is not of necessity *all* there is to habit. Consider the conditions under which the first serviceable abilities of life are formed. When a child begins to walk he acutely observes, he intently and intensely experiments. He looks to see what is going to happen and he keeps curious watch on every incident. What others do, the assistance they give, the models they set operate not as limitations but as encouragements to his own acts, reinforcements of personal perception and endeavor. The first toddling is a romantic adventuring into the unknown; and every gained power is a delightful discovery of one's own powers and of the wonders of the world. We may not be able to retain in adult habits this zest of intelligence and this freshness of satisfaction in newly discovered powers. But there is surely a middle term between a normal exercise of power which includes some excursion into the unknown, and a mechanical activity hedged within a drab world. Even in dealing with inanimate machines we rank that invention higher which adapts its movements to varying conditions.

All life operates through a mechanism, and the higher the form of life the more complex, sure and flexible the mechanism. This fact alone should save

from opposing life and mechanism, thereby reducing
latter to unintelligent automatism and the former
an aimless splurge. How delicate, prompt, sure and
ied are the movements of a violin player or an en-
ver! How unerringly they phrase every shade of
otion and every turn of idea! Mechanism is indis-
sable. If each act has to be consciously searched
at the moment and intentionally performed, exe-
ion is painful and the product is clumsy and halting.
vertheless the difference between the artist and the
e technician is unmistakeable. The artist is a mas-
ful technician. The technique or mechanism is fused
h thought and feeling. The "mechanical" per-
mer permits the mechanism to dictate the perform-
e. It is absurd to say that the latter exhibits habit
the former not. We are confronted with two kinds
habit, intelligent and routine. All life has its élan,
only the prevalence of dead habits deflects life into
e élan.

Yet the current dualism of mind and body, thought
action, is so rooted that we are taught (and science
aid to support the teaching) that the art, the habit,
the artist is acquired by previous mechanical exer-
s of repetition in which skill apart from thought is
aim, until suddenly, magically, this soulless mechan-
is taken possession of by sentiment and imagination
it becomes a flexible instrument of mind. The fact,
scientific fact, is that even in his exercises, his prac-
for skill, an artist uses an art he already has. He
uires greater skill because practice *of* skill is more

important to him than practice *for* skill. Otherwis natural endowment would count for nothing, an sufficient mechanical exercise would make any on an expert in any field. A flexible, sensitive habit grow more varied, more adaptable by practice and use. W do not as yet fully understand the physiological fac tors concerned in mechanical routine on one hand an artistic skill on the other, but we do know that th latter is just as much habit as is the forme Whether it concerns the cook, musician, carpenter, cit izen, or statesman, the intelligent or artistic habit i the desirable thing, and the routine the undesirabl thing:—or, at least, desirable and undesirable fro every point of view except one.

Those who wish a monopoly of social power fin desirable the separation of habit and thought, actio and soul, so characteristic of history. For the dualis enables them to do the thinking and planning, whil others remain the docile, even if awkward, instrument of execution. Until this scheme is changed, democrac is bound to be perverted in realization. With ou present system of education—by which something muc more extensive than schooling is meant—democrac multiplies occasions for imitation not occasions fo thought in action. If the visible result is rather messy confusion than an ordered discipline of habits, i is because there are so many models of imitation set u that they tend to cancel one another, so that individ uals have the advantage neither of uniform trainin nor of intelligent adaptation. Whence an intellectu

, the one with whom thinking is itself a segregated
t, infers that the choice is between muss-and-
dling and a bureaucracy. He prefers the latter,
gh under some other name, usually an aristocracy
ılent and intellect, possibly a dictatorship of the
etariat.

has been repeatedly stated that the current philo-
ical dualism of mind and body, of spirit and mere
ard doing, is ultimately but an intellectual reflex
ıe social divorce of routine habit from thought, of
ıs from ends, practice from theory. One hardly
vs whether most to admire the acumen with which
gson has penetrated through the accumulation of
ric technicalities to this essential fact, or to de-
e the artistic skill with which he has recommended
division and the metaphysical subtlety with which
as striven to establish its necessary and unchange-
nature. For the latter tends to confirm and sanc-
the dualism in all its obnoxiousness. In the end,
ever, detection, discovery, is the main thing. To
sage the relation of spirit, life, to matter, body,
ı effect an affair of a force which outruns habit
e it leaves a trail of routine habits behind it, will
y turn out in the end to imply the acknowledg-
of the need of a continuous unification of spirit
habit, rather than to be a sanction of their di-
e. And when Bergson carries the implicit logic
ıe point of a clear recognition that upon this basis
rete intelligence is concerned with the habits
h incorporate and deal with objects, and that noth-

ing remains to spirit, pure thought, except a blind c
ward push or impetus, the net conclusion is surely t
need of revision of the fundamental premiss of sep
ration of soul and habit. A blind creative force is
likely to turn out to be destructive as creative; the vi
élan may delight in war rather than in the laborio
arts of civilization, and a mystic intuition of an ungoi
splurge be a poor substitute for the detailed work of
intelligence embodied in custom and institution, c
which creates by means of flexible continuous contr
ances of reorganization. For the eulogistic qualit
which Bergson attributes to the *élan vital* flow not fr
its nature but from a reminiscence of the optimism
romanticism, an optimism which is only the reverse s
of pessimism about actualities. A spiritual life wh
is nothing but a blind urge separated from thou
(which is said to be confined to mechanical m
nipulation of material objects for personal uses)
likely to have the attributes of the Devil in spite of
being ennobled with the name of God.

V

or practical purposes morals mean customs, folk-, established collective habits. This is a common- of the anthropologist, though the moral theorist rally suffers from an illusion that his own place day is, or ought to be, an exception. But always everywhere customs supply the standards for per- l activities. They are the pattern into which in- lual activity must weave itself. This is as true y as it ever was. But because of present mobility interminglings of customs, an individual is now ed an enormous range of custom-patterns, and can cise personal ingenuity in selecting and rearranging elements. In short he can, if he will, intelligently ot customs to conditions, and thereby remake them. oms in any case constitute moral standards. For are active demands for certain ways of acting. y habit creates an unconscious expectation. It s a certain outlook. What psychologists have la- ously treated under the caption of association of has little to do with ideas and everything to do the influence of habit upon recollection and per- on. A habit, a routine habit, when interfered with rates uneasiness, sets up a protest in favor of ration and a sense of need of some expiatory act, lse it goes off in casual reminiscence. It is the

essence of routine to insist upon its own continuatio
Breach of it is violation of right. Deviation from
is transgression.

All that metaphysics has said about the nisus
Being to conserve its essence and all that a myth
logical psychology has said about a special instinct
self-preservation is a cover for the persistent se
assertion of habit. Habit is energy organized in ce
tain channels. When interfered with, it swells as r
sentment and as an avenging force. To say that
will be obeyed, that custom makes law, that *nomos*
lord of all, is after all only to say that habit is hab
Emotion is a perturbation from clash or failure
habit, and reflection, roughly speaking, is the painf
effort of disturbed habits to readjust themselves.
is a pity that Westermarck in his monumental colle
tion of facts which show the connection of custom wi
morals* is still so much under the influence of curre
subjective psychology that he misstates the point
his data. For although he recognizes the objectivi
of custom, he treats sympathetic resentment and a
probation as distinctive inner feelings or conscio
states which give rise to acts. In his anxiety to d
place an unreal rational source of morals he sets up
equally unreal emotional basis. In truth, feelings
well as reason spring up within action. Breach of cu
tom or habit is the source of sympathetic resentme
while overt approbation goes out to fidelity to cust
maintained under exceptional circumstances.

* "The Origin and Development of Moral Ideas."

hose who recognize the place of custom in lower
l forms generally regard its presence in civilized
ty as a mere survival. Or, like Sumner, they fancy
to recognize its abiding place is equivalent to the
l of all rationality and principle to morality;
alent to the assertion of blind, arbitrary forces
fe. In effect, this point of view has already
dealt with. It overlooks the fact that the real
sition is not between reason and habit but between
ne, unintelligent habit, and intelligent habit or
Even a savage custom may be reasonable in that
adapted to social needs and uses. Experience may
to such adaptation a conscious recognition of it,
hen the custom of rationality is added to a prior
m.

ternal reasonableness or adaptation to ends pre-
reasonableness of mind. This is only to say that
orals as well as in physics things have to be there
e we perceive them, and that rationality of mind
t an original endowment but is the offspring of
course with objective adaptations and relations—
w which under the influence of a conception of
ing the like by the like has been distorted into
onic and other objective idealisms. Reason as
vation of an adaptation of acts to valuable re-
is not however a mere idle mirroring of pre-
nt facts. It is an additional event having its own
r. It sets up a heightened emotional appreciation
provides a new motive for fidelities previously blind.
ts up an attitude of criticism, of inquiry, and

makes men sensitive to the brutalities and extrav
gancies of customs. In short, it becomes a custom
expectation and outlook, an active demand for reaso
ableness in other customs. The reflective disposition
not self-made nor a gift of the gods. It arises in so
exceptional circumstance out of social customs, as
see in the case of the Greeks. But when it has be
generated it establishes a new custom, which is capa
of exercising the most revolutionary influence up
other customs.

Hence the growing importance of personal ratio
ality or intelligence, in moral theory if not in practi
That current customs contradict one another, th
many of them are unjust, and that without critici
none of them is fit to be the guide of life was the d
covery with which the Athenian Socrates initiated c
scious moral theorizing. Yet a dilemma soon presen
itself, one which forms the burden of Plato's ethi
writings. How shall thought which is personal arr
at standards which hold good for all, which, in mod
phrase, are objective? The solution found by Pl
was that reason is itself objective, universal, cos
and makes the individual soul its vehicle. The res
however, was merely to substitute a metaphysical
transcendental ethics for the ethics of custom. If Pl
had been able to see that reflection and criticism exp
a conflict of customs, and that their purport and o
is to re-organize, re-adjust customs, the subsequ
course of moral theory would have been very differ
Custom would have provided needed objective and

tial ballast, and personal rationality or reflective
ligence been treated as the necessary organ of
rimental initiative and creative invention in re-
ng custom.

e have another difficulty to face: a greater wave
to overwhelm us. It is said that to derive moral
lards from social customs is to evacuate the latter
l authority. Morals, it is said, imply the subordi-
on of fact to ideal consideration, while the view pre-
d makes morals secondary to bare fact, which is
l to depriving them of dignity and jurisdiction.
objection has the force of the custom of moral
rists behind it; and therefore in its denial of cus-
avails itself of the assistance of the notion it at-
s. The criticism rests upon a false separation.
gues in effect that either ideal standards antecede
oms and confer their moral quality upon them, or
in being subsequent to custom and evolved from
, they are mere accidental by-products. But how
the case stand with language? Men did not in-
language; they did not have social objects con-
isly in view when they began to talk, nor did they
grammatical and phonetic principles before them
hich to regulate their efforts at communication.
e things come after the fact and because of it.
guage grew out of unintelligent babblings, instinc-
notions called gestures, and the pressure of circum-
ce. But nevertheless language once called into ex-
ce is language and operates as language. It op-
s not to perpetuate the forces which produced it

but to modify and redirect them. It has such tr scendent importance that pains are taken with its u Literatures are produced, and then a vast appara of grammar, rhetoric, dictionaries, literary critici reviews, essays, a derived literature *ad lib.* Educati schooling, becomes a necessity; literacy an end. short language when it is produced meets old needs a opens new possibilities. It creates demands which t effect, and the effect is not confined to speech and erature, but extends to the common life in commu cation, counsel and instruction.

What is said of the institution of language ho good of every institution. Family life, property, le forms, churches and schools, academies of art and ence did not originate to serve conscious ends nor their generation regulated by consciousness of pr ciples of reason and right. Yet each institution brought with its development demands, expectatio rules, standards. These are not mere embellishme of the forces which produced them, idle decorations the scene. They are additional forces. They rec struct. They open new avenues of endeavor and imp new labors. In short they are civilization, cult morality.

Still the question recurs: What authority have sta ards and ideas which have originated in this w What claim have they upon us? In one se the question is unanswerable. In the same se however, the question is unanswerable what origin and sanction is ascribed to moral obligati

loyalties. Why attend to metaphysical and
ıscendental ideal realities even if we concede they
the authors of moral standards? Why do this act
feel like doing something else? Any moral question
reduce itself to this question if we so choose.
in an empirical sense the answer is simple. The
ıority is that of life. Why employ language, cul-
te literature, acquire and develop science, sustain
ıstry, and submit to the refinements of art? To
these questions is equivalent to asking: Why live?
the only answer is that if one is going to live one
t live a life of which these things form the sub-
ıce. The only question having sense which can be
d is *how* we are going to use and be used by these
gs, not whether we are going to use them. Reason,
al principles, cannot in any case be shoved behind
e affairs, for reason and morality grow out of them.
they have grown into them as well as out of them.
y are there as part of them. No one can escape
ı if he wants to. He cannot escape the problem
ow to engage in life, since in any case he must en-
ɔ in it in some way or other—or else quit and get
In short, the choice is not between a moral author-
outside custom and one within it. It is between
ɔting more or less intelligent and significant
ɔms.

uriously enough, the chief practical effect of re-
ıg to recognize the connection of custom with moral
dards is to deify some special custom and treat it
ternal, immutable, outside of criticism and revision.

This consequence is especially harmful in times of rap social flux. For it leads to disparity between nomin standards, which become ineffectual and hypocritical i exact ratio to their theoretical exaltation, and actu habits which have to take note of existing cond tions. The disparity breeds disorder. Irregulari and confusion are however practically intolerable, ar effect the generation of a new rule of some sort o other. Only such complete disturbance of the physic bases of life and security as comes from plague ar starvation can throw society into utter disorder. N amount of intellectual transition can seriously distu the main tenor of custom, or morals. Hence th greater danger which attends the attempt in period social change to maintain the immutability of o standards is not general moral relaxation. It is rath social clash, an irreconciled conflict of moral standar and purposes, the most serious form of class warfare.

For segregated classes develop their own custon which is to say their own working morals. As long society is mainly immobile these diverse principles a ruling aims do not clash. They exist side by side different strata. Power, glory, honor, magnificen mutual faith here; industry, obedience, abstinen humility, and reverence there: noble and plebeian v tues. Vigor, courage, energy, enterprise here; su mission, patience, charm, personal fidelity there: t masculine and feminine virtues. But mobility invad society. War, commerce, travel, communication, co tact with the thoughts and desires of other classes, n

entions in productive industry, disturb the settled tribution of customs. Congealed habits thaw out, l a flood mixes things once separated.

Each class is rigidly sure of the rightness of its own s and hence not overscrupulous about the means of aining them. One side proclaims the ultimacy of ter—that of some old order which conduces to its interest. The other side proclaims its rights to dom, and identifies justice with its submerged ms. There is no common ground, no moral underding, no agreed upon standard of appeal. Today h a conflict occurs between propertied classes and se who depend upon daily wage; between men and nen; between old and young. Each appeals to its standard of right, and each thinks the other the ature of personal desire, whim or obstinacy. Mobil- has affected peoples as well. Nations and races e one another, each with its own immutable stands. Never before in history have there existed such nerous contacts and minglings. Never before have re been such occasions for conflict which are the re significant because each side feels that it is supted by moral principles. Customs relating to what been and emotions referring to what may come to go their independent ways. The demand of each side its opponent as a wilful violator of moral princis, an expression of self-interest or superior might. elligence which is the only possible messenger of onciliation dwells in a far land of abstractions or es after the event to record accomplished facts.

VI

The prior discussion has tried to show why the psy
chology of habit is an objective and social psychology
Settled and regular action must contain an adjustmen
of environing conditions; it must incorporate them i
itself. For human beings, the environing affairs d
rectly important are those formed by the activities o
other human beings. This fact is accentuated an
made fundamental by the fact of infancy—the fac
that each human being begins life completely depend
ent upon others. The net outcome accordingly is tha
what can be called distinctively individual in behavio
and mind is not, contrary to traditional theory, a
original datum. Doubtless physical or physiologic
individuality always colors responsive activity an
hence modifies the form which custom assumes in i
personal reproductions. In forceful energetic cha
acters this quality is marked. But it is important t
note that it is a quality of habit, not an element o
force existing apart from adjustment of the en
vironment and capable of being termed a separate in
dividual mind. Orthodox psychology starts howev
from the assumption of precisely such independen
minds. However much different schools may vary
their definitions of mind, they agree in this premi
of separateness and priority. Hence social psycholog

confused by the effort to render its facts in the terms
aracteristic of old psychology, since the distinctive
ng about it is that it implies an abandonment of that
chology.

The traditional psychology of the original separate
l, mind or consciousness is in truth a reflex of con-
ions which cut human nature off from its natural
ective relations. It implies first the severance of
n from nature and then of each man from his fel-
s. The isolation of man from nature is duly mani-
ed in the split between mind and body—since body
learly a connected part of nature. Thus the instru-
t of action and the means of the continuous modi-
tion of action, of the cumulative carrying forward
old activity into new, is regarded as a mysterious
ruder or as a mysterious parallel accompaniment.
s fair to say that the psychology of a separate and
pendent consciousness began as an intellectual
mulation of those facts of morality which treated
most important kind of action as a private con-
n, something to be enacted and concluded within
racter as a purely personal possession. The re-
ous and metaphysical interests which wanted the
l to be a separate realm finally coincided with a
ctical revolt against current customs and institu-
ns to enforce current psychological individualism.
this formulation (put forth in the name of science)
cted to confirm the conditions out of which it arose,
to convert it from a historic episode into an essen-
truth. Its exaggeration of individuality is largely

a compensatory reaction against the pressure of insti tutional rigidities.

Any moral theory which is seriously influenced b current psychological theory is bound to emphasiz states of consciousness, an inner private life, at the ex pense of acts which have public meaning and whic incorporate and exact social relationships. A psy chology based upon habits (and instincts which becom elements in habits as soon as they are acted upon) wi on the contrary fix its attention upon the objectiv conditions in which habits are formed and operate. Th rise at the present time of a clinical psychology whic revolts at traditional and orthodox psychology is symptom of ethical import. It is a protest against th futility, as a tool of understanding and dealing wit human nature in the concrete, of the psychology c conscious sensations, images and ideas. It exhibits sense for reality in its insistence upon the profoun importance of unconscious forces in determining no only overt conduct but desire, judgment, belief, ideal ization.

Every movement of reaction and protest, howeve usually accepts some of the basic ideas of the positie against which it rebels. So the most popular forms the clinical psychology, those associated with th founders of psycho-analysis, retain the notion of a se arate psychic realm or force. They add a statemer pointing to facts of the utmost value, and which equivalent to practical recognition of the dependence

nd upon habit and of habit upon social conditions. is is the statement of the existence and operation of "unconscious," of complexes due to contacts and nflicts with others, of the social censor. But they still ng to the idea of the separate psychic realm and so effect talk about unconscious consciousness. They their truths mixed up in theory with the false psy- ology of original individual consciousness, just as school of social psychologists does upon its side. eir elaborate artificial explanations, like the mystic ective mind, consciousness, over-soul, of social psy- ology, are due to failure to begin with the facts of it and custom.

What then is meant by individual mind, by mind *as* ividual? In effect the reply has already been given. nflict of habits releases impulsive activities which in ir manifestation require a modification of habit, of tom and convention. That which was at first the in- idualized color or quality of habitual activity is ab- acted, and becomes a center of activity aiming to onstruct customs in accord with some desire which ejected by the immediate situation and which there- e is felt to belong to one's self, to be the mark and session of an individual in partial and temporary osition to his environment. These general and nec- arily vague statements will be made more definite in further discussion of impulse and intelligence. For ulse when it asserts itself deliberately against an ting custom is the beginning of individuality in

mind. This beginning is developed and consolidated i the observations, judgments, inventions which try t transform the environment so that a variant, deviatin impulse may itself in turn become incarnated in ob jective habit.

PART TWO

THE PLACE OF IMPULSE IN CONDUCT

I

Habits as organized activities are secondary and uired, not native and original. They are out-vths of unlearned activities which are part of man's owment at birth. The order of topics followed in discussion may accordingly be questioned. Why uld what is derived and therefore in some sense ar-ial in conduct be discussed before what is primitive, ural and inevitable? Why did we not set out with examination of those instinctive activities upon ch the acquisition of habits is conditioned?

The query is a natural one, yet it tempts to flinging h a paradox. In conduct the acquired is the prim-. Impulses although first in time are never pri-y in fact; they are secondary and dependent. The ning paradox in statement covers a familiar fact. he life of the individual, instinctive activity comes . But an individual begins life as a baby, and es are dependent beings. Their activities could inue at most for only a few hours were it not for presence and aid of adults with their formed habits. babies owe to adults more than procreation, more

than the continued food and protection which preserv life. They owe to adults the opportunity to expres their native activities in ways which have meanin Even if by some miracle original activity could contin without assistance from the organized skill and art adults, it would not amount to anything. It would b mere sound and fury.

In short, the *meaning* of native activities is not na tive; it is acquired. It depends upon interaction wit a matured social medium. In the case of a tiger o eagle, anger may be identified with a serviceable lif activity, with attack and defense. With a human bein it is as meaningless as a gust of wind on a mudpudd apart from a direction given it by the presence of othe persons, apart from the responses they make to it. is a physical spasm, a blind dispersive burst of wast ful energy. It gets quality, significance, when it be comes a smouldering sullenness, an annoying interru tion, a peevish irritation, a murderous revenge, a bla ing indignation. And although these phenomena whic have a meaning spring from original native reaction to stimuli, yet they depend also upon the responsiv behavior of others. They and all similar human dis plays of anger are not pure impulses; they are habit formed under the influence of association with othe who have habits already and who show their habits i the treatment which converts a blind physical discharg into a significant anger.

After ignoring impulses for a long time in behalf o sensations, modern psychology now tends to start ou

h an inventory and description of instinctive activ-s. This is an undoubted improvement. But when tries to explain complicated events in personal and ial life by direct reference to these native powers, explanation becomes hazy and forced. It is like ing the flea and the elephant, the lichen and the red-od, the timid hare and the ravening wolf, the plant h the most inconspicuous blossom and the plant with most glaring color are alike products of natural ction. There may be a sense in which the statement rue; but till we know the specific environing condi-ns under which selection took place we really know hing. And so we need to know about the social ditions which have educated original activities into inite and significant dispositions before we can dis-s the psychological element in society. This is the e meaning of social psychology.

At some place on the globe, at some time, every kind practice seems to have been tolerated or even praised. w is the tremendous diversity of institutions (includ-moral codes) to be accounted for? The native ck of instincts is practically the same everywhere. aggerate as much as we like the native differences of agonians and Greeks, Sioux Indians and Hindoos, hmen and Chinese, their original differences will bear comparison to the amount of difference found in tom and culture. Since such a diversity cannot be ributed to an original identity, the development of ive impulse must be stated in terms of acquired its, not the growth of customs in terms of instincts.

The wholesale human sacrifices of Peru and the tender
ness of St. Francis, the cruelties of pirates and th
philanthropies of Howard, the practice of Suttee an
the cult of the Virgin, the war and peace dances of th
Comanches and the parliamentary institutions of th
British, the communism of the southsea islander an
the proprietary thrift of the Yankee, the magic of th
medicine man and the experiments of the chemist in h
laboratory, the non-resistance of Chinese and the ag
gressive militarism of an imperial Prussia, monarch
by divine right and government by the people; th
countless diversity of habits suggested by such a ran
dom list springs from practically the same capital-stoc
of native instincts.

It would be pleasant if we could pick and choo
those institutions which we like and impute them t
human nature, and the rest to some devil; or those w
like to our kind of human nature, and those we dislik
to the nature of despised foreigners on the ground the
are not really "native" at all. It would appear to l
simpler if we could point to certain customs, sayin
that they are the unalloyed products of certain i
stincts, while those other social arrangements are to l
attributed wholly to other impulses. But such metho
are not feasible. The same original fears, angers, lov
and hates are hopelessly entangled in the most opposi
institutions. The thing we need to know is how
native stock has been modified by interaction with di
ferent environments.

Yet it goes without saying that original, unlearn

vity has its distinctive place and that an important in conduct. Impulses are the pivots upon which re-organization of activities turn, they are agencies deviation, for giving new directions to old habits changing their quality. Consequently whenever are concerned with understanding social transition flux or with projects for reform, personal and collive, our study must go to analysis of native tencies. Interest in progress and reform is, indeed, the son for the present great development of scientific rest in primitive human nature. If we inquire why were so long blind to the existence of powerful and ied instincts in human beings, the answer seems to ound in the lack of a conception of orderly progress. s fast becoming incredible that psychologists dis- ed as to whether they should choose between innate as and an empty, passive, wax-like mind. For it ns as if a glance at a child would have revealed that truth lay in neither doctrine, so obvious is the surg- of specific native activities. But this obtuseness facts was evidence of lack of interest in what could done with impulses, due, in turn, to lack of interest in lifying existing institutions. It is no accident that became interested in the psychology of savages babies when they became interested in doing away old institutions.

combination of traditional individualism with the nt interest in progress explains why the discovery he scope and force of instincts has led many psyogists to think of them as the fountain head of all

conduct, as occupying a place before instead of afte
that of habits. The orthodox tradition in psycholog
is built upon isolation of individuals from their su
roundings. The soul or mind or consciousness wa
thought of as self-contained and self-enclosed. Now i
the career of an individual if it is regarded as com
plete in itself instincts clearly come before habits. Ge
eralize this individualistic view, and we have an assump
tion that all customs, all significant episodes in the li
of individuals can be carried directly back to the opera
tion of instincts.

But, as we have already noted, if an individual b
isolated in this fashion, along with the fact of primac
of instinct we find also the fact of death. The inchoa
and scattered impulses of an infant do not coordina
into serviceable powers except through social depen
encies and companionships. His impulses are mere
starting points for assimilation of the knowledge an
skill of the more matured beings upon whom he depend
They are tentacles sent out to gather that nutritio
from customs which will in time render the infant ca
able of independent action. They are agencies f
transfer of existing social power into personal abilit
they are means of reconstructive growth. Abandon a
impossible individualistic psychology, and we arrive
the fact that native activities are organs of re-orga
ization and re-adjustment. The hen precedes the eg
But nevertheless this particular egg may be so treat
as to modify the future type of hen.

II

In the case of the young it is patent that impulses highly flexible starting points for activities which diversified according to the ways in which they are d. Any impulse may become organized into almost disposition according to the way it interacts with roundings. Fear may become abject cowardice, dent caution, reverence for superiors or respect for als; an agency for credulous swallowing of absurd erstitions or for wary scepticism. A man may be efly afraid of the spirits of his ancestors, of officials, arousing the disapproval of his associates, of being eived, of fresh air, or of Bolshevism. The actual come depends upon how the impulse of fear is interven with other impulses. This depends in turn upon outlets and inhibitions supplied by the social enonment.

In a definite sense, then, a human society is always rting afresh. It is always in process of renewing, d it endures only because of renewal. We speak of peoples of southern Europe as Latin peoples. Their sting languages depart widely from one another and m the Latin mother tongue. Yet there never was a when this alteration of speech was intentional or licit. Persons always meant to reproduce the speech y heard from their elders and supposed they were

succeeding. This fact may stand as a kind of symbo of the reconstruction wrought in habits because of th fact that they can be transmitted and be made to en dure only through the medium of the crude activitie of the young or through contact with persons havin different habits.

For the most part, this continuous alteration ha been unconscious and unintended. Immature, undeve oped activity has succeeded in modifying adult organ ized activity accidentally and surreptitiously. Bu with the dawn of the idea of progressive betterment an an interest in new uses of impulses, there has grow up some consciousness of the extent to which a futur new society of changed purposes and desires may b created by a deliberate humane treatment of the im pulses of youth. This is the meaning of education for a truly humane education consists in an intelligen direction of native activities in the light of the poss bilities and necessities of the social situation. But fo the most part, adults have given training rather tha education. An impatient, premature mechanization o impulsive activity after the fixed pattern of adult habi of thought and affection has been desired. The com bined effect of love of power, timidity in the face of th novel and a self-admiring complacency has been to strong to permit immature impulse to exercise its r organizing potentialities. The younger generatio has hardly even knocked frankly at the door of adu customs, much less been invited in to rectify throug better education the brutalities and inequities esta

hed in adult habits. Each new generation has crept ndly and furtively through such chance gaps as have ppened to be left open. Otherwise it has been mod- d after the old.

We have already noted how original plasticity is rped and docility is taken mean advantage of. It s been used to signify not capacity to learn liberally l generously, but willingness to learn the customs of ult associates, ability to learn just those special ngs which those having power and authority wish teach. Original modifiability has not been given a r chance to act as a trustee for a better human life. has been loaded with convention, biased by adult venience. It has been practically rendered into an uivalent of non-assertion of originality, a pliant ac- nmodation to the embodied opinions of others.

Consequently docility has been identified with imi- iveness, instead of with power to re-make old habits, re-create. Plasticity and originality have been op- sed to each other. That the most precious part of asticity consists in ability to form habits of inde- ndent judgment and of inventive initiation has been nored. For it demands a more complete and intense cility to form flexible easily re-adjusted habits than does to acquire those which rigidly copy the ways others. In short, among the native activities of the ing are some that work towards accommodation, as- milation, reproduction, and others that work toward ploration, discovery and creation. But the weight adult custom has been thrown upon retaining

and strengthening tendencies toward conformity, and against those which make for variation and independence. The habits of the growing person are jealously kept within the limit of adult customs. The delightful originality of the child is tamed. Worship of institutions and personages themselves lacking in imaginative foresight, versatile observation and liberal thought, is enforced.

Very early in life sets of mind are formed without attentive thought, and these sets persist and control the mature mind. The child learns to avoid the shock of unpleasant disagreement, to find the easy way out to appear to conform to customs which are wholly mysterious to him in order to get his own way—that is to display some natural impulse without exciting the unfavorable notice of those in authority. Adults distrust the intelligence which a child has while making upon him demands for a kind of conduct that requires a high order of intelligence, if it is to be intelligent at all. The inconsistency is reconciled by instilling in him "moral" habits which have a maximum of emotional empressment and adamantine hold with a minimum of understanding. These habitudes, deeply engrained before thought is awake and even before the day of experiences which can later be recalled, govern conscious later thought. They are usually deepest and most unget-at-able just where critical thought is most needed —in morals, religion and politics. These "infantilisms" account for the mass of irrationalities that prevail among men of otherwise rational tastes. The

rsonal "hang-overs" are the cause of what the stu-
nt of culture calls survivals. But unfortunately
ese survivals are much more numerous and pervasive
an the anthropologist and historian are wont to ad-
t. To list them would perhaps oust one from "re-
ectable" society.

And yet the intimation never wholly deserts us that
re is in the unformed activities of childhood and
uth the possibilities of a better life for the com-
nity as well as for individuals here and there. This
n sense is the ground of our abiding idealization of
ldhood. For with all its extravagancies and uncer-
nties, its effusions and reticences, it remains a stand-
g proof of a life wherein growth is normal not an
omaly, activity a delight not a task, and where habit-
ming is an expansion of power not its shrinkage.
bit and impulse may war with each other, but it is
ombat between the habits of adults and the impulses
the young, and not, as with the adult, a civil war-
e whereby personality is rent asunder. Our usual
asure for the "goodness" of children is the amount
trouble they make for grownups, which means of
rse the amount they deviate from adult habits and
ectations. Yet by way of expiation we envy chil-
n their love of new experiences, their intentness in
racting the last drop of significance from each sit-
ion, their vital seriousness in things that to us are
worn.

We compensate for the harshness and monotony
our present insistence upon formed habits by

imagining a future heaven in which we too shall respon freshly and generously to each incident of life. I consequence of our divided attitude, our ideals are self contradictory. On the one hand, we dream of an at tained perfection, an ultimate static goal, in whic effort shall cease, and desire and execution be once an for all in complete equilibrium. We wish for a char acter which shall be steadfast, and we then conceive thi desired faithfulness as something immutable, a char acter exactly the same yesterday, today and forever But we also have a sneaking sympathy for the courag of an Emerson in declaring that consistency should b thrown to the winds when it stands between us and th opportunities of present life. We reach out to th opposite extreme of our ideal of fixity, and unde the guise of a return to nature dream of a romanti freedom, in which *all* life is plastic to impulse, a con tinual source of improvised spontaneities and novel in spirations. We rebel against all organization and a stability. If modern thought and sentiment is to es cape from this division in its ideals, it must be throug utilizing released impulse as an agent of steady re organization of custom and institutions.

While childhood is the conspicuous proof of th renewing of habit rendered possible by impulse, th latter never wholly ceases to play its refreshing rô in adult life. If it did, life would petrify, society stag nate. Instinctive reactions are sometimes too inten to be woven into a smooth pattern of habits. Unde ordinary circumstances they appear to be tamed t

ey their master, custom. But extraordinary crises ease them and they show by wild violent energy how perficial is the control of routine. The saying that ilization is only skin deep, that a savage persists neath the clothes of a civilized man, is the common nowledgment of this fact. At critical moments of usual stimuli the emotional outbreak and rush of tincts dominating all activity show how superficial he modification which a rigid habit has been able to ct.

When we face this fact in its general significance, confront one of the ominous aspects of the history man. We realize how little the progress of man been the product of intelligent guidance, how gely it has been a by-product of accidental upheav- even though by an apologetic interest in behalf of ie privileged institution we later transmute chance o providence. We have depended upon the clash of , the stress of revolution, the emergence of heroic ividuals, the impact of migrations generated by war l famine, the incoming of barbarians, to change es- llished institutions. Instead of constantly utilizing sed impulse to effect continuous reconstruction, we e waited till an accumulation of stresses suddenly aks through the dikes of custom.

It is often supposed that as old persons die, so must peoples. There are many facts in history to sup- rt the belief. Decadence and degeneration seems to he rule as age increases. An irruption of some un- ilized horde has then provided new blood and fresh

life—so much so that history has been defined as a pro
cess of rebarbarization. In truth the analogy betwee
a person and a nation with respect to senescence an
death is defective. A nation is always renewed by th
death of its old constituents and the birth of those wh
are as young and fresh as ever were any individuals i
the hey-day of the nation's glory. Not the nation bu
its customs get old. Its institutions petrify into rigid
ity; there is social arterial sclerosis. Then some peo
ple not overburdened with elaborate and stiff habit
take up and carry on the moving process of life. Th
stock of fresh peoples is, however, approaching ex
haustion. It is not safe to rely upon this expensiv
method of renewing civilization. We need to discove
how to rejuvenate it from within. A normal perpetu
ation becomes a fact in the degree in which impulse
released and habit is plastic to the transforming touc
of impulse. When customs are flexible and youth
educated as youth and not as premature adulthoo
no nation grows old.

There always exists a goodly store of non-functio
ing impulses which may be drawn upon. Their man
festation and utilization is called conversion or rege
eration when it comes suddenly. But they may
drawn upon continuously and moderately. Then
call it learning or educative growth. Rigid custo
signifies not that there are no such impulses but th
they are not organically taken advantage of. As ma
ter of fact, the stiffer and the more encrusted the cu
toms, the larger is the number of instinctive activiti

at find no regular outlet and that accordingly merely ait a chance to get an irregular, uncoordinated man-station. Routine habits never take up all the slack. ey apply only where conditions remain the same or ur in uniform ways. They do not fit the unusual l novel.

Consequently rigid moral codes that attempt to lay wn definite injunctions and prohibitions for every asion in life turn out in fact loose and slack. retch ten commandments or any other number as far you will by ingenious exegesis, yet acts unprovided by them will occur. No elaboration of statute law forestall variant cases and the need of interpreta-n *ad hoc*. Moral and legal schemes that attempt impossible in the way of definite formulation com-sate for explicit strictness in some lines by implicit seness in others. The only truly severe code is the which foregoes codification, throwing responsibility judging each case upon the agents concerned, im-ing upon them the burden of discovery and adap-ion.

The relation which actually exists between un-ected instinct and over-organized custom is illus-ted in the two views that are current about savage The popular view looks at the savage as a wild n; as one who knows no controlling principles or s of action, who freely follows his own impulse, m or desire whenever it seizes him and wherever it es him. Anthropologists are given to the opposed ion. They view savages as bondsmen to custom.

They note the network of regulations that order hi risings-up and his sittings-down, his goings-out an his comings-in. They conclude that in compariso with civilized man the savage is a slave, governed b many inflexible tribal habitudes in conduct and ideas.

The truth about savage life lies in a combination o these two conceptions. Where customs exist they ar of one pattern and binding on personal sentiment an thought to a degree unknown in civilized life. But sinc they cannot possibly exist with respect to all the chang ing detail of daily life, whatever is left uncovered b custom is free from regulation. It is therefore left t appetite and momentary circumstance. Thus enslave ment to custom and license of impulse exist side by sid Strict conformity and unrestrained wildness intensif each other. This picture of life shows us in an exag gerated form the psychology current in civilized li whenever customs harden and hold individuals en meshed. Within civilization, the savage still exists. H is known in his degree by oscillation between loose in dulgence and stiff habit.

Impulse in short brings with itself the possibilit but not the assurance of a steady reorganization o habits to meet new elements in new situations. Th moral problem in child and adult alike as regards im pulse and instinct is to utilize them for formation o new habits, or what is the same thing, the modificati of an old habit so that it may be adequately serviceab under novel conditions. The place of impulse in co duct as a pivot of re-adjustment, re-organization,

its may be defined as follows: On one side, it is ked off from the territory of arrested and encrusted its. On the other side, it is demarcated from the on in which impulse is a law unto itself.* General- g these distinctions, a valid moral theory contrasts all those theories which set up static goals (even n they are called perfection), and with those the- s which idealize raw impulse and find in its spon- ities an adequate mode of human freedom. Im- e is a source, an indispensable source, of liberation; only as it is employed in giving habits pertinence freshness does it liberate power.

The use of the words instinct and impulse as practical equiva- is intentional, even though it may grieve critical readers. word instinct taken alone is still too laden with the older on that an instinct is always definitely organized and adapted hich for the most part is just what it is not in human beings. word impulse suggests something primitive, yet loose, undi- d, initial. Man can progress as beasts cannot, precisely use he has so many 'instincts' that they cut across one her, so that most serviceable actions must be *learned*. In ing habits it is possible for man to learn the habit of ing. Then betterment becomes a conscious principle of life.

III

Incidentally we have touched upon a most far-reac
ing problem: The alterability of human nature. Ear
reformers, following John Locke, were inclined to mi
mize the significance of native activities, and to e
phasize the possibilities inherent in practice and habi
acquisition. There was a political slant to this deni
of the native and a priori, this magnifying of the a
complishments of acquired experience. It held out
prospect of continuous development, of improveme
without end. Thus writers like Helvetius made the id
of the complete malleability of a human nature whi
originally is wholly empty and passive, the basis f
asserting the omnipotence of education to shape hum
society, and the ground of proclaiming the infinite p
fectibility of mankind.

Wary, experienced men of the world have alwa
been sceptical of schemes of unlimited improveme
They tend to regard plans for social change with
eye of suspicion. They find in them evidences of t
proneness of youth to illusion, or of incapacity on t
part of those who have grown old to learn anythi
from experience. This type of conservative h
thought to find in the doctrine of native instincts
scientific support for asserting the practical unalte
bility of human nature. Circumstances may chan

human nature remains from age to age the same. edity is more potent than environment, and human dity is untouched by human intent. Effort for a us alteration of human institutions is utopian. As gs have been so they will be. The more they change more they remain the same.

uriously enough both parties rest their case upon the factor which when it is analyzed weakens their ective conclusions. That is to say, the radical re- er rests his contention in behalf of easy and rapid ge upon the psychology of habits, of institutions haping raw nature, and the conservative grounds counter-assertion upon the psychology of instincts. matter of fact, it is precisely custom which has test inertia, which is least susceptible of alteration; e instincts are most readily modifiable through use, t subject to educative direction. The conservative begs scientific support from the psychology of in- cts is the victim of an outgrown psychology which ved its notion of instinct from an exaggeration of fixity and certainty of the operation of instincts ng the lower animals. He is a victim of a popular ogy of the bird, bee and beaver, which was largely ned to the greater glory of God. He is ignorant instincts in the animals are less infallible and defi- than is supposed, and also that the human being rs from the lower animals in precisely the fact that native activities lack the complex ready-made or- zation of the animals' original abilities.

ut the short-cut revolutionist fails to realize the

full force of the things about which he talks mo
namely institutions as embodied habits. Any one wi
knowledge of the stability and force of habit will he
tate to propose or prophesy rapid and sweeping soc
changes. A social revolution may effect abrupt a
deep alterations in external customs, in legal and p
litical institutions. But the habits that are behi
these institutions and that have, willy-nilly, been shap
by objective conditions, the habits of thought and fe
ing, are not so easily modified. They persist and
sensibly assimilate to themselves the outer innovatio
—much as American judges nullify the intend
changes of statute law by interpreting legislation
the light of common law. The force of lag in hum
life is enormous.

Actual social change is never so great as is appare
change. Ways of belief, of expectation, of judgme
and attendant emotional dispositions of like and d
like, are not easily modified after they have once tak
shape. Political and legal institutions may be alter
even abolished; but the bulk of popular thought wh
has been shaped to their pattern persists. This is w
glowing predictions of the immediate coming of a soc
millennium terminate so uniformly in disappoi
ment, which gives point to the standing suspicion
the cynical conservative about radical changes. Hab
of thought outlive modifications in habits of ov
action. The former are vital, the latter, without
sustaining life of the former, are muscular tricks. C
sequently as a rule the moral effects of even great

l revolutions, after a few years of outwardly con-
ious alterations, do not show themselves till after
apse of years. A new generation must come upon
cene whose habits of mind have been formed under
iew conditions. There is pith in the saying that
rtant reforms cannot take real effect until after
nber of influential persons have died. Where gen-
and enduring moral changes do accompany an
nal revolution it is because appropriate habits of
ght have previously been insensibly matured. The
nal change merely registers the removal of an ex-
l superficial barrier to the operation of existing
ectual tendencies.

iose who argue that social and moral reform is
ssible on the ground that the Old Adam of human
re remains forever the same, attribute however to
e activities the permanence and inertia that in
belong only to acquired customs. To Aristotle
ry was rooted in aboriginal human nature. Na-
distinctions of quality exist such that some persons
y nature gifted with power to plan, command and
rvise, and others possess merely capacity to obey
execute. Hence slavery is natural and inevitable.
e is error in supposing that because domestic and
el slavery has been legally abolished, therefore
ry as conceived by Aristotle has disappeared. But
ers have at least progressed to a point where it is
that slavery is a social state not a psychological
sity. Nevertheless the worldlywise Aristotles of
y assert that the institutions of war and the pres-

ent wage-system are so grounded in immutable hum
nature that effort to change them is foolish.

Like Greek slavery or feudal serfdom, war and t
existing economic regime are social patterns woven o
of the stuff of instinctive activities. Native hum
nature supplies the raw materials, but custom furnish
the machinery and the designs. War would not be p
sible without anger, pugnacity, rivalry, self-displa
and such like native tendencies. Activity inheres
them and will persist under every condition of life.
imagine they can be eradicated is like supposing th
society can go on without eating and without union
the sexes. But to fancy that they must eventuate
war is as if a savage were to believe that because
uses fibers having fixed natural properties in order
weave baskets, therefore his immemorial tribal patte
are also natural necessities and immutable forms.

From a humane standpoint our study of history
still all too primitive. It is possible to study a mul
tude of histories, and yet permit history, the record
the transitions and transformations of human activiti
to escape us. Taking history in separate doses of t
country and that, we take it as a succession of isola
finalities, each one in due season giving way to anoth
as supernumeraries succeed one another in a ma
across the stage. We thus miss the fact of history a
also its lesson; the diversity of institutional forms a
customs which the same human nature may prod
and employ. An infantile logic, now happily expel
from physical science, taught that opium put men

because of its dormitive potency. We follow the e logic in social matters when we believe that war ts because of bellicose instincts; or that a partic- economic regime is necessary because of acquisi- and competitive impulses which must find ex- ssion.

ugnacity and fear are no more native than are and sympathy. The important thing morally is way these native tendencies interact, for their inter- on may give a chemical transformation not a me- nical combination. Similarly, no social institution ds alone as a product of one dominant force. It is enomenon or function of a multitude of social fac- in their mutual inhibitions and reinforcements. If follow an infantile logic we shall reduplicate the y of result in an assumption of unity of force be- l it—as men once did with natural events, employing logy as an exhibition of causal efficiency. We thus e the same social custom twice over: once as an ting fact and then as an original force which pro- ed the fact, and utter sage platitudes about the lterable workings of human nature or of race. As account for war by pugnacity, for the capitalistic em by the necessity of an incentive of gain to stir ition and effort, so we account for Greece by power sthetic observation, Rome by administrative ability, middle ages by interest in religion and so on. We e constructed an elaborate political zoology as hological and not nearly as poetic as the other ogy of phœnixes, griffins and unicorns. Native

racial spirit, the spirit of the people or of the tin national destiny are familiar figures in this social zo As names for effects, for existing customs, they a sometimes useful. As names for explanatory forc they work havoc with intelligence.

An immense debt is due William James for the me title of his essay: The Moral Equivalents of War. reveals with a flash of light the true psycholog Clans, tribes, races, cities, empires, nations, states ha made war. The argument that this fact proves ineradicable belligerent instinct which makes war fo ever inevitable is much more respectable than ma arguments about the immutability of this and th social tradition. For it has the weight of a certa empirical generality back of it. Yet the suggestion an *equivalent* for war calls attention to the medley impulses which are casually bunched together under t caption of belligerent impulse; and it calls attention the fact that the elements of this medley may be wov together into many differing types of activity, so of which may function the native impulses in mu better ways than war has ever done.

Pugnacity, rivalry, vainglory, love of booty, fe suspicion, anger, desire for freedom from the conv tions and restrictions of peace, love of power a hatred of oppression, opportunity for novel displa love of home and soil, attachment to one's people a to the altar and the hearth, courage, loyalty, opp tunity to make a name, money or a career, affecti piety to ancestors and ancestral gods—all of th

ings and many more make up the war-like force. To pose there is some one unchanging native force which nerates war is as naive as the usual assumption that r enemy is actuated solely by the meaner of the tenncies named and we only by the nobler. In earlier ys there was something more than a verbal connecn between pugnacity and fighting; anger and fear ved promptly through the fists. But between a sely organized pugilism and the highly organized rfare of today there intervenes a long economic, entific and political history. Social conditions her than an old and unchangeable Adam have gented wars; the ineradicable impulses that are utilized them are capable of being drafted into many other annels. The century that has witnessed the triumph the scientific doctrine of the convertibility of natural rgies ought not to balk at the lesser miracle of ial equivalences and substitutes.

It is likely that if Mr. James had witnessed the world r, he would have modified his mode of treatment. So ny new transformations entered into the war, that war seems to prove that though an equivalent has been found for war, the psychological forces traionally associated with it have already undergone found changes. We may take the Iliad as a classic ression of war's traditional psychology as well as source of the literary tradition regarding its mos and glories. But where are Helen, Hector and nilles in modern warfare? The activities that evoke l incorporate a war are no longer personal love,

love of glory, or the soldier's love of his own privatel amassed booty, but are of a collective, prosaic politica and economic nature.

Universal conscription, the general mobilization o all agricultural and industrial forces of the folk no engaged in the trenches, the application of every con ceivable scientific and mechanical device, the mas movements of soldiery regulated from a common cente by a depersonalized general staff: these factors relegat the traditional psychological apparatus of war to now remote antiquity. The motives once appealed t are out of date; they do not now induce war. The simply are played upon after war has been brough into existence in order to keep the common soldie keyed up to their task. The more horrible a depe sonalized scientific mass war becomes, the more nece sary it is to find universal ideal motives to justify i Love of Helen of Troy has become a burning love fo all humanity, and hatred of the foe symbolizes a hatre of all the unrighteousness and injustice and oppressio which he embodies. The more prosaic the actual cause the more necessary is it to find glowingly sublim motives.

Such considerations hardly prove that war is to b abolished at some future date. But they destroy tha argument for its necessary continuance which is base on the immutability of specified forces in original huma nature. Already the forces that once caused wars ha found other outlets for themselves; while new provoc tions, based on new economic and political condition

ave come into being. War is thus seen to be a function social institutions, not of what is natively fixed in man constitution. The last great war has not, it ust be confessed, made the problem of finding social uivalents simpler and easier. It is now naive to at- ibute war to specific isolable human impulses for ich separate channels of expression may be found, ile the rest of life is left to go on about the same. general social re-organization is needed which will distribute forces, immunize, divert and nullify. Hin- n was doubtless right when he wrote that the only y to abolish war was to make peace heroic. It now pears that the heroic emotions are not anything ich may be specialized in a side-line, so that the war- pulses may find a sublimation in special practices d occupations. They have to get an outlet in all the sks of peace.

The argument for the abiding necessity of war turns t, accordingly, to have this much value. It makes us sely suspicious of all cheap and easy equivalencies. convinces us of the folly of striving to eliminate war agencies which leave other institutions of society etty much unchanged. History does not prove the vitability of war, but it does prove that customs and titutions which organize native powers into certain tterns in politics and economics will also generate the r-pattern. The problem of war is difficult because it serious. It is none other than the wider problem of effective moralizing or humanizing of native im- lses in times of peace.

The case of economic institutions is as suggestive a that of war. The present system is indeed much mor recent and more local than is the institution of war. Bu no system has ever as yet existed which did not in som form involve the exploitation of some human being for the advantage of others. And it is argued that thi trait is unassailable because it flows from the inherent immutable qualities of human nature. It is argued, fo example, that economic inferiorities and disabilities ar incidents of an institution of private property whic flows from an original proprietary instinct; it is con tended they spring from a competitive struggle fo wealth which in turn flows from the absolute need o profit as an inducement to industry. The pleas ar worth examination for the light they throw upon th place of impulses in organized conduct.

No unprejudiced observer will lightly deny the ex istence of an original tendency to assimilate objects an events to the self, to make them part of the "me." W may even admit that the "me" cannot exist withou the "mine." The self gets solidity and form throug an appropriation of things which identifies them wit whatever we call myself. Even a workman in a moder factory where depersonalization is extreme gets to hav "his" machine and is perturbed at a change. Posses sion shapes and consolidates the "I" of philosopher "I own, therefore I am" expresses a truer psycholog than the Cartesian "I think, therefore I am." A man' deeds are imputed to him as their owner, not merel as their creator. That he cannot disown them whe

ne moment of their occurrence passes is the root of sponsibility, moral as well as legal.

But these same considerations evince the versatility possessive activity. My worldly goods, my good me, my friends, my honor and shame all depend upon possessive tendency. The need for appropriation has d to be satisfied; but only a calloused imagination ncies that the institution of private property as it ists A. D. 1921 is the sole or the indispensable means its realization. Every gallant life is an experiment different ways of fulfilling it. It expends itself in edatory aggression, in forming friendships, in seek- g fame, in literary creation, in scientific production. the face of this elasticity, it requires an arrogant ig- rance to take the existing complex system of stocks d bonds, of wills and inheritance, a system supported every point by manifold legal and political arrange- nts, and treat it as the sole legitimate and baptized ild of an instinct of appropriation. Sometimes, even w, a man most accentuates the fact of ownership nen he gives something away; use, consumption, is e normal end of possession. We can conceive a state things in which the proprietary impulse would get ll satisfaction by holding goods as mine in just the gree in which they were visibly administered for a nefit in which a corporate community shared.

Does the case stand otherwise with the other psycho- gical principle appealed to, namely, the need of an ntive of personal profit to keep men engaged in eful work? We need not content ourselves with point-

ing out the elasticity of the idea of gain, and possibl equivalences for pecuniary gain, and the possibility of state of affairs in which only those things would b counted personal gains which profit a group. It wil advance the discussion if we instead subject to analysi the whole conception of incentive and motive.

There is doubtless some sense in saying that ever conscious act has an incentive or motive. But thi sense is as truistic as that of the not dissimilar sayin that every event has a cause. Neither statement throw any light on any particular occurrence. It is at mos a maxim which advises us to search for some other fac with which the one in question may be correlate Those who attempt to defend the necessity of existin economic institutions as manifestations of human na ture convert this suggestion of a concrete inquiry int a generalized truth and hence into a definitive falsity They take the saying to mean that nobody would d anything, or at least anything of use to others, wit out a prospect of some tangible reward. And beneat this false proposition there is another assumption st more monstrous, namely, that man exists naturally in state of rest so that he requires some external for to set him into action.

The idea of a thing intrinsically wholly inert in t sense of absolutely passive is expelled from physics a has taken refuge in the psychology of current econo ics. In truth man acts anyway, he can't help actin In every fundamental sense it is false that a man quires a motive to make him do something. To

althy man inaction is the greatest of woes. Any one
ho observes children knows that while periods of rest
re natural, laziness is an acquired vice—or virtue.
hile a man is awake he will do something, if only to
ild castles in the air. If we like the form of words
may say that a man eats only because he is
moved" by hunger. The statement is nevertheless
re tautology. For what does hunger mean except
at one of the things which man does naturally, in-
nctively, is to search for food—that his activity nat-
ally turns that way? Hunger primarily names an
t or active process not a motive to an act. It is an
t if we take it grossly, like a babe's blind hunt for the
other's breast; it is an activity if we take it minutely
a chemico-physiological occurrence.

The whole concept of motives is in truth extra-
ychological. It is an outcome of the attempt of men
influence human action, first that of others, then of
nan to influence his own behavior. No sensible person
inks of attributing the acts of an animal or an idiot
a motive. We call a biting dog ugly, but we don't
ok for his motive in biting. If however we were able
direct the dog's action by inducing him to reflect
on his acts, we should at once become interested in
e dog's motives for acting as he does, and should
deavor to get him interested in the same subject. It
absurd to ask what induces a man to activity gen-
ally speaking. He is an active being and that is all
ere is to be said on that score. But when we want
get him to act in this specific way rather than in

that, when we want to direct his activity that is to say in a specified channel, then the question of motive is pertinent. A motive is then that element in the total complex of a man's activity which, if it can be sufficiently stimulated, will result in an act having specified consequences. And part of the process of intensifying (or reducing) certain elements in the total activity and thus regulating actual consequence is to impute these elements to a person as his actuating motives.

A child naturally grabs food. But he does it in our presence. His manner is socially displeasing and we attribute to his act, up to this time wholly innocent, the motive of greed or selfishness. Greediness simply means the quality of his act as socially observed and disapproved. But by attributing it to him as his motive for acting in the disapproved way, we induce him to refrain. We analyze his total act and call his attention to an obnoxious element in its outcome. A child with equal spontaneity, or thoughtlessness, gives way to others. We point out to him with approval that he acted considerately, generously. And this quality of action when noted and encouraged becomes a reinforcing stimulus of that factor which will induce similar acts in the future. An element in an act viewed as a tendency to produce such and such consequences is a motive. A motive does not exist prior to an act and produce it. It is an act *plus* a judgment upon some element of it, the judgment being made in the light of the consequences of the act.

At first, as was said, others characterize an act with orable or condign qualities which they impute to an nt's character. They react in this fashion in order ncourage him in future acts of the same sort, or in er to dissuade him—in short to build or destroy a it. This characterization is part of the technique influencing the development of character and con- t. It is a refinement of the ordinary reactions of ise and blame. After a time and to some extent, erson teaches himself to think of the results of act- in this way or that before he acts. He recalls that e acts this way or that some observer, real or im- nary, will attribute to him noble or mean disposi- , virtuous or vicious motive. Thus he learns to in- nce his own conduct. An inchoate activity taken his forward-looking reference to results, especially lts of approbation and condemnation, constitutes otive. Instead then of saying that a man requires otive in order to induce him to act, we should say t when a man is going to act he needs to know *what* is going to do—what the quality of his act is in ns of consequences to follow. In order to act prop- he needs to view his act as others view it; namely, manifestation of a character or will which is good ad according as it is bent upon specific things which desirable or obnoxious. There is no call to furnish an with incentives to activity in general. But there very need to induce him to guide his own action by ntelligent perception of its results. For in the long

run this is the most effective way of influencing activi to take this desirable direction rather than that o jectionable one.

A motive in short is simply an impulse viewed as constituent in a habit, a factor in a disposition. general its meaning is simple. But in fact motives a as numerous as are original impulsive activities mult plied by the diversified consequences they produce they operate under diverse conditions. How then do it come about that current economic psychology has tremendously oversimplified the situation? Why do it recognize but one type of motive, that which co cerns personal gain. Of course part of the answer to be found in the natural tendency in all scienc toward a substitution of artificial conceptual simpli cations for the tangles of concrete empirical facts. B the significant part of the answer has to do with t social conditions under which work is done, conditio which are such as to put an unnatural emphasis up the prospect of reward. It exemplifies again our lea ing proposition that social customs are not direct a necessary consequences of specific impulses, but th social institutions and expectations shape and cryst lize impulses into dominant habits.

The social peculiarity which explains the empha put upon profit as an inducement to productive se iceable work stands out in high relief in the identifi tion of work with labor. For labor means in econo theory something painful, something so onerously agreeable or "costly" that every individual avoid

he can, and engages in it only because of the prom- of an overbalancing gain. Thus the question we are ited to consider is what the social condition is which kes productive work uninteresting and toilsome. ny is the psychology of the industrialist so different m that of inventor, explorer, artist, sportsman, ntific investigator, physician, teacher? For the ter we do not assert that activity is such a burden- ne sacrifice that it is engaged in only because men are bed to act by hope of reward or are coerced by fear loss.

The social conditions under which "labor" is under- en have become so uncongenial to human nature that s not undertaken because of intrinsic meaning. It is ried on under conditions which render it immedi- ly irksome. The alleged need of an incentive to stir n out of quiescent inertness is the need of an incen- e powerful enough to overcome contrary stimuli ich proceed from the social conditions. Circum- nces of productive service now shear away direct isfaction from those engaging in it. A real and portant fact is thus contained in current economic chology, but it is a fact about existing industrial ditions and not a fact about native, original ivity.

It is "natural" for activity to be agreeable. It ds to find fulfillment, and finding an outlet is itself isfactory, for it marks partial accomplishment. If oductive activity has become so inherently unsatis- tory that men have to be artificially induced to

engage in it, this fact is ample proof that the cond
tions under which work is carried on balk the compl
of activities instead of promoting them, irritate a
frustrate natural tendencies instead of carrying the
forward to fruition. Work then becomes labor, t
consequence of some aboriginal curse which forces m
to do what he would not do if he could help it, the ou
come of some original sin which excluded man from
paradise in which desire was satisfied without industr
compelling him to pay for the means of livelihood wi
the sweat of his brow. From which it follows natural
that Paradise Regained means the accumulation of i
vestments such that a man can live upon their retu
without labor. There is, we repeat, too much truth
this picture. But it is not a truth concerning origin
human nature and activity. It concerns the for
human impulses have taken under the influence of
specific social environment. If there are difficulti
in the way of social alteration—as there certainly are
they do not lie in an original aversion of human n
ture to serviceable action, but in the historic conditio
which have differentiated the work of the laborer f
wage from that of the artist, adventurer, sportsma
soldier, administrator and speculator.

IV

War and the existing economic regime have not been
cussed primarily on their own account. They are
ucial cases of the relation existing between original
pulse and acquired habit. They are so fraught with
il consequences that any one who is disposed can heap
criticisms without end. Nevertheless they persist.
is persistence constitutes the case for the conserva-
e who argues that such institutions are rooted in an
alterable human nature. A truer psychology locates
difficulty elsewhere. It shows that the trouble lies
the inertness of established habit. No matter how
idental and irrational the circumstances of its
gin, no matter how different the conditions which
w exist to those under which the habit was formed,
latter persists until the environment obstinately
ects it. Habits once formed perpetuate themselves,
acting unremittingly upon the native stock of activ-
s. They stimulate, inhibit, intensify, weaken, select,
ncentrate and organize the latter into their own like-
s. They create out of the formless void of impulses
world made in their own image. Man is a creature of
bit, not of reason nor yet of instinct.

Recognition of the correct psychology locates the
oblem but does not guarantee its solution. Indeed,
first sight it seems to indicate that every attempt to

solve the problem and secure fundamental reorganiz
tions is caught in a vicious circle. For the directio
of native activity depends upon acquired habits, a
yet acquired habits can be modified only by redirecti
of impulses. Existing institutions impose their stam
their superscription, upon impulse and instinct. The
embody the modifications the latter have undergon
How then can we get leverage for changing instit
tions? How shall impulse exercise that re-adjusti
office which has been claimed for it? Shall we not ha
to depend in the future as in the past upon upheaval a
accident to dislocate customs so as to release impuls
to serve as points of departure for new habits?

The existing psychology of the industrial worker f
example is slack, irresponsible, combining a maximu
of mechanical routine with a maximum of explosi
unregulated impulsiveness. These things have be
bred by the existing economic system. But they exi
and are formidable obstacles to social change. V
cannot breed in men the desire to get something f
as nearly nothing as possible and in the end not p
the price. We satisfy ourselves cheaply by preachi
the charm of productivity and by blaming the inhere
selfishness of human nature, and urging some gre
moral and religious revival. The evils point in reali
to the necessity of a change in economic institutio
but meantime they offer serious obstacles to t
change. At the same time, the existing economic s
tem has enlisted in behalf of its own perpetuity t
managerial and the technological abilities which m

ve the cause of the laborer if he is to be emancipated. the face of these difficulties other persons seek an ially cheap satisfaction in the thought of universal il war and revolution.

Is there any way out of the vicious circle? In the st place, there are possibilities resident in the educa- n of the young which have never yet been taken vantage of. The idea of universal education is as t hardly a century old, and it is still much more of idea than a fact, when we take into account the ly age at which it terminates for the mass. Also, is far schooling has been largely utilized as a con- ient tool of the existing nationalistic and economic gimes. Hence it is easy to point out defects and versions in every existing school system. It is easy a critic to ridicule the religious devotion to educa- n which has characterized for example the American ublic. It is easy to represent it as zeal without owledge, fanatical faith apart from understanding. d yet the cold fact of the situation is that the chief ans of continuous, graded, economical improvement d social rectification lies in utilizing the opportuni- s of educating the young to modify prevailing types thought and desire.

The young are not as yet as subject to the full im- ct of established customs. Their life of impulsive ivity is vivid, flexible, experimenting, curious. ults have their habits formed, fixed, at least com- ratively. They are the subjects, not to say victims, an environment which they can directly change only

by a maximum of effort and disturbance. They ma
not be able to perceive clearly the needed changes, c
be willing to pay the price of effecting them. Yet the
wish a different life for the generation to come. I
order to realize that wish they may create a speci
environment whose main function is education. I
order that education of the young be efficacious in i
ducing an improved society, it is not necessary fo
adults to have a formulated definite ideal of some bett
state. An educational enterprise conducted in th
spirit would probably end merely in substituting o
rigidity for another. What is necessary is that habi
be formed which are more intelligent, more sensitive
percipient, more informed with foresight, more awa
of what they are about, more direct and sincere, mo
flexibly responsive than those now current. Then th
will meet their own problems and propose their ov
improvements.

Educative development of the young is not the on
way in which the life of impulse may be employed
effect social ameliorations, though it is the least expe
sive and most orderly. No adult environment is all
one piece. The more complex a culture is, the mo
certain it is to include habits formed on differing, ev
conflicting patterns. Each custom may be rigid, un
telligent in itself, and yet this rigidity may cause it
wear upon others. The resulting attrition may relea
impulse for new adventures. The present time is co
spicuously a time of such internal frictions and lib
ations. Social life seems chaotic, unorganized, rath

an too fixedly regimented. Political and legal in-
tutions are now inconsistent with the habits that
minate friendly intercourse, science and art. Dif-
rent institutions foster antagonistic impulses and
rm contrary dispositions.

If we had to wait upon exhortations and unembodied
ideals" to effect social alterations, we should indeed
it long. But the conflict of patterns involved in in-
tutions which are inharmonious with one another is
ready producing great changes. The significant
int is not whether modifications shall continue to
cur, but whether they shall be characterized chiefly
uneasiness, discontent and blind antagonistic strug-
s, or whether intelligent direction may modulate the
rshness of conflict, and turn the elements of disin-
gration into a constructive synthesis. At all events,
e social situation in "advanced" countries is such
to impart an air of absurdity to our insistence upon
e rigidity of customs. There are plenty of persons
tell us that the real trouble lies in lack of fixity of
bit and principle; in departure from immutable
ndards and structures constituted once for all. We
e told that we are suffering from an excess of instinct,
d from laxity of habit due to surrender to impulse
a law of life. The remedy is said to be to return
m contemporary fluidity to the stable and spacious
tterns of a classic antiquity that observed law and
oportion: for somehow antiquity is always classic.
hen instability, uncertainty, erratic change are dif-
sed throughout the situation, why dwell upon the

evils of fixed habit and the need of release of impuls as an initiator of reorganizations? Why not rathe condemn impulse and exalt habits of reverencing orde and fixed truth?

The question is natural, but the remedy suggeste is futile. It is not easy to exaggerate the extent t which we now pass from one kind of nurture t another as we go from business to church, from scienc to the newspaper, from business to art, from compar ionship to politics, from home to school. An indivi ual is now subjected to many conflicting schemes o education. Hence habits are divided against one ar other, personality is disrupted, the scheme of conduc is confused and disintegrated. But the remedy lies i the development of a new morale which can be attaine only as released impulses are intelligently employed t form harmonious habits adapted to one another in new situation. A laxity due to decadence of old habi cannot be corrected by exhortations to restore ol habits in their former rigidity. Even though it we abstractly desirable it is impossible. And it is not d sirable because the inflexibility of old habits is precise the chief cause of their decay and disintegratio Plaintive lamentations at the prevalence of change ar abstract appeals for restoration of senile authority a signs of personal feebleness, of inability to cope wi change. It is a "defense reaction."

V

We may sum up the discussion in a few generalized
atements. In the first place, it is unscientific to try
restrict original activities to a definite number of
arply demarcated classes of instincts. And the prac-
al result of this attempt is injurious. To classify
indeed, as useful as it is natural. The indefinite
ltitude of particular and changing events is met by
mind with acts of defining, inventorying and listing,
lucing to common heads and tying up in bunches.
t these acts like other intelligent acts are performed
a purpose, and the accomplishment of purpose is
ir only justification. Speaking generally, the pur-
se is to facilitate our dealings with unique individ-
ls and changing events. When we assume that our
fts and bunches represent fixed separations and col-
tions *in rerum natura*, we obstruct rather than aid
r transactions with things. We are guilty of a
sumption which nature promptly punishes. We are
ndered incompetent to deal effectively with the deli-
ies and novelties of nature and life. Our thought is
rd where facts are mobile; bunched and chunky where
nts are fluid, dissolving.

The tendency to forget the office of distinctions and
ssifications, and to take them as marking things in
mselves, is the current fallacy of scientific spe-

cialism. It is one of the conspicuous traits of high browism, the essence of false abstractionism. This at titude which once flourished in physical science no governs theorizing about human nature. Man has bee resolved into a definite collection of primary instinct which may be numbered, catalogued and exhaustivel described one by one. Theorists differ only or chiefl as to their number and ranking. Some say one, self love; some two, egoism and altruism; some three, greed fear and glory; while today writers of a more em pirical turn run the number up to fifty and sixty. Bu in fact there are as many specific reactions to differ ing stimulating conditions as there is time for, an our lists are only classifications for a purpose.

One of the great evils of this artificial simplificatio is its influence upon social science. Complicated prov inces of life have been assigned to the jurisdiction o some special instinct or group of instincts, which ha reigned despotically with the usual consequences o despotism. Politics has replaced religion as the set o phenomena based upon fear; or after having been th fruit of a special Aristotelian political faculty, has be come the necessary condition of restraining man's self seeking impulse. All sociological facts are disposed o in a few fat volumes as products of imitation and in vention, or of cooperation and conflict. Ethics res upon sympathy, pity, benevolence. Economics is th science of phenomena due to one love and one aversio —gain and labor. It is surprising that men can engag in these enterprises without being reminded of their e

t similarity to natural science before scientific method s discovered in the seventeenth century. Just now nother simplification is current. All instincts go back the sexual, so that *cherchez la femme* (under multi-dinous symbolic disguises) is the last word of science th respect to the analysis of conduct.

Some sophisticated simplifications which once had eat influence are now chiefly matters of historic mo-nt. Even so they are instructive. They show how cial conditions put a heavy load on certain tendencies, that in the end an acquired disposition is treated if it were an original, and almost the only original tivity. Consider, for example, the burden of causal wer placed by Hobbes upon the reaction of fear. To man living with reasonable security and comfort to-y, Hobbes' pervasive consciousness of fear seems like e idiosyncrasy of an abnormally timid temperament. ut a survey of the conditions of his own time, of the sorders which bred general distrust and antagonism, hich led to brutal swashbuckling and disintegrating trigue, puts the matter on a different footing. The cial situation conduced to fearfulness. As an account the psychology of the natural man his theory is un-und. As a report of contemporary social condi-ns there is much to be said for it.

Something of the same sort may be said regarding e emphasis of eighteenth century moralists upon nevolence as the inclusive moral spring to action, an phasis represented in the nineteenth century by mte's exaltation of altruism. The load was excessive.

But it testifies to the growth of a new philanthropi spirit. With the breaking down of feudal barriers an a consequent mingling of persons previously divided a sense of responsibility for the happiness of others for the mitigation of misery, grew up. Conditions wer not ripe for its translation into political action. Henc the importance attached to the private disposition o voluntary benevolence.

If we venture into more ancient history, Plato' threefold division of the human soul into a rationa element, a spirited active one, and an appetitive on aiming at increase or gain, is immensely illuminating As is well known, Plato said that society is the huma soul writ large. In society he found three classes: th philosophic and scientific, the soldier-citizenry, and th traders and artisans. Hence the generalization as t the three dominating forces in human nature. Rea the other way around, we perceive that trade in his day appealed especially to concupiscence, citizenship to generous *élan* of self-forgetting loyalty, and scientif study to a disinterested love of wisdom that seemed t be monopolized by a small isolated group. The di tinctions were not in truth projected from the brea of the natural individual into society, but they wer cultivated in classes of individuals by force of soci custom and expectation.

Now the prestige that once attached to the "i stinct" of self-love has not wholly vanished. The ca is still worth examination. In its "scientific" for start was taken from an alleged instinct of sel

reservation, characteristic of man as well as of other imals. From this seemingly innocuous assumption, a ythological psychology burgeoned. Animals, including an, certainly perform many acts whose consequence is protect and preserve life. If their acts did not upon e whole have this tendency, neither the individual or e species would long endure. The acts that spring om life also in the main conserve life. Such is the un-ubted fact. What does the statement amount to? mply the truism that life is life, that life is a con-nuing activity as long as it is life at all. But the lf-love school converted the fact that life tends to aintain life into a separate and special force which mehow lies back of life and accounts for its various ts. An animal exhibits in its life-activity a multitude acts of breathing, digesting, secreting, excreting, at-ck, defense, search for food, etc., a multitude of spe-fic responses to specific stimulations of the environ-ent. But mythology comes in and attributes them l to a nisus for self-preservation. Thence it is but a ep to the idea that all conscious acts are prompted y self-love. This premiss is then elaborated in in-enious schemes, often amusing when animated by a nical knowledge of the "world," tedious when of a ould-be logical nature, to prove that every act of man cluding his apparent generosities is a variation ayed on the theme of self-interest.

The fallacy is obvious. Because an animal cannot e except as it is alive, except that is as its acts have e result of sustaining life, it is concluded that all its

acts are instigated by an impulse to self-preservatio
Since all acts affect the well-being of their agent in o
way or another, and since when a person becomes r
flective he prefers consequences in the way of weal t
those of woe, therefore all his acts are due to self-lov
In actual substance, one statement says that life is lif
and the other says that a self is a self. One says tha
special acts are acts of a living creature and the othe
that they are acts of a self. In the biological statemen
the concrete diversity between the acts of say a cla
and of a dog are covered up by pointing out that th
acts of each tend to self-preservation, ignoring th
somewhat important fact that in one case it is the li
of a clam and in the other the life of a dog which
continued. In morals, the concrete differences betwe
a Jesus, a Peter, a John and a Judas are covered u
by the wise remark that after all they are all selves an
all act as selves. In every case, a result or "end"
treated as an actuating cause.

The fallacy consists in transforming the (truistic
fact of acting *as* a self into the fiction of acting alway
for self. Every act, truistically again, tends to a ce
tain fulfilment or satisfaction of some habit which
an undoubted element in the structure of characte
Each satisfaction is qualitatively what it is because
the disposition fulfilled in the object attained, treacher
or loyalty, mercy or cruelty. But theory comes in an
blankets the tremendous diversity in the quality of th
satisfactions which are experienced by pointing out tha
they are all satisfactions. The harm done is then con

ed by transforming this artificial unity of result
an original love of satisfaction as the force that
erates all acts alike. Because a Nero and a Peabody
get satisfaction in acting as they do it is inferred
the satisfaction of each is the same in quality, and
both were actuated by love of the same objective.
reality the more we concretely dwell upon the com-
fact of fulfilment, the more we realize the differ-
in the kinds of selves fulfilled. In pointing out
both the north and the south poles are poles we
not abolish the difference of north from south; we
ntuate it.

The explanation of the fallacy is however too easy
e convincing. There must have been some material,
irical reason why intelligent men were so easily en-
pped by a fairly obvious fallacy. That material
or was a belief in the fixity and simplicity of the
, a belief which had been fostered by a school far
oved from the one in question, the theologians with
ir dogma of the unity and ready-made completeness
he soul. We arrive at true conceptions of motiva-
and interest only by the recognition that selfhood
cept as it has encased itself in a shell of routine)
process of making, and that any self is capable of
uding within itself a number of inconsistent selves,
unharmonized dispositions. Even a Nero may be
able upon occasion of acts of kindness. It is even
ceivable that under certain circumstances he may be
alled by the consequences of cruelty, and turn to the
ering of kindlier impulses. A sympathetic person is

not immune to harsh arrogances, and he may find hi
self involved in so much trouble as a consequence of
kindly act, that he allows his generous impulses
shrivel and henceforth governs his conduct by the d
tates of the strictest worldly prudence. Inconsistenc
and shiftings in character are the commonest things
experience. Only the hold of a traditional concepti
of the singleness and simplicity of soul and self blin
us to perceiving what they mean: the relative fluid
and diversity of the constituents of selfhood. Th
is no one ready-made self behind activities. There
complex, unstable, opposing attitudes, habits, impul
which gradually come to terms with one another, a
assume a certain consistency of configuration, ev
though only by means of a distribution of incons
tencies which keeps them in water-tight compartmer
giving them separate turns or tricks in action.

Many good words get spoiled when the word self
prefixed to them: Words like pity, confidence, sacrif
control, love. The reason is not far to seek. The w
self infects them with a fixed introversion and isolati
It implies that the act of love or trust or control
turned back upon a self which already is in full ex
ence and in whose behalf the act operates. Pity fu
and creates a self when it is directed outward, open
the mind to new contacts and receptions. Pity for
withdraws the mind back into itself, rendering its s
ject unable to learn from the buffetings of fortu
Sacrifice may enlarge a self by bringing about surr
der of acquired possessions to requirements of

wth. Self-sacrifice means a self-maiming which asks compensatory pay in some later possession or in-gence. Confidence as an outgoing act is directness courage in meeting the facts of life, trusting them ring instruction and support to a developing self. fidence which terminates in the self means a smug placency that renders a person obtuse to instruc- by events. Control means a command of resources t enlarges the self; self-control denotes a self which contracting, concentrating itself upon its own ievements, hugging them tight, and thereby estop- the growth that comes when the self is generously ased; a self-conscious moral athleticism that ends disproportionate enlargement of some organ.

What makes the difference in each of these cases is difference between a self taken as something already le and a self still making through action. In the ner case, action has to contribute profit or secur- or consolation *to* a self. In the latter, impulsive on becomes an adventure in discovery of a self ch is possible but as yet unrealized, an experiment in ting a self which shall be more inclusive than the which exists. The idea that only those impulses e moral validity which aim at the welfare of others, re altruistic, is almost as one-sided a doctrine as dogma of self-love. Yet altruism has one marked eriority; it at least suggests a generosity of out- g action, a liberation of power as against the close, in, protected atmosphere of a ready-made ego.

he reduction of all impulses to forms of self-love

is worth investigation because it gives an opportuni
to say something about self as an ongoing process. T
doctrine itself is faded, its advocates are belated. T
notion is too tame to appeal to a generation that h
experienced romanticism and has been intoxicated
imbibing from the streams of power released by t
industrial revolution. The fashionable unification
today goes by the name of the will to power.

In the beginning, this is hardly more than a name f
a quality of all activity. Every fulfilled activity te
minates in added control of conditions, in an art
administering objects. Execution, satisfaction, rea
zation, fulfilment are all names for the fact that
activity implies an accomplishment which is possi
only by subduing circumstance to serve as an acco
plice of achievement. Each impulse or habit is th
a will to its *own* power. To say this is to clothe
truism in a figure. It says that anger or fear or lo
or hate is successful when it effects some change ou
side the organism which measures its force and reg
ters its efficiency. The achieved outcome marks t
difference between action and a cooped-up sentime
which is expended upon itself. The eye hungers f
light, the ear for sound, the hand for surfaces, the a
for things to reach, throw and lift, the leg for distan
anger for an enemy to destroy, curiosity for somethi
to shiver and cower before, love for a mate. Each i
pulse is a demand for an object which will enable it
function. Denied an object in reality it tends to cre
one in fancy, as pathology shows.

So far we have no generalized will to power, but only inherent pressure of every activity for an adequate nifestation. It is not so much a demand for power search for an opportunity to use a power already ting. If opportunities corresponded to the need, esire *for* power would hardly arise: power would be d and satisfaction would accrue. But impulse is ked. If conditions are right for an educative wth, the snubbed impulse will be "sublimated." it is, it will become a contributory factor in some re inclusive and complex activity, in which it educed to a subordinate yet effectual place. Some- es however frustration dams activity up, and inten- s it. A longing for satisfaction at any cost is en- dered. And when social conditions are such that path of least resistance lies through subjugation the energies of others, the will to power bursts into er.

This explains why we attribute a will to power to ers but not to ourselves, except in the complimen- y sense that being strong we naturally wish to exer- our strength. Otherwise for ourselves we only t what we want when we want it, not being over- pulous about the means we take to get it. This chology is naive but it is truer to facts than the position that there exists by itself as a separate and ginal thing a will to power. For it indicates that real fact is some existing power which demands out- and which becomes self-conscious only when it is weak to overcome obstacles. Conventionally the

will to power is imputed only to a comparatively sm
number of ambitious and ruthless men. They are pr
ably upon the whole quite unconscious of any such w
being mastered by specific intense impulses that f
their realization most readily by bending others to se
as tools of their aims. Self-conscious will to pov
is found mainly in those who have a so-called inferior
complex, and who would compensate for a sense of p
sonal disadvantage (acquired early in childhood)
making a striking impression upon others, in the ref
of which they feel their strength appreciated. T
literateur who has to take his action out in imagi
tion is much more likely to evince a will to power th
a Napoleon who sees definite objects with extraordina
clearness and who makes directly for them. Explos
irritations, naggings, the obstinacy of weak perso
dreams of grandeur, the violence of those usually s
missive are the ordinary marks of a will to power.

Discussion of the false simplification involved in t
doctrine suggests another unduly fixed and limi
classification. Critics of the existing economic reg
have divided instincts into the creative and the acq
itive, and have condemned the present order becaus
embodies the latter at the expense of the former. T
division is convenient, yet mistaken. Convenient
cause it sums up certain facts of the present syst
mistaken because it takes social products for psyc
logical originals. Speaking roughly we may say t
native activity is both creative and acquisitive, crea
as a process, acquisitive in that it terminates as a

some tangible product which brings the process to sciousness of itself.

Activity is creative in so far as it moves to its own ichment as activity, that is, bringing along with it- a release of further activities. Scientific inquiry, stic production, social companionship possess this t to a marked degree; some amount of it is a normal ompaniment of all successfully coordinated action. ile from the standpoint of what precedes it is a ilment, it is a liberative expansion with respect to t comes after. There is here no antagonism between tive expression and the production of results which ure and which give a sense of accomplishment. hitecture at its best, for example, would probably ear to most persons to be *more* creative, not less, n dancing at its best. There is nothing in industrial duction which of necessity excludes creative activ-

The fact that it terminates in tangible utilities no e lowers its status than the uses of a bridge exclude tive art from a share in its design and construction. at requires explanation is why process is so definitely servient to product in so much of modern indus-:—that is, why later use rather than present ieving is the emphatic thing. The answer seems to twofold.

An increasingly large portion of economic work is e with machines. As a rule, these machines are not er the personal control of those who operate them. machines are operated for ends which the worker no share in forming and in which as such, or apart

from his wage, he has no interest. He neither und
stands the machines nor cares for their purpose. H
engaged in an activity in which means are cut off fr
ends, instruments from what they achieve. Hig
mechanized activity tends as Emerson said to turn n
into spiders and needles. But if men understand wh
they are about, if they see the whole process of wh
their special work is a necessary part, and if they h
concern, care, for the whole, then the mechanizing
fect is counteracted. But when a man is only the ten
of a machine, he can have no insight and no affecti
creative activity is out of the question.

What remains to the workman is however not so mu
acquisitive desires as love of security and a wish
a good time. An excessive premium on security spri
from the precarious conditions of the workman; des
for a good time, so far as it needs any explanati
from demand for relief from drudgery, due to the
sence of culturing factors in the work done. Instead
acquisition being a primary end, the net effect of
process is rather to destroy sober care for mater
and products; to induce careless wastefulness, so
as that can be indulged in without lessening the wee
wage. From the standpoint of orthodox econo
theory, the most surprising thing about modern ind
try is the small number of persons who have any
fective interest in acquisition of wealth. This di
gard for acquisition makes it easier for a few who
want to have things their own way, and who monopo
what is amassed. If an acquisitive impulse were o

ore evenly developed, more of a real fact, than it is, it quite possible that things would be better than they e.

Even with respect to men who succeed in accumulat- g wealth it is a mistake to suppose that acquisitive- ss plays with most of them a large rôle, beyond get- ig control of the tools of the game. Acquisition is cessary as an outcome, but it arises not from love of cumulation but from the fact that without a large ck of possessions one cannot engage effectively in dern business. It is an incident of love of power, of sire to impress fellows, to obtain prestige, to secure luence, to manifest ability, to "succeed" in short der the conditions of the given regime. And if we e to shove a mythological psychology of instincts be- nd modern economics, we should do better to invent stincts for security, a good time, power and success an to rely upon an acquisitive instinct. We should ve also to give much weight to a peculiar sporting stinct. Not acquiring dollars, but chasing them, nting them is the important thing. Acquisition has part in the big game, for even the most devoted ortsman prefers, other things being equal, to bring me the fox's brush. A tangible result is the mark to e's self and to others of success in sport.

Instead of dividing sharply an acquisitive impulse nifested in business and a creative instinct displayed science, art and social fellowship, we should rather st inquire why it is that so much of creative activity in our day diverted into business, and then ask why

it is that opportunity for exercise of the creative ca
pacity in business is now restricted to such a smal
class, those who have to do with banking, finding
market, and manipulating investments; and finally as
why creative activity is perverted into an over-special
ized and frequently inhumane operation. For after al
it is not the bare fact of creation but its quality whic
counts.

That captains of industry are creative artists of
sort, and that industry absorbs an undue share of th
creative activity of the present time cannot be denied
To impute to the leaders of industry and commerc
simply an acquisitive motive is not merely to lack in
sight into their conduct, but it is to lose the clew t
bettering conditions. For a more proportionate dis
tribution of creative power between business and othe
occupations, and a more humane, wider use of it i
business depend upon grasping aright the forces actu
ally at work. Industrial leaders combine interest i
making far-reaching plans, large syntheses of cond
tions based upon study, mastery of refined and comple
technical skill, control over natural forces and event
with love of adventure, excitement and mastery of fe
low-men. When these interests are reinforced wit
actual command of all the means of luxury, of displa
and procuring admiration from the less fortunate, it
not surprising that creative force is drafted largel
into business channels, and that competition for an op
portunity to display power becomes brutal.

The strategic question, as was said, is to understan

ow and why political, legal, scientific and educational onditions of society for the last centuries have stimlated and nourished such a one-sided development of reative activities. To approach the problem from is point of view is much more hopeful, though infinely more complex intellectually, than the approach hich sets out with a fixed dualism between acquisitive nd creative impulses. The latter assumes a complete olit of higher and lower in the original constitution of an. Were this the case, there would be no organic emedy. The sole appeal would be to sentimental exortation to men to wean themselves from devotion to ie things which are beloved by their lower and material ature. And if the appeal were moderately successful ie social result would be a fixed class division. There ould remain a lower class, superciliously looked down pon by the higher, consisting of those in whom the cquisitive instinct remains stronger and who do the ecessary work of life, while the higher "creative" lass devotes itself to social intercourse, science and rt.

Since the underlying psychology is wrong, the prob-m and its solution assumes in fact a radically differnt form. There are an indefinite number of original r instinctive activities, which are organized into interests and dispositions according to the situations to hich they respond. To increase the creative phase nd the humane quality of these activities is an affair f modifying the social conditions which stimulate, select, intensify, weaken and coordinate native activities.

The first step in dealing with it is to increase our de tailed scientific knowledge. We need to know exactl the selective and directive force of each social situation exactly how each tendency is promoted and retarded Command of the physical environment on a large an deliberate scale did not begin until belief in gross force and entities was abandoned. Control of physical en ergies is due to inquiry which establishes specific co relations between minute elements. It will not be othe wise with social control and adjustment. Having th knowledge we may set hopefully at work upon a cours of social invention and experimental engineering. study of the educative effect, the influence upon habi of each definite form of human intercourse, is pr requisite to effective reform.

VI

In spite of what has been said, it will be asserted that ıere are definite, independent, original instincts which anifest themselves in specific acts in a one-to-one orrespondence. Fear, it will be said, is a reality, and) is anger, and rivalry, and love of mastery of others, nd self-abasement, maternal love, sexual desire, gre-ariousness and envy, and each has its own appropriate eed as a result. Of course they are realities. So are ıction, rusting of metals, thunder and lightning and ghter-than-air flying machines. But science and in-ention did not get on as long as men indulged in the otion of special forces to account for such phenomena. Ien tried that road, and it only led them into learned gnorance. They spoke of nature's abhorrence of a ıcuum; of a force of combustion; of intrinsic nisus ward this and that; of heaviness and levity as forces. : turned out that these "forces" were only the phe-mena over again, translated from a specific and con-ete form (in which they were at least actual) into a eneralized form in which they were verbal. They con erted a problem into a solution which afforded a sim lated satisfaction.

Advance in insight and control came only when the ind turned squarely around. After it had dawned pon inquirers that their alleged causal forces were only

names which condensed into a duplicate form a variety of complex occurrences, they set about breaking up phenomena into minute detail and searching for correlations, that is, for elements in other gross phenomena which also varied. Correspondence of variations of elements took the place of large and imposing forces. The psychology of behavior is only beginning to undergo similar treatment. It is probable that the vogue of sensation-psychology was due to the fact that it seemed to promise a similar detailed treatment of personal phenomena. But as yet we tend to regard sex, hunger, fear, and even much more complex active interests as if they were lump forces, like the combustion or gravity of old-fashioned physical science.

It is not hard to see how the notion of a single and separate tendency grew up in the case of simpler acts like hunger and sex. The paths of motor outlet or discharge are comparatively few and are fairly well defined. Specific bodily organs are conspicuously involved. Hence there is suggested the notion of a correspondingly separate psychic force or impulse. There are two fallacies in this assumption. The first consists in ignoring the fact that no activity (even one that is limited by routine habit) is confined to the channel which is most flagrantly involved in its execution. The whole organism is concerned in every act to some extent and in some fashion, internal organs as well as muscular, those of circulation, secretion, etc. Since the total state of the organism is never exactly twice alike, in so far the phenomena of hunger and sex

re never twice the same in fact. The difference may e negligible for some purposes, and yet give the key or the purposes of a psychological analysis which shall erminate in a correct judgment of value. Even hysiologically the context of organic changes accom-anying an act of hunger or sex makes the difference etween a normal and a morbid phenomenon.

In the second place, the environment in which the act akes place is never twice alike. Even when the overt rganic discharge is substantially the same, the acts npinge upon a different environment and thus have ifferent consequences. It is impossible to regard hese differences of objective result as indifferent to he quality of the acts. They are immediately ensed if not clearly perceived; and they are the nly *components of the meaning* of the act. When eelings, dwelling antecedently in the soul, were sup-osed to be the causes of acts, it was natural to sup-ose that each psychic element had its own inherent uality which might be directly read off by introspec-ion. But when we surrender this notion, it becomes vident that the only way of telling what an organic ct is like is by the sensed or perceptible changes which occasions. Some of these will be intra-organic, and as just indicated) they will vary with every act. thers will be external to the organism, and these con-equences are more important than the intra-organic nes for determining the quality of the act. For they re consequences in which others are concerned and hich evoke reactions of favor and disfavor as well as

cooperative and resisting activities of a more indirec sort.

Most so-called self-deception is due to employing immediate organic states as criteria of the value o an act. To say that it feels good or yields direct sat isfaction is to say that it gives rise to a comfortabl internal state. The judgment based upon this experi ence may be entirely different from the judgment passe by others upon the basis of its objective or social con sequences. As a matter of even the most rudimentar precaution, therefore, every person learns to recogniz to some extent the quality of an act on the basis of it consequences in the acts of others. But even withou this judgment, the exterior changes produced by an ac are immediately sensed, and being associated with th act become a part of its quality. Even a young chil sees the smash of things occasionally by his anger, an the smash may compete with his satisfied feeling of dis charged energy as an index of value.

A child gives way to what, grossly speaking, we ca anger. Its felt or appreciated quality depends in th first place upon the condition of his organism at th time, and this is never twice alike. In the second plac the act is at once modified by the environment upo which it impinges so that different consequences ar immediately reflected back to the doer. In one cas anger is directed say at older and stronger playmate who immediately avenge themselves upon the offende perhaps cruelly. In another case, it takes effect upo weaker and impotent children, and the reflected ap

ciated consequence is one of achievement, victory, wer and a knowledge of the means of having one's own y. The notion that anger still remains a single rce is a lazy mythology. Even in the cases of hunger d sex, where the channels of action are fairly demarted by antecedent conditions (or "nature"), the tual content and feel of hunger and sex, are indefitely varied according to their social contexts. Only ien a man is starving, is hunger an unqualified natal impulse; as it approaches this limit, it tends to se, moreover, its psychological distinctiveness and to come a raven of the entire organism.

The treatment of sex by psycho-analysts is most inructive, for it flagrantly exhibits both the consequences of artificial simplification and the transformaon of social results into psychic causes. Writers, ually male, hold forth on the psychology of woman, if they were dealing with a Platonic universal entity, though they habitually treat men as individuals, varyg with structure and environment. They treat phemena which are peculiarly symptoms of the civilizaon of the West at the present time as if they were e necessary effects of fixed native impulses of human ture. Romantic love as it exists today, with all the rying perturbations it occasions, is as definitely a gn of specific historic conditions as are big battle ips with turbines, internal-combustion engines, and ctrically driven machines. It would be as sensible treat the latter as effects of a single psychic cause to attribute the phenomena of disturbance and con-

flict which accompany present sexual relations as mani festations of an original single psychic force or *Libido* Upon this point at least a Marxian simplification i nearer the truth than that of Jung.

Again it is customary to suppose that there i a single instinct of fear, or at most a few well-define sub-species of it. In reality, when one is afraid th whole being reacts, and this entire responding organism is never twice the same. In fact, also, every reactio takes place in a different environment, and its meanin is never twice alike, since the difference in environmen makes a difference in consequences. It is only myth ology which sets up a single, identical psychic forc which "causes" all the reactions of fear, a force be ginning and ending in itself. It is true enough that i all cases we are able to identify certain more or les separable characteristic acts—muscular contraction withdrawals, evasions, concealments. But in the latte words we have already brought in an environment. Suc terms as withdrawal and concealment have no meanin except as attitudes toward objects. There is no suc thing as an environment in general; there are specif changing objects and events. Hence the kind of eva sion or running away or shrinking up which takes plac is directly correlated with specific surrounding cond tions. There is no one fear having diverse manifesta tions; there are as many qualitatively different fears a there are objects responded to and different cons quences sensed and observed.

Fear of the dark is different from fear of publicit

ar of the dentist from fear of ghosts, fear of conicuous success from fear of humiliation, fear of a t from fear of a bear. Cowardice, embarrassment, aution and reverence may all be regarded as forms of ar. They all have certain physical organic acts in ommon—those of organic shrinkage, gestures of hesiation and retreat. But each is qualitatively unique. ach is what it is in virtue of its total interactions or orrelations with other acts and with the environing edium, with consequences. High explosives and the eroplane have brought into being something new in onduct. There is no error in calling it fear. But here is error, even from a limited clinical standpoint, permitting the classifying name to blot from view he difference between fear of bombs dropped from the ky and the fears which previously existed. The new ear is just as much and just as little original and ative as a child's fear of a stranger.

For any activity is original when it first occurs. As onditions are continually changing, new and *primitive* ctivities are continually occurring. The traditional sychology of instincts obscures recognition of this act. It sets up a hard-and-fast preordained class nder which specific acts are subsumed, so that their wn quality and originality are lost from view. This is hy the novelist and dramatist are so much more illumiating as well as more interesting commentators on onduct than the schematizing psychologist. The rtist makes perceptible individual responses and thus isplays a new phase of human nature evoked in new

situations. In putting the case visibly and dramat cally he reveals vital actualities. The scientific syste atizer treats each act as merely another sample of so old principle, or as a mechanical combination of el ments drawn from a ready-made inventory.

When we recognize the diversity of native activiti and the varied ways in which they are modified throug interactions with one another in response to differe conditions, we are able to understand moral phenome otherwise baffling. In the career of any impulse acti ity there are speaking generally three possibilities. may find a surging, explosive discharge—blind, uni telligent. It may be sublimated—that is, become a fa tor, coordinated intelligently with others in a conti uing course of action. Thus a gust of anger may, b cause of its dynamic incorporation into dispositio be converted into an abiding conviction of social i justice to be remedied, and furnish the dynamic carry the conviction into execution. Or an excitati of sexual attraction may reappear in art or in tranq domestic attachments and services. Such an outco represents the normal or desirable functioning of i pulse; in which, to use our previous language, the i pulse operates as a pivot, or reorganization of hab Or again a released impulsive activity may be neith immediately expressed in isolated spasmodic action, n indirectly employed in an enduring interest. It m be "suppressed."

Suppression is not annihilation. "Psychic" ener is no more capable of being abolished than the for

recognize as physical. If it is neither exploded nor nverted, it is turned inwards, to lead a surreptitious, bterranean life. An isolated or spasmodic manifestion is a sign of immaturity, crudity, savagery; a ppressed activity is the cause of all kinds of intelctual and moral pathology. One form of the resultg pathology constitutes "reaction" in the sense in ich the historian speaks of reactions. A conventionally familiar instance is Stuart license after Puriin restraint. A striking modern instance is the orgy extravagance following upon the enforced economies id hardships of war, the moral let-down after its ghstrung exalted idealisms, the deliberate carelessss after an attention too intense and too narrow. utward manifestation of many normal activities had een suppressed. But activities were not suppressed. hey were merely dammed up awaiting their chance.

Now such "reactions" are simultaneous as well as ccessive. Resort to artificial stimulation, to alcoholic xcess, sexual debauchery, opium and narcotics are exmples. Impulses and interests that are not manifested the regular course of serviceable activity or in recation demand and secure a special manifestation. nd it is interesting to note that there are two oppote forms. Some phenomena are characteristic of perons engaged in a routine monotonous life of toil atended with fatigue and hardship. And others are ound in persons who are intellectual and executive, en whose activities are anything but monotonous, but re narrowed through over-specialization. Such men

think too much, that is, too much along a *particula* line. They carry too heavy responsibilities; that i their offices of service are not adequately shared wit others. They seek relief by escape into a more sociab and easy-going world. The imperative demand fo companionship not satisfied in ordinary activity is m by convivial indulgence. The other class has recour to excess because its members have in ordinary occu pations next to no opportunity for imagination. The make a foray into a more highly colored world as substitute for a normal exercise of invention, plannir and judgment. Having no regular responsibilitie they seek to recover an illusion of potency and of soci recognition by an artificial exaltation of their su merged and humiliated selves.

Hence the love of pleasure against which moralis issue so many warnings. Not that love of pleasures in itself in any way demoralizing. Love of the plea ures of cheerfulness, of companionship is one of t steadying influences in conduct. But pleasure h often become identified with special thrills, excitatior ticklings of sense, stirrings of appetite for the expre purpose of enjoying the immediate stimulation irr spective of results. Such pleasures are signs of dis pation, dissoluteness, in the literal sense. An activi which is deprived of regular stimulation and norm function is piqued into isolated activity, and the resu is division, disassociation. A life of routine and over-specialization in non-routine lines seek occasio in which to arouse by abnormal means a *feeling* of s

action without any accompanying objective fulfil-nt. Hence, as moralists have pointed out, the in-iable character of such appetites. Activities are not lly satisfied, that is fulfilled in objects. They con-ue to seek for gratification in more intensified stim-tions. Orgies of pleasure-seeking, varying from urnalia to mild sprees, result.

It does not follow however that the sole alternative satisfaction by means of objectively serviceable ac-n, that is by action which effects useful changes in e environment. There is an optimistic theory of ture according to which wherever there is natural w there is also natural harmony. Since man as ll as the world is included in the scope of natural w, it is inferred that there is natural harmony be-een human activities and surroundings, a harmony ich is disturbed only when man indulges in "arti-ial" departures from nature. According to this view, l man has to do is to keep his occupations in balance th the energies of the environment and he will be th happy and efficient. Rest, recuperation, relief can found in a proper alternation of forms of useful rk. Do the things which surroundings indicate need ing, and success, content, restoration of powers will ke care of themselves.

This benevolent view of nature falls in with a Puri-nic devotion to work for its own sake and creates strust of amusement, play and recreation. They are lt to be unnecessary, and worse, dangerous diversions om the path of useful action which is also the path of

duty. Social conditions certainly impart to occupa tions as they are now carried on an undue element o fatigue, strain and drudgery. Consequently useful oc cupations which are so ordered socially as to engag thought, feed imagination and equalize the impact o stress would surely introduce a tranquillity and recrea tion which are now lacking. But there is good reaso to think that even in the best conditions there is enoug maladjustment between the necessities of the enviror ment and the activities "natural" to man, so that cor straint and fatigue would always accompany activity and special forms of action be needed—forms that ar significantly called re-creation.

Hence the immense moral importance of play and o fine, or make-believe, art—of activity, that is, which make-believe from the standpoint of the useful arts er forced by the demands of the environment. When mor alists have not regarded play and art with a censorio eye, they often have thought themselves carrying ma ters to the pitch of generosity by conceding that the may be morally indifferent or innocent. But in trut they are moral necessities. They are required to tak care of the margin that exists between the total stoc of impulses that demand outlet and the amount ex pended in regular action. They keep the balance whic work cannot indefinitely maintain. They are require to introduce variety, flexibility and sensitiveness int disposition. Yet upon the whole the humanizing capa bilities of sport in its varied forms, drama, fictio music, poetry, newspapers have been neglected. The

ave been left in a kind of a moral no-man's territory. They have accomplished part of their function but they ave not done what they are capable of doing. In nany cases they have operated merely as reactions ike those artificial and isolated stimulations already nentioned.

The suggestion that play and art have an indispenable moral function which should receive an attention ow denied, calls out an immediate and vehement proest. We omit reference to that which proceeds from rofessional moralists to whom art, fun and sport are abitually under suspicion. For those interested in rt, professional estheticians, will protest even more trenuously. They at once imagine that some kind of rganized supervision if not censorship of play, drama nd fiction is contemplated which will convert them into neans of moral edification. If they do not think of omstockian interference in the alleged interest of pubc morals, they at least think that what is intended is ne elimination by persons of a Puritanic, unartistic emperament of everything not found sufficiently earest and elevating, a fostering of art not for its own ake but as a means of doing good by something to omebody. There is a natural fear of injecting into rt a spirit of earnest uplift, of surrendering art to the eformers.

But something quite other than this is meant. Relief om continuous moral activity—in the conventional nse of moral—is itself a moral necessity. The service f art and play is to engage and release impulses in

ways quite different from those in which they are occu
pied and employed in ordinary activities. Their func
tion is to forestall and remedy the usual exaggera
tions and deficits of activity, even of "moral" activit
and to prevent a stereotyping of attention. To sa
that society is altogether too careless about the mora
worth of art is not to say that carelessness about usefu
occupations is not a necessity for art. On the con
trary, whatever deprives play and art of their ow
careless rapture thereby deprives them of their mora
function. Art then becomes poorer as art as a matte
of course, but it also becomes in the same measure les
effectual in its pertinent moral office. It tries to d
what other things can do better, and it fails to do wha
nothing but itself can do for human nature, softenin
rigidities, relaxing strains, allaying bitterness, dispe
ling moroseness, and breaking down the narrowness co
sequent upon specialized tasks.

Even if the matter be put in this negative way, th
moral value of art cannot be depreciated. But there
a more positive function. Play and art add fresh an
deeper meanings to the usual activities of life. In co
trast with a Philistine relegation of the arts to a trivi
by-play from serious concerns, it is truer to say th
most of the significance now found in serious occup
tions originated in activities not immediately usefu
and gradually found its way from them into objective
serviceable employments. For their spontaneity an
liberation from external necessities permits to them
enhancement and vitality of meaning not possible

reoccupation with immediate needs. Later this meang is transferred to useful activities and becomes a art of their ordinary working. In saying then that rt and play have a moral office not adequately taken dvantage of it is asserted that they are responsible life, to the enriching and freeing of its meanings, ot that they are responsible to a moral code, comandment or special task.

To a coarse view—and professed moral refinement is ten given to taking coarse views—there is something ulgar not only in recourse to abnormal artificial excitations and stimulations but also in interest in useless ames and arts. Negatively the two things have feares which are alike. They both spring from failure regular occupations to engage the full scope of imulses and instincts in an elastically balanced way. hey both evince a surplusage of imagination over ct; a demand in imaginative activity for an outlet hich is denied in overt activity. They both aim at ducing the domination of the prosaic; both are prosts against the lowering of meanings attendant upon dinary vocations. As a consequence no rule can be id down for discriminating by direct inspection beeen unwholesome stimulations and invaluable excurons into appreciative enhancements of life. Their fference lies in the way they work, the careers to hich they commit us.

Art releases energy and focuses and tranquilizes it. releases energy in constructive forms. Castles in air like art have their source in a turning of im-

pulse away from useful production. Both are due to the failure in some part of man's constitution to secure fulfilment in ordinary ways. But in one case the conversion of direct energy into imagination is the starting point of an activity which *shapes* material; fancy is fed upon a stuff of life which assumes under its influence a rejuvenated, composed and enhanced form. In the other case, fancy remains an end in itself. It becomes an indulging in fantasies which bring about withdrawal from all realities, while wishes impotent in action build a world which yields temporary excitement. Any imagination is a sign that impulse is impeded and is groping for utterance. Sometimes the outcome is a refreshed useful habit; sometimes it is an articulation in creative art; and sometimes it is a futile romancing which for some natures does what self-pity does for others. The amount of potential energy of reconstruction that is dissipated in unexpressed fantasy supplies us with a fair measure of the extent to which the current organization of occupation balks and twists impulse, and, by the same sign, with a measure of the function of art which is not yet utilized.

The development of mental pathologies to the point where they need clinical attention has of late enforced a widespread consciousness of some of the evils of suppression of impulse. The studies of psychiatrists have made clear that impulses driven into pockets distil poison and produce festering sores. An organization of impulse into a working habit forms an interest. A surreptitious furtive organization which does not articu-

late in avowed expression forms a "complex." Current clinical psychology has undoubtedly overworked the influence of sexual impulse in this connection, refusing at the hands of some writers to recognize the operation of any other modes of disturbance. There are explanations of this onesidedness. The intensity of the sexual instinct and its organic ramifications produce many of the cases that are so noticeable as to demand the attention of physicians. And social taboos and the tradition of secrecy have put this impulse under greater strain than has been imposed upon others. If a society existed in which the existence of impulse toward food were socially disavowed until it was compelled to live an illicit, covert life, alienists would have plenty of cases of mental and moral disturbance to relate in connection with hunger.

The significant thing is that the pathology arising from the sex instinct affords a striking case of a universal principle. Every impulse is, as far as it goes, force, urgency. It must either be used in some function, direct or sublimated, or be driven into a crowded, hidden activity. It has long been asserted on empirical grounds that repression and enslavement result in corruption and perversion. We have at last discovered the reason for this fact. The wholesome and saving force of intellectual freedom, open confrontation, publicity, now has the stamp of scientific sanction. The evil of checking impulses is not that they are checked. Without inhibition there is no institution of imagination, no redirection into more dis-

criminated and comprehensive activities. The evil re
sides in a refusal of direct attention which forces th
impulse into disguise and concealment, until it enact
its own unavowed uneasy private life subject to n
inspection and no control.

A rebellious disposition is also a form of romant
cism. At least rebels set out as romantics, or, in pop
ular parlance, as idealists. There is no bitterness lik
that of conscious impotency, the sense of suffocatingl
complete suppression. The world is hopeless to or
without hope. The rage of total despair is a vain e
fort at blind destructiveness. Partial suppression i
duces in some natures a picture of complete freedor
while it arouses a destructive protest against existir
institutions as enemies that stand in the way of fre
dom. Rebellion has at least one advantage over r
course to artificial stimulation and to subconscio
nursings of festering sore spots. It engages in acti
and thereby comes in contact with realities. It co
tains the possibility of learning something. Yet lear
ing by this method is immensely expensive. The cos
are incalculable. As Napoleon said, every revoluti
moves in a vicious circle. It begins and ends in exce

To view institutions as enemies of freedom, and
conventions as slaveries, is to deny the only means
which positive freedom in action can be secured.
general liberation of impulses may set things goi
when they have been stagnant, but if the released for
are on their way to anything they do not know t
way nor where they are going. Indeed, they are bou

be mutually contradictory and hence destructive—
estructive not only of the habits they wish to destroy
it of themselves, of their own efficacy. Convention
nd custom are necessary to carrying forward impulse
any happy conclusion. A romantic return to nature
nd a freedom sought within the individual without
gard to the existing environment finds its terminus
chaos. Every belief to the contrary combines pes-
mism regarding the actual with an even more opti-
istic faith in some natural harmony or other—a faith
hich is a survival of some of the traditional meta-
ysics and theologies which professedly are to be
ept away. Not convention but stupid and rigid con-
ntion is the foe. And, as we have noted, a convention
n be reorganized and made mobile only by using some
her custom for giving leverage to an impulse.

Yet it is too easy to utter commonplaces about the
periority of constructive action to destructive. At
events the professed conservative and classicist of
adition seeks too cheap a victory over the rebel. For
e rebel is not self-generated. In the beginning no
e is a revolutionist simply for the fun of it, however
may be after the furor of destructive power gets
der way. The rebel is the product of extreme fixa-
n and unintelligent immobilities. Life is perpetu-
d only by renewal. If conditions do not permit re-
wal to take place continuously it will take place ex-
sively. The cost of revolutions must be charged up
those who have taken for their aim arrest of custom
tead of its readjustment. The only ones who have

the right to criticize "radicals"—adopting for th moment that perversion of language which identifies th radical with the destructive rebel—are those who pu as much effort into reconstruction as the rebels are put ting into destruction. The primary accusation agains the revolutionary must be directed against those wh having power refuse to use it for ameliorations. The are the ones who accumulate the wrath that sweep away customs and institutions in an undiscriminatin avalanche. Too often the man who should be crit cizing institutions expends his energy in criticizin those who would re-form them. What he really objec to is any disturbance of his own vested securities, con forts and privileged powers.

VII

We return to the original proposition. The position impulse in conduct is intermediary. Morality is an deavor to find for the manifestation of impulse in cial situations an office of refreshment and renewal. e endeavor is not easy of accomplishment. It is sier to surrender the main and public channels of tion and belief to the sluggishness of custom, and alize tradition by emotional attachment to its ease, mforts and privileges instead of idealizing it in prac-e by making it more equably balanced with pres-t needs. Again, impulses not used for the work of juvenation and vital recovery are sidetracked to find ir own lawless barbarities or their own sentimental finements. Or they are perverted to pathological reers—some of which have been mentioned.

In the course of time custom becomes intolerable be-use of what it suppresses and some accident of war inner catastrophe releases impulses for unrestrained pression. At such times we have philosophies which ntify progress with motion, blind spontaneity with edom, and which under the name of the sacredness of lividuality or a return to the norms of nature make pulse a law unto itself. The oscillation between im-lse arrested and frozen in rigid custom and impulse lated and undirected is seen most conspicuously when

epochs of conservatism and revolutionary ardor alte
nate. But the same phenomenon is repeated on
smaller scale in individuals. And in society the tw
tendencies and philosophies exist simultaneously; the
waste in controversial strife the energy that is neede
for specific criticism and specific reconstruction.

The release of some portion of the stock of impuls
is an opportunity, not an end. In its origin it is t
product of chance; but it affords imagination and i
vention *their* chance. The moral correlate of liberat
impulse is not immediate activity, but reflection up
the way in which to use impulse to renew dispositi
and reorganize habit. Escape from the clutch of cu
tom gives an opportunity to do old things in new way
and thus to construct new ends and means. Brea
in the crust of the cake of custom releases impulse
but it is the work of intelligence to find the ways
using them. There is an alternative between anchori
a boat in the harbor till it becomes a rotting hulk a
letting it loose to be the sport of every contrary gu
To discover and define this alternative is the busine
of mind, of observant, remembering, contriving d
position.

Habit as a vital art depends upon the animation
habit by impulse; only this inspiriting stands betwe
habit and stagnation. But art, little as well as gre
anonymous as well as that distinguished by titles
dignity, cannot be improvised. It is impossible witho
spontaneity, but it is not spontaneity. Impulse
needed to arouse thought, incite reflection and enli

ief. But only thought notes obstructions, invents ls, conceives aims, directs technique, and thus con- ts impulse into an art which lives in objects. ought is born as the twin of impulse in every mo- nt of impeded habit. But unless it is nurtured, it edily dies, and habit and instinct continue their il warfare. There is instinctive wisdom in the ten- ncy of the young to ignore the limitations of the en- ronment. Only thus can they discover their own wer and learn the differences in different kinds of ironing limitations. But this discovery when once de marks the birth of intelligence; and with its birth nes the responsibility of the mature to observe, to all, to forecast. Every moral life has its radical- ; but this radical factor does not find its full ex- ession in direct action but in the courage of intelli- nce to go deeper than either tradition or immediate pulse goes. To the study of intelligence in action we w turn our attention.

PART THREE

THE PLACE OF INTELLIGENCE IN CONDUCT

I

In discussing habit and impulse we have repeate met topics where reference to the work of thought w imperative. Explicit consideration of the place a office of intelligence in conduct can hardly begin oth wise than by gathering together these incidental ref ences and reaffirming their significance. The stimu tion of reflective imagination by impulse, its depe ence upon established habits, and its effect in tra forming habit and regulating impulse forms, acco ingly, our first theme.

Habits are conditions of intellectual efficiency. Th operate in two ways upon intellect. Obviously, th restrict its reach, they fix its boundaries. They blinders that confine the eyes of mind to the road ahe They prevent thought from straying away from its minent occupation to a landscape more varied a picturesque but irrelevant to practice. Outside scope of habits, thought works gropingly, fumbling confused uncertainty; and yet habit made complete routine shuts in thought so effectually that it is longer needed or possible. The routineer's road i

ch out of which he cannot get, whose sides enclose
a, directing his course so thoroughly that he no
nger thinks of his path or his destination. All habit-
rming involves the beginning of an intellectual spec-
lization which if unchecked ends in thoughtless
tion.

Significantly enough this fullblown result is called
sentmindedness. Stimulus and response are mechan-
lly linked together in an unbroken chain. Each suc-
sive act facilely evoked by its predecessor pushes us
tomatically into the next act of a predetermined se-
s. Only a signal flag of distress recalls consciousness
the task of carrying on. Fortunately nature which
ckons us to this path of least resistance also puts
stacles in the way of our complete acceptance of its
itation. Success in achieving a ruthless and dull
ciency of action is thwarted by untoward circum-
nce. The most skilful aptitude bumps at times into
unexpected, and so gets into trouble from which
ly observation and invention extricate it. Efficiency
following a beaten path has then to be converted
o breaking a new road through strange lands.

Nevertheless what in effect is love of ease has mas-
eraded morally as love of perfection. A goal of fin-
ed accomplishment has been set up which if it were
ained would mean only mindless action. It has been
led complete and free activity when in truth it is
ly a treadmill activity or marching in one place. The
actical impossibility of reaching, in an all around
y and all at once such a "perfection" has been rec-

ognized. But such a goal has nevertheless been co
ceived as the ideal, and progress has been defined
approximation to it. Under diverse intellectual ski
the ideal has assumed diverse forms and colors. B
all of them have involved the conception of a complet
activity, a static perfection. Desire and need have be
treated as signs of deficiency, and endeavor as pro
not of power but of incompletion.

In Aristotle this conception of an end which e
hausts all realization and excludes all potentiality a
pears as a definition of the highest excellence. It
necessity excludes all want and struggle and all d
pendencies. It is neither practical nor social. Not
ing is left but a self-revolving, self-sufficing thoug
engaged in contemplating its own sufficiency. So
forms of Oriental morals have united this logic with
profounder psychology, and have seen that the fi
terminus on this road is Nirvana, an obliteration
all thought and desire. In medieval science, the id
reappeared as a definition of heavenly bliss accessi
only to a redeemed immortal soul. Herbert Spen
is far enough away from Aristotle, medieval Christi
ity and Buddhism; but the idea re-emerges in his c
ception of a goal of evolution in which adaptation
organism to environment is complete and final.
popular thought, the conception lives in the vag
thought of a remote state of attainment in which
shall be beyond "temptation," and in which vir
by its own inertia will persist as a triumphant consu
mation. Even Kant who begins with a complete sc

happiness ends with an "ideal" of the eternal and disturbed union of virtue and joy, though in his e nothing but a symbolic approximation is admitted be feasible.

The fallacy in these versions of the same idea is haps the most pervasive of all fallacies in philosy. So common is it that one questions whether it ght not be called *the* philosophical fallacy. It cons in the supposition that whatever is found true ler certain conditions may forthwith be asserted unisally or without limits and conditions. Because a rsty man gets satisfaction in drinking water, bliss sists in being drowned. Because the success of any rticular struggle is measured by reaching a point of ctionless action, therefore there is such a thing as an inclusive end of effortless smooth activity endlessly intained. It is forgotten that success is success *of* specific effort, and satisfaction the fulfilment *of* a cific demand, so that success and satisfaction be- ne meaningless when severed from the wants and uggles whose consummations they are, or when en universally. The philosophy of Nirvana comes closest to admission of this fact, but even it holds rvana to be desirable.

Habit is however more than a restriction of thought. bits become negative limits because they are first itive agencies. The more numerous our habits the er the field of possible observation and foretelling. e more flexible they are, the more refined is percepn in its discrimination and the more delicate the pres-

entation evoked by imagination. The sailor is int
lectually at home on the sea, the hunter in the fore
the painter in his studio, the man of science in his lab
ratory. These commonplaces are universally rec
nized in the concrete; but their significance is obscur
and their truth denied in the current general theo
of mind. For they mean nothing more or less th
that habits formed in process of exercising biologi
aptitudes are the sole agents of observation, recoll
tion, foresight and judgment: a mind or consciousn
or soul in general which performs these operations
a myth.

The doctrine of a single, simple and indissoluble s
was the cause and the effect of failure to recognize th
concrete habits are the means of knowledge a
thought. Many who think themselves scientifica
emancipated and who freely advertise the soul for
superstition, perpetuate a false notion of what kno
that is, of a separate knower. Nowadays they usua
fix upon consciousness in general, as a stream or proc
or entity; or else, more specifically upon sensations a
images as the tools of intellect. Or sometimes th
think they have scaled the last heights of realism
adverting grandiosely to a formal knower in gene
who serves as one term in the knowing relati
by dismissing psychology as irrelevant to knowle
and logic, they think to conceal the psychological m
ster they have conjured up.

Now it is dogmatically stated that no such conc
tions of the seat, agent or vehicle will go psycholog

dly at the present time. Concrete habits do all the erceiving, recognizing, imagining, recalling, judging, onceiving and reasoning that is done. "Consciousess," whether as a stream or as special sensations and nages, expresses functions of habits, phenomena of eir formation, operation, their interruption and reoranization.

Yet habit does not, of itself, know, for it does not f itself stop to think, observe or remember. Neither oes impulse of itself engage in reflection or contemlation. It just lets go. Habits by themselves are too rganized, too insistent and determinate to need to dulge in inquiry or imagination. And impulses are oo chaotic, tumultuous and confused to be able to now even if they wanted to. Habit as such is too efinitely adapted to an environment to survey or anlyze it, and impulse is too indeterminately related to ne environment to be capable of reporting anything bout it. Habit incorporates, enacts or overrides obects, but it doesn't know them. Impulse scatters and bliterates them with its restless stir. A certain deliate combination of habit and impulse is requisite for bservation, memory and judgment. Knowledge which not projected against the black unknown lives in the uscles, not in consciousness.

We may, indeed, be said to *know how* by means of our abits. And a sensible intimation of the practical funcon of knowledge has led men to identify all acquired ractical skill, or even the instinct of animals, with nowledge. We walk and read aloud, we get off and

on street cars, we dress and undress, and do a thousan useful acts without thinking of them. We know some thing, namely, how to do them. Bergson's philosoph of intuition is hardly more than an elaborately docu mented commentary on the popular conception that b instinct a bird knows how to build a nest and a spide to weave a web. But after all, this practical wor done by habit and instinct in securing prompt and exac adjustment to the environment is not knowledge, excep by courtesy. Or, if we choose to call it knowledge— and no one has the right to issue an ukase to the con trary—then other things also called knowledge, know edge *of* and *about* things, knowledge *that* things ar thus and so, knowledge that involves reflection and con scious appreciation, remains of a different sort, una counted for and undescribed.

For it is a commonplace that the more suavely e ficient a habit the more unconsciously it operates. Onl a hitch in its workings occasions emotion and provok thought. Carlyle and Rousseau, hostile in tempera ment and outlook, yet agree in looking at consciou ness as a kind of disease, since we have no consciousne of bodily or mental organs as long as they work at ea in perfect health. The idea of disease is, however, asi from the point, unless we are pessimistic enough t regard every slip in total adjustment of a person to i surroundings as something abnormal—a point of vi which once more would identify well-being with perfe automatism. The truth is that in every waking m ment, the complete balance of the organism and i

nvironment is constantly interfered with and as con-tantly restored. Hence the "stream of consciousness" in general, and in particular that phase of it cele-rated by William James as alternation of flights and erchings. Life is interruptions and recoveries. Con-inuous interruption is not possible in the activities f an individual. Absence of perfect equilibrium is not quivalent to a complete crushing of organized activ-y. When the disturbance amounts to such a pitch s that, the self goes to pieces. It is like shell-shock. ormally, the environment remains sufficiently in har-ony with the body of organized activities to sustain ost of them in active function. But a novel factor the surroundings releases some impulse which tends o initiate a different and incompatible activity, to ring about a redistribution of the elements of organ-ed activity between those have been respectively entral and subsidiary. Thus the hand guided by the ye moves toward a surface. Visual quality is the dom-nant element. The hand comes in contact with an bject. The eye does not cease to operate but some nexpected quality of touch, a voluptuous smoothness r annoying heat, compels a readjustment in which the ouching, handling activity strives to dominate the ac-ion. Now at these moments of a shifting in activity onscious feeling and thought arise and are accentu-ted. The disturbed adjustment of organism and en-ironment is reflected in a temporary strife which con-udes in a coming to terms of the old habit and the new mpulse.

In this period of redistribution impulse determine the direction of movement. It furnishes the focus abou which reorganization swirls. Our attention in short i always directed forward to bring to notice somethin which is imminent but which as yet escapes us. Impuls defines the peering, the search, the inquiry. It is, i logical language, the movement into the unknown, no into the immense inane of the unknown at large, but int that special unknown which when it is hit upon restore an ordered, unified action. During this search, ol habit supplies content, filling, definite, recognizable subject-matter. It begins as vague presentiment o what we are going towards. As organized habits ar definitely deployed and focused, the confused situatio takes on form, it is "cleared up"—the essential func tion of intelligence. Processes become objects. Witl out habit there is only irritation and confused hesita tion. With habit alone there is a machine-like repeti tion, a duplicating recurrence of old acts. With con flict of habits and release of impulse there is conscious search.

II

We are going far afield from any direct moral issue. But the problem of the place of knowledge and judgment in conduct depends upon getting the fundamental psychology of thought straightened out. So the excursion must be continued. We compare life to a traveler faring forth. We may consider him first at a moment where his activity is confident, straightforward, organized. He marches on giving no direct attention to his path, nor thinking of his destination. Abruptly he is pulled up, arrested. Something is going wrong in his activity. From the standpoint of an onlooker, he has met an obstacle which must be overcome before his behavior can be unified into a successful ongoing. From his own standpoint, there is shock, confusion, perturbation, uncertainty. For the moment he doesn't know what hit him, as we say, nor where he is going. But a new impulse is stirred which becomes the starting point of an investigation, a looking into things, a trying to see them, to find out what is going on. Habits which were interfered with begin to get a new direction as they cluster about the impulse to look and see. The blocked habits of locomotion give him a sense of where he *was* going, of what he had set out to do, and of the ground already traversed. As he looks, he sees definite things which are not just things at large but which are related

to his course of action. The momentum of the activity entered upon persists as a sense of direction, of aim it is an anticipatory project. In short, he recollects observes and plans.

The trinity of these forecasts, perceptions and re membrances form a subject-matter of discriminate and identified objects. These objects represent habit turned inside out. They exhibit both the onward ten dency of habit and the objective conditions which hav been incorporated within it. Sensations in immediat consciousness are elements of action dislocated throug the shock of interruption. They never, however, com pletely monopolize the scene; for there is a body o residual undisturbed habits which is reflected in remem bered and perceived objects having a meaning. Thu out of shock and puzzlement there gradually emerges figured framework of objects, past, present, future These shade off variously into a vast penumbra o vague, unfigured things, a setting which is taken fo granted and not at all explicitly presented. The com plexity of the figured scene in its scope and refinemer of contents depends wholly upon prior habits and the organization. The reason a baby can know little an an experienced adult know much when confronting th same things is not because the latter has a "mind which the former has not, but because one has alread formed habits which the other has still to acquire. Th scientific man and the philosopher like the carpente the physician and politician know with their habits n with their "consciousness." The latter is eventual, n

a source. Its occurrence marks a peculiarly delicate connection between highly organized habits and unorganized impulses. Its contents or objects, observed, recollected, projected and generalized into principles, represent the incorporated material of habits coming to the surface, because habits are disintegrating at the touch of conflicting impulses. But they also gather themselves together to comprehend impulse and make it effective.

This account is more or less strange as psychology but certain aspects of it are commonplaces in a static logical formulation. It is, for example, almost a truism that knowledge is both synthetic and analytic; a set of discriminated elements connected by relations. This combination of opposite factors of unity and difference, elements and relations, has been a standing paradox and mystery of the theory of knowledge. It will remain so until we connect the theory of knowledge with an empirically verifiable theory of behavior. The steps of this connection have been sketched and we may enumerate them. We know at such times as habits are impeded, when a conflict is set up in which impulse is released. So far as this impulse sets up a definite forward tendency it constitutes the forward, prospective character of knowledge. In this phase unity or synthesis is found. We are striving to unify our responses, to achieve a consistent environment which will restore unity of conduct. Unity, relations, are prospective; they mark out lines converging to a focus. They are ideal." But *what* we know, the objects that present

themselves with definiteness and assurance, are retrospective; they are the conditions which have been mastered, incorporated in the past. They are elements, discriminated, analytic just because old habits so far as they are checked are also broken into objects which define the obstruction of ongoing activity. They are "real," not ideal. Unity is something sought; split, division is something given, at hand. Were we to carry the same psychology into detail we should come upon the explanation of perceived particulars and conceived universals, of the relation of discovery and proof, induction and deduction, the discrete and the continuous. Anything approaching an adequate discussion is too technical to be here in place. But the main point, however technical and abstract it may be in statement, is of far reaching importance for everything concerned with moral beliefs, conscience and judgments of right and wrong.

The most general, if vaguest issue, concerns the nature of the organ of moral knowledge. As long as knowledge in general is thought to be the work of a special agent, whether soul, consciousness, intellect or a knower in general, there is a logical propulsion towards postulating a special agent for knowledge of moral distinctions. Consciousness and conscience have more than a verbal connection. If the former is something in itself, a seat or power which antecedes intellectual functions, why should not the latter be also a unique faculty with its own separate jurisdiction? If reason in general is independent of empirically verifi

ble realities of human nature, such as instincts and ganized habits, why should there not also exist a oral or practical reason independent of natural op- ations? On the other hand if it is recognized that nowing is carried on through the medium of natural ctors, the assumption of special agencies for moral nowing becomes outlawed and incredible. Now the atter of the existence or non-existence of such special gencies is no technically remote matter. The belief a separate organ involves belief in a separate and dependent subject-matter. The question fundamen- lly at issue is nothing more or less than whether oral values, regulations, principles and objects form separate and independent domain or whether they are rt and parcel of a normal development of a life ocess.

These considerations explain why the denial of a parate organ of knowledge, of a separate instinct or pulse toward knowing, is not the wilful philistinism is sometimes alleged to be. There is of course a sense which there is a distinctive impulse, or rather habit- l disposition, to know. But in the same sense there an impulse to aviate, to run a typewriter or write ories for magazines. Some activities result in knowl- ge, as others result in these other things. The result ay be so important as to induce distinctive attention to e activities in order to foster them. From an incident, most a by-product, attainment of truth, physical, so- l, moral, may become the leading characteristic of ne activities. Under such circumstances, they be-

come transformed. Knowing is then a distinctive acti
ity, with its own ends and its peculiarly adapted pr
cesses. All this is a matter of course. Having h
upon knowledge accidentally, as it were, and the pro
uct being liked and its importance noted, knowledg
getting becomes, upon occasion, a definite occupatio
And education confirms the disposition, as it may co
firm that of a musician or carpenter or tenni
player. But there is no more an original separate in
pulse or power in one case than in the other. Eve
habit is impulsive, that is projective, urgent, and t
habit of knowing is no exception.

The reason for insisting on this fact is not failu
to appreciate the distinctive value of knowledge wh
once it comes into existence. This value is so immen
it may be called unique. The aim of the discussion
not to subordinate knowing to some hard, prosaic uti
tarian end. The reason for insistence upon the deriv
tive position of knowing in activity, roots in a sense f
fact, and in a realization that the doctrine of a sep
rate original power and impulse of knowledge cu
knowledge off from other phases of human nature, a
results in its non-natural treatment. The isolation
intellectual disposition from concrete empirical fac
of biological impulse and habit-formation entails a d
nial of the continuity of mind with nature. Aristo
asserted that the faculty of pure knowing enters a m
from without as through a door. Many since his d
have asserted that knowing and doing have no intrin
connection with each other. Reason is asserted to ha

responsibility to experience; conscience is said to be sublime oracle independent of education and social influences. All of these views follow naturally from a failure to recognize that all knowing, judgment, belief present an acquired result of the workings of natural impulses in connection with environment.

Upon the ethical side, as has been intimated, the matter at issue concerns the nature of conscience. Conscience has been asserted by orthodox moralists to be unique in origin and subject-matter. The same view is embodied by implication in all those popular methods of moral training which attempt to fix rigid authoritative notions of right and wrong by disconnecting moral judgments from the aids and tests which are used in other forms of knowledge. Thus it has been asserted that conscience is an original faculty of illumination which (if it has not been dimmed by indulgence in sin) shines upon moral truths and objects and reveals them without effort for precisely what they are. Those who hold this view differ enormously among themselves as to the nature of the objects of conscience. Some hold them to be general principles, others individual acts, others the order of worth among motives, others the sense of duty in general, others the unqualified authority of right. Still others carry the implied logic of authority to conclusion, and identify knowledge of moral truths with a divine supernatural revelation of a code of commandments.

But among these diversities there is agreement about the fundamental. There must be a separate non-

natural faculty of moral knowledge because the thing to be known, the matters of right and wrong, good and evil, obligation and responsibility, form a separate domain, separate that is from that of ordinary action in its usual human and social significance. The latter activities may be prudential, political, scientific, economic. But, from the standpoint of these theories, they have no moral meaning until they are brought under the purview of this separate unique department of our nature. It thus turns out that the so-called intuitional theories of moral knowledge concentrate in themselves all the ideas which are subject to criticism in these pages: Namely, the assertion that morality is distinct in origin, working and destiny from the natural structure and career of human nature. This fact is the excuse, if excuse be desired, for a seemingly technical excursion that links intellectual activity with the conjoint operation of habit and impulse.

III

So far the discussion has ignored the fact that there
: an influential school of moralists (best represented
ı contemporary thought by the utilitarians) which
lso insists upon the natural, empirical character of
ıoral judgments and beliefs. But unfortunately this
:hool has followed a false psychology; and has tended,
y calling out a reaction, actually to strengthen the
ands of those who persist in assigning to morals a
:parate domain of action and in demanding a separate
gent of moral knowledge. The essentials of this false
sychology consist in two traits. The first, that knowl-
lge originates from sensations (instead of from habits
nd impulses); and the second, that judgment about
ood and evil in action consists in calculation of agree-
ble and disagreeable consequences, of profit and loss.
t is not surprising that this view seems to many to
egrade morals, as well as to be false to facts. If the
gical outcome of an empirical view of moral knowledge
that all morality is concerned with calculating what
expedient, politic, prudent, measured by consequences
the ways of pleasurable and painful sensations, then,
ıy moralists of the orthodox school, we will have
ıught to do with such a sordid view: It is a reduction
the absurd of its premisses. We will have a sepa-

rate department for morals and a separate organ c
moral knowledge.

Our first problem is then to investigate the natur
of ordinary judgments upon what it is best or wise t
do, or, in ordinary language, the nature of deliberatio
We begin with a summary assertion that deliberation i
a dramatic rehearsal (in imagination) of various com
peting possible lines of action. It starts from th
blocking of efficient overt action, due to that conflic
of prior habit and newly released impulse to which re
erence has been made. Then each habit, each impuls
involved in the temporary suspense of overt actio
takes its turn in being tried out. Deliberation is a
experiment in finding out what the various lines of po
sible action are really like. It is an experiment i
making various combinations of selected elements c
habits and impulses, to see what the resultant actio
would be like if it were entered upon. But the trial
in imagination, not in overt fact. The experiment
carried on by tentative rehearsals in thought which d
not affect physical facts outside the body. Though
runs ahead and foresees outcomes, and thereby avoi
having to await the instruction of actual failure an
disaster. An act overtly tried out is irrevocable, i
consequences cannot be blotted out. An act tried ou
in imagination is not final or fatal. It is retrievable.

Each conflicting habit and impulse takes its turn
projecting itself upon the screen of imagination.
unrolls a picture of its future history, of the career
would have if it were given head. Although overt e

ibition is checked by the pressure of contrary propul-ive tendencies, this very inhibition gives habit a chance t manifestation in thought. Deliberation means pre-isely that activity is disintegrated, and that its various lements hold one another up. While none has force nough to become the center of a re-directed activity, r to dominate a course of action, each has enough ower to check others from exercising mastery. Activ-y does not cease in order to give way to reflection; ctivity is turned from execution into intra-organic hannels, resulting in dramatic rehearsal.

If activity were directly exhibited it would result in ertain experiences, contacts with the environment. It ould succeed by making environing objects, things and ersons, co-partners in its forward movement; or else would run against obstacles and be troubled, pos-ibly defeated. These experiences of contact with ob-ects and their qualities give meaning, character, to an therwise fluid, unconscious activity. We find out what eeing means by the objects which are seen. They con-titute the significance of visual activity which would therwise remain a blank. "Pure" activity is for con-ciousness pure emptiness. It acquires a content or lling of meanings only in static termini, what it comes o rest in, or in the obstacles which check its onward ovement and deflect it. As has been remarked, the ob-ect is that which objects.

There is no difference in this respect between a visible ourse of conduct and one proposed in deliberation. Ve have no direct consciousness of what we purpose

to do. We can judge its nature, assign its meaning only by following it into the situations whither it leads noting the objects against which it runs and seeing how they rebuff or unexpectedly encourage it. In imagination as in fact we know a road only by what we see as we travel on it. Moreover the objects which prick out the course of a proposed act until we can see its design also serve to direct eventual overt activity. Every object hit upon as the habit traverses its imaginary path has a direct effect upon existing activities. It reinforces, inhibits, redirects habits already working or stirs up others which had not previously actively entered in. In thought as well as in overt action, the objects experienced in following out a course of action attract, repel, satisfy, annoy, promote and retard. Thus deliberation proceeds. To say that at last it ceases is to say that choice, decision, takes place.

What then is choice? Simply hitting in imagination upon an object which furnishes an adequate stimulus to the recovery of overt action. Choice is made as soon as some habit, or some combination of elements of habit and impulse, finds a way fully open. Then energy is released. The mind is made up, composed, unified. As long as deliberation pictures shoals or rocks or trouble some gales as marking the route of a contemplated voyage, deliberation goes on. But when the various factors in action fit harmoniously together, when imagination finds no annoying hindrance, when there is a picture of open seas, filled sails and favoring winds, the voyage is definitely entered upon. This decisive dire

tion of action constitutes choice. It is a great error to suppose that we have no preferences until there is a choice. We are always biased beings, tending in one direction rather than another. The occasion of deliberation is an *excess* of preferences, not natural apathy or an absence of likings. We want things that are incompatible with one another; therefore we have to make a choice of what we *really* want, of the course of action, that is, which most fully releases activities. Choice is not the emergence of preference out of indifference. It is the emergence of a unified preference out of competing preferences. Biases that had held one another in check now, temporarily at least, reinforce one another, and constitute a unified attitude. The moment arrives when imagination pictures an objective consequence of action which supplies an adequate stimulus and releases definitive action. All deliberation is a search for a *way* to act, not for a final terminus. Its office is to facilitate stimulation.

Hence there is reasonable and unreasonable choice. The object thought of may simply stimulate some impulse or habit to a pitch of intensity where it is temporarily irresistible. It then overrides all competitors and secures for itself the sole right of way. The object looms large in imagination; it swells to fill the field. It allows no room for alternatives; it absorbs us, enraptures us, carries us away, sweeps us off our feet by its own attractive force. Then choice is arbitrary, unreasonable. But the object thought of may be one which stimulates by unifying, harmonizing, different

competing tendencies. It may release an activity i which all are fulfilled, not indeed, in their original form but in a "sublimated" fashion, that is in a way whic modifies the original direction of each by reducing i to a component along with others in an action of trans formed quality. Nothing is more extraordinary tha the delicacy, promptness and ingenuity with which de liberation is capable of making eliminations and re combinations in projecting the course of a possibl activity. To every shade of imagined circumstanc there is a vibrating response; and to every complex sit uation a sensitiveness as to its integrity, a feeling o whether it does justice to all facts, or overrides som to the advantage of others. Decision is reasonabl when deliberation is so conducted. There may b error in the result, but it comes from lack of data no from ineptitude in handling them.

These facts give us the key to the old controvers as to the respective places of desire and reason in con duct. It is notorious that some moralists have de plored the influence of desire; they have found the hea of strife between good and evil in the conflict of desi with reason, in which the former has force on its sid and the latter authority. But reasonableness is in fa a quality of an effective relationship among desir rather than a thing opposed to desire. It signifies th order, perspective, proportion which is achieved, durin deliberation, out of a diversity of earlier incompatib preferences. Choice is reasonable when it induces t to act reasonably; that is, with regard to the clai

of each of the competing habits and impulses. This implies, of course, the presence of a comprehensive object, one which coordinates, organizes and functions each factor of the situation which gave rise to conflict, suspense and deliberation. This is as true when some "bad" impulses and habits enter in as when approved ones require unification. We have already seen the effects of choking them off, of efforts at direct suppression. Bad habits can be subdued only by being utilized as elements in a new, more generous and comprehensive scheme of action, and good ones be preserved from rot only by similar use.

The nature of the strife of reason and passion is well stated by William James. The cue of passion, he says in effect, is to keep imagination dwelling upon those objects which are congenial to it, which feed it, and which by feeding it intensify its force, until it crowds out all thought of other objects. An impulse or habit which is strongly emotional magnifies all objects that are congruous with it and smothers those which are opposed whenever they present themselves. A passionate activity learns to work itself up artificially —as Oliver Cromwell indulged in fits of anger when he wanted to do things that his conscience would not justify. A presentiment is felt that if the thought of contrary objects is allowed to get a lodgment in imagination, these objects will work and work to chill and freeze out the ardent passion of the moment.

The conclusion is not that the emotional, passionate phase of action can be or should be eliminated in be-

half of a bloodless reason. More "passions," not fewer is the answer. To check the influence of hate there must be sympathy, while to rationalize sympathy there are needed emotions of curiosity, caution, respect for the freedom of others—dispositions which evoke objects which balance those called up by sympathy, and prevent its degeneration into maudlin sentiment and meddling interference. Rationality, once more, is not a force to evoke against impulse and habit. It is the attainment of a working harmony among diverse desires. "Reason" as a noun signifies the happy cooperation of a multitude of dispositions, such as sympathy, curiosity, exploration, experimentation, frankness, pursuit—to follow things through—circumspection, to look about at the context, etc., etc. The elaborate systems of science are born not of reason but of impulse at first slight and flickering; impulses to handle, move about, to hunt, to uncover, to mix things separated and divide things combined, to talk and to listen. Method is their effectual organization into continuous dispositions of inquiry, development and testing. It occurs after these acts and because of their consequences. Reason, the rational attitude, is the resulting disposition, not a ready-made antecedent which can be invoked at will and set into movement. The man who would intelligently cultivate intelligence will widen, not narrow, his life of strong impulses while aiming at the happy coincidence in operation.

The clew of impulse is, as we say, to start something. It is in a hurry. It rushes us off our feet.

eaves no time for examination, memory and foresight. ut the clew of reason is, as the phrase also goes, to top and think. Force, however, is required to stop the ngoing of a habit or impulse. This is supplied by nother habit. The resulting period of delay, of sus- ended and postponed overt action, is the period in hich activities that are refused direct outlet project naginative counterparts. It signifies, in technical hrase, the mediation of impulse. For an isolated im- ulse *is* immediate, narrowing the world down to the irectly present. Variety of competing tendencies en- arges the world. It brings a diversity of considera- ons before the mind, and enables action to take place nally in view of an object generously conceived and elicately refined, composed by a long process of elections and combinations. In popular phrase, to be eliberate is to be slow, unhurried. It takes time to put bjects in order.

There are however vices of reflection as well as of npulse. We may not look far enough ahead because e are hurried into action by stress of impulse; but e may also become overinterested in the delights of eflection; we become afraid of assuming the responsi- ilities of decisive choice and action, and in general be icklied over by a pale cast of thought. We may be- ome so curious about remote and abstract matters hat we give only a begrudged, impatient attention to he things right about us. We may fancy we are glori- ying the love of truth for its own sake when we are nly indulging a pet occupation and slighting demands

of the immediate situation. Men who devote themselve to thinking are likely to be unusually unthinking i some respects, as for example in immediate personal re lationships. A man to whom exact scholarship is a absorbing pursuit may be more than ordinarily vagu in ordinary matters. Humility and impartiality ma be shown in a specialized field, and pettiness and ar rogance in dealing with other persons. "Reason" i not an antecedent force which serves as a panacea. I is a laborious achievement of habit needing to be con tinually worked over. A balanced arrangement of pro pulsive activities manifested in deliberation—namely reason—depends upon a sensitive and proportionat emotional sensitiveness. Only a one-sided, over-special ized emotion leads to thinking of it as separate fron emotion. The traditional association of justice an reason has good psychology back of it. Both imply balanced distribution of thought and energy. Delib eration is irrational in the degree in which an end i so fixed, a passion or interest so absorbing, that th foresight of consequences is warped to include onl what furthers execution of its predetermined bias. De liberation is rational in the degree in which forethough flexibly remakes old aims and habits, institutes percep tion and love of new ends and acts.

IV

We now return to a consideration of the utilitarian heory according to which deliberation consists in calulation of courses of action on the basis of the profit nd loss to which they lead. The contrast of this noion with fact is obvious. The office of deliberation is ot to supply an inducement to act by figuring out here the most advantage is to be procured. It is to esolve entanglements in existing activity, restore connuity, recover harmony, utilize loose impulse and reirect habit. To this end observation of present conitions, recollection of previous situations are devoted. Deliberation has its beginning in troubled activity and s conclusion in choice of a course of action which raightens it out. It no more resembles the casting-up f accounts of profit and loss, pleasures and pains, than n actor engaged in drama resembles a clerk recording ebit and credit items in his ledger.

The primary fact is that man is a being who responds action to the stimuli of the environment. This fact complicated in deliberation, but it certainly is not olished. We continue to react to an object presented imagination as we react to objects presented in obrvation. The baby does not move to the mother's reast because of calculation of the advantages of armth and food over against the pains of effort. Nor

does the miser seek gold, nor the architect strive t make plans, nor the physician to heal, because of reck onings of comparative advantage and disadvantage Habit, occupation, furnishes the necessity of forward action in one case as instinct does in the other. We d not act *from* reasoning; but reasoning puts before u objects which are not directly or sensibly present, s that we then may react directly to these objects, wit aversion, attraction, indifference or attachment, pre cisely as we would to the same objects if they wer physically present. In the end it results in a case o direct stimulus and response. In one case the stimulu is presented at once through sense; in the other case, i is indirectly reached through memory and constructiv imagination. But the matter of directness and in directness concerns the way the stimulus is reached not the way in which it operates.

Joy and suffering, pain and pleasure, the agreeabl and disagreeable, play their considerable rôle in de liberation. Not, however, by way of a calculated es timate of future delights and miseries, but by way o experiencing present ones. The reaction of joy an sorrow, elation and depression, is as natural a respons to objects presented in imagination as to those pr sented in sense. Complacency and annoyance follo hard at the heels of any object presented in image a they do upon its sensuous experience. Some objec when thought of are congruent to our existing sta of activity. They fit in, they are welcome. They agre or are agreeable, not as matter of calculation but a

atter of experienced fact. Other objects rasp; they t across activity; they are tiresome, hateful, unlcome. They disagree with the existing trend of tivity, that is, they are disagreeable, and in no other ıy than as a bore who prolongs his visit, a dun we n't pay, or a pestiferous mosquito who goes on buzzg. We do not think of future losses and expansions. e think, through imagination, of objects into which the future some course of action will run, and we e *now* delighted or depressed, pleased or pained at ıat is presented. This running commentary of likes d dislikes, attractions and disdains, joys and sorws, reveals to any man who is intelligent enough to te them and to study their occasions his own charter. It instructs him as to the composition and dction of the activities that make him what he is. To ıow what jars an activity and what agrees with it is know something important about that activity and out ourselves.

Some one may ask what practical difference it makes ıether we are influenced by calculation of future joys ıd annoyances or by experience of present ones. To ch a question one can hardly reply except in the ords "All the difference in the world." In the first ace, no difference can be more important than that ıich concerns the nature of the *subject-matter* of deıeration. The calculative theory would have it that is subject-matter is future feelings, sensations, and at actions and thought are external means to get ıd avoid these sensations. If such a theory has any

practical influence, it is to advise a person to concer
trate upon his own most subjective and private feeling
It gives him no choice except between a sickly intr
spection and an intricate calculus of remote, inaccess
ble and indeterminate results. In fact, deliberation,
a tentative trying-out of various courses of action,
outlooking. It flies toward and settles upon objecti
situations not upon feelings. No doubt we sometim
fall to deliberating upon the effect of action upon o
future feelings, thinking of a situation mainly with re
erence to the comforts and discomforts it will excite
us. But these moments are precisely our sentiment
moments of self-pity or self-glorification. They co
duce to morbidity, sophistication, isolation from other
while facing our acts in terms of their objective co
sequences leads to enlightenment and to considerati
of others. The first objection therefore to deliberati
as a calculation of future feelings is that, if it is co
sistently adhered to, it makes an abnormal case t
standard one.

If however an objective estimate is attempt
thought gets speedily lost in a task impossible
achievement. Future pleasures and pains are inf
enced by two factors which are independent of prese
choice and effort. They depend upon our own state
some future moment and upon the surrounding c
cumstances of that moment. Both of these are va
ables which change independently of present resolve a
action. They are much more important determina
of future sensations than is anything which can now

lculated. Things sweet in anticipation are bitter in tual taste, things we now turn from in aversion are lcome at another moment in our career. Independ-tly of deep changes in character, such as from merci-lness to callousness, from fretfulness to cheerfulness, ere are unavoidable changes in the waxing and wan-g of activity. A child pictures a future of unlimited ys and unrestricted sweetmeats. An adult pictures an ject as giving pleasure while he is empty while the ing arrives in a moment of repletion. A sympathetic rson reckons upon the utilitarian basis the pains of hers as a debit item in his calculations. But why not rden himself so that others' sufferings won't count? hy not foster an arrogant cruelty so that the suf-ring of others which will follow from one's own action ll fall on the credit side of the reckoning, be pleasur-le, all to the good?

Future pleasures and pains, even of one's own, are nong the things most elusive of calculation. Of all ings they lend themselves least readily to anything proaching a mathematical calculus. And the further to the future we extend our view, and the more the easures of others enter into the account, the more peless does the problem of estimating future conse-ences become. All of the elements become more and ore indeterminate. Even if one could form a fairly curate picture of the things that give pleasure to st people at the present moment—an exceedingly ficult task—he cannot foresee the detailed circum-nces which will give a decisive turn to enjoyment at

future times and remote places. Do pleasures due defective education or unrefined disposition, to s nothing of the pleasures of sensuality and brutalit rank the same as those of cultivated persons havi acute social sensitiveness? The only reason the i possibility of the hedonistic calculus is not self-evide is that theorists in considering it unconsciously su stitute for calculation of future pleasures an appreci tion of present ones, a present realization in imagin tion of future objective situations.

For, in truth, a man's judgment of future joys a sorrows is but a projection of what now satisfies a annoys him. A man of considerate disposition n feels hurt at the thought of an act bringing harm others, and so he is on the lookout for consequences that sort, ranking them as of high importance. may even be so abnormally sensitive to such cons quences that he is held back from needed vigorous a tion. He fears to do the things which are for the r welfare of others because he shrinks from the thoug of the pain to be inflicted upon them by needed me ures. A man of an executive type, engrossed in carr ing through a scheme, will react in present emotion everything concerned with its external success; the p its execution brings to others will not occur to him, if it does, his mind will easily glide over it. This s of consequence will seem to him of slight importa in comparison with the commercial or political chan which bulk in his plans. What a man foresees and f to foresee, what he appraises highly and at a low ra

hat he deems important and trivial, what he dwells on and what he slurs over, what he easily recalls and hat he naturally forgets—all of these things depend on his character. His estimate of future consequences of the agreeable and annoying is consequently much greater value as an index of what he now is an as a prediction of future results.

One has only to read between the lines to see the ormous difference that marks off modern utilitarianm from epicureanism, in spite of similarities in prosed psychologies. Epicureanism is too worldly-wise indulge in attempts to base present action upon prerious estimates of future and universal pleasures and ins. On the contrary it says let the future go, for e is uncertain. Who knows when it will end, or what rtune the morrow will bring? Foster, then, with jeals care every gift of pleasure now allotted to you, ell upon it with lingering love, prolong it as best you ay. Utilitarianism on the contrary was a part of a ilanthropic and reform movement of the nineteenth ntury. Its commendation of an elaborate and imssible calculus was in reality part of a movement to velop a type of character which should have a wide cial outlook, sympathy with the experiences of all ntient creatures, one zealous about the social effects all proposed acts, especially those of collective legision and administration. It was concerned not with tracting the honey of the passing moment but with eeding improved bees and constructing hives.

After all, the object of foresight of consequences is

not to predict the future. It is to ascertain the mea
ing of present activities and to secure, so far as po
sible, a present activity with a unified meaning. We a
not the creators of heaven and earth; we have no r
sponsibility for their operations save as their motio
are altered by our movements. Our concern is wi
the significance of that slight fraction of total activi
which starts from ourselves. The best laid plans
men as well as of mice gang aglee; and for the sa
reason: inability to dominate the future. The pow
of man and mouse is infinitely constricted in comparis
with the power of events. Men always build better
worse than they know, for their acts are taken up in
the broad sweep of events.

Hence the problem of deliberation is not to calcula
future happenings but to appraise present propos
actions. We judge present desires and habits by th
tendency to produce certain consequences. It is o
business to watch the course of our action so as to s
what is the significance, the import of our habits a
dispositions. The future outcome is not certain. B
neither is it certain what the present fire will do in t
future. It may be unexpectedly fed or extinguishe
But its *tendency* is a knowable matter, what it will
under certain circumstances. And so we know what
the tendency of malice, charity, conceit, patience. W
know by observing their consequences, by recollecti
what we have observed, by using that recollection
constructive imaginative forecasts of the future,

ing the thought of future consequence to tell the ality of the act now proposed.

Deliberation is not calculation of indeterminate fu- re results. The present, not the future, is ours. No rewdness, no store of information will make it ours. t by constant watchfulness concerning the tendency acts, by noting disparities between former judgments d actual outcomes, and tracing that part of the dis- rity that was due to deficiency and excess in dispo- ion, we come to know the meaning of present acts, d to guide them in the light of that meaning. The ral is to develop conscientiousness, ability to judge significance of what we are doing and to use that lgment in directing what we do, not by means of ect cultivation of something called conscience, or son, or a faculty of moral knowledge, but by fos- ing those impulses and habits which experience has wn to make us sensitive, generous, imaginative, im- rtial in perceiving the tendency of our inchoate dawn- activities. Every attempt to forecast the future is ject in the end to the auditing of present concrete ulse and habit. Therefore the important thing is fostering of those habits and impulses which lead to road, just, sympathetic survey of situations.

The occasion of deliberation, that is of the attempt find a stimulus to complete overt action in thought some future object, is confusion and uncertainty present activities. A similar division in activi- s and need of a like deliberative activity for the

sake of recovery of unity is sure to recur, to recur aga
and again, no matter how wise the decision. Even t
most comprehensive deliberation leading to the mo
momentous choice only fixes a disposition which has
be continuously applied in new and unforeseen cond
tions, re-adapted by future deliberations. Always o
old habits and dispositions carry us into new field
We have to be always learning and relearning the mea
ing of our active tendencies. Does not this redu
moral life to the futile toil of a Sisyphus who is fo
ever rolling a stone uphill only to have it roll back
that he has to repeat his old task? Yes, judged fr
progress made in a control of conditions which sh
stay put and which excludes the necessity of future d
liberations and reconsiderations. No, because conti
ual search and experimentation to discover the mea
ing of changing activity, keeps activity alive, growi
in significance. The future situation involved in del
eration is of necessity marked by contingency. Wh
it will be in fact remains dependent upon conditions th
escape our foresight and power of regulation. B
foresight which draws liberally upon the lessons of pa
experience reveals the tendency, the meaning, of prese
action; and, once more, it is this present meaning rath
than the future outcome which counts. Imaginat
forethought of the probable consequences of a propos
act keeps that act from sinking below consciousness in
routine habit or whimsical brutality. It preserves t
meaning of that act alive, and keeps it growing
depth and refinement of meaning. There is no limit

he amount of meaning which reflective and meditative abit is capable of importing into even simple acts, ust as the most splendid successes of the skilful execu- ive who manipulates events may be accompanied by an ncredibly meager and superficial consciousness.

V

The reason for dividing conduct into two distinc regions, one of expediency and the other of morality disappears when the psychology that identifies ord nary deliberation with calculation is disposed of. Ther is seen to be but one issue involved in all reflection upo conduct: The rectifying of present troubles, the ha monizing of present incompatibilities by projecting course of action which gathers into itself the meanin of them all. The recognition of the true psycholog also reveals to us the nature of good or satisfactio Good consists in the meaning that is experienced t belong to an activity when conflict and entanglemer of various incompatible impulses and habits termina in a unified orderly release in action. This human goo being a fulfilment conditioned upon thought, diffe from the pleasures which an animal nature—of cour we also remain animals so far as we do not think—hi upon accidentally. Moreover there is a genuine di ference between a false good, a spurious satisfactio and a "true" good, and there is an empirical test f discovering the difference. The unification which en thought in act may be only a superficial compromis not a real decision but a postponement of the issu Many of our so-called decisions are of this nature. it may present, as we have seen, a victory of a te

orarily intense impulse over its rivals, a unity by oppression and suppression, not by coordination. These eeming unifications which are not unifications of fact re revealed by the event, by subsequent occurrences. t is one of the penalties of evil choice, perhaps the chief enalty, that the wrong-doer becomes more and more incapable of detecting these objective revelations of imself.

In quality, the good is never twice alike. It never opies itself. It is new every morning, fresh every vening. It is unique in its every presentation For it arks the resolution of a distinctive complication of mpeting habits and impulses which can never repeat self. Only with a habit rigid to the point of immolity could exactly the same good recur twice. And ith such rigid routines the same good does not after l recur, for it does not even occur. There is no conciousness at all, either of good or bad. Rigid habits nk below the level of any meaning at all. And since e live in a moving world, they plunge us finally against nditions to which they are not adapted and so terinate in disaster.

To utilitarianism with all its defects belongs the disnction of enforcing in an unforgettable way the fact at moral good, like every good, consists in a satisction of the forces of human nature, in welfare, happiness. To Bentham remains, in spite of all crudities nd eccentricities, the imperishable renown of forcing me to the popular consciousness that "conscience," telligence applied to in moral matters, is too often

not intelligence but is veiled caprice, dogmatic *ipse dixitism*, vested class interest. It is truly conscienc only as it contributes to relief of misery and promo tion of happiness. An examination of utilitarianism brings out however the catastrophe involved in thinking of the good to which intelligence is pertinent as con sisting in future pleasures and pains, and moral re flection as their algebraic calculus. It emphasizes th contrast between such conceptions of good and of in telligence, and the facts of human nature according t which good, happiness, is found in the present meanin of activity, depending upon the proportion, order an freedom introduced into it by thought as it discover objects which release and unify otherwise contendin elements.

An adequate discussion of why utilitarianism with it just insight into the central place of good, and it ardent devotion to rendering morals more intelligen and more equitably human took its onesided course (an thereby provoked an intensified reaction to transcen dental and dogmatic morals) would take us far afiel into social conditions and the antecedent history c thought. We can deal with only one factor, the domi nation of intellectual interest by economic considera tions. The industrial revolution was bound in any cas to give a new direction to thought. It enforced liberatio from other-worldly concerns by fixing attention upo the possibility of the betterment of this world throug control and utilization of natural forces; it opened u marvelous possibilities in industry and commerce, an

new social conditions conducive to invention, ingenuity, enterprise, constructive energy and an impersonal habit of mind dealing with mechanisms rather than appearances. But new movements do not start in a new and clear field. The context of old institutions and corresponding habits of thought persisted. The new movement was perverted in theory because prior established conditions deflected it in practice. Thus the new industrialism was largely the old feudalism, living in a bank instead of a castle and brandishing the check of credit instead of the sword.

An old theological doctrine of total depravity was continued and carried over in the idea of an inherent laziness of human nature which rendered it averse to useful work, unless bribed by expectations of pleasure, or driven by fears of pains. This being the "incentive" to action, it followed that the office of reason is only to enlighten the search for good or gain by instituting a more exact calculus of profit and loss. Happiness was thus identified with a maximum net gain of pleasures on the basis of analogy with business conducted for pecuniary profit, and directed by means of a science of accounting dealing with quantities of receipts and expenses expressed in definite monetary units.* For business was conducted as matter of fact with primary reference to procuring gain and averting loss. Gain and loss were reckoned in terms of units of

*I owe the suggestion of this mode of interpreting the hedonistic calculus of utilitarianism to Dr. Wesley Mitchell. See his articles in *Journal of Political Economy*, vol. 18. Compare also his article in *Political Science Quarterly*, vol. 33.

money, assumed to be fixed and equal, exactly compar able whether loss or gain occurred, while business fore sight reduced future prospects to definitely measure forms, to dollars and cents. A dollar is a dollar, past present or future; and every business transaction, ever expenditure and consumption of time, energy, goods is, in theory, capable of exact statement in terms o dollars. Generalize this point of view into the notio that gain is the object of *all* action; that gain takes th form of pleasure; that there are definite, commensu rable units of pleasure, which are exactly offset by unit of pain (loss), and the working psychology of th Benthamite school is at hand.

Now admitting that the device of money accountin makes possible more exact estimates of the consequence of many acts than is otherwise possible, and that ac cordingly the use of money and accounting may work triumph for the application of intelligence in daily af fairs, yet there exists a difference in kind between busi ness calculation of profit and loss and deliberation upo what purposes to form. Some of these differences ar inherent and insuperable. Others of them are due t the nature of present business conducted for pecuniar profit, and would disappear if business were conducte primarily for service of needs. But it is important t see *how* in the latter case the assimilation of busines accounting and normal deliberation would occur. Fo it would not consist in making deliberation identica with calculation of loss and gain; it would proceed i the opposite direction. It would make accounting an

uditing a subordinate factor in discovering the mean-
ıg of present activity. Calculation would be a means
f stating future results more exactly and objectively
nd thus of making action more humane. Its function
ould be that of statistics in all social science.

But first as to the inherent difference between de-
beration regarding business profit and loss and de-
beration about ordinary conduct. The distinction be-
ween wide and narrow use of reason has already been
oted. The latter holds a fixed end in view and de-
berates only upon means of reaching it. The former
gards the end-in-view in deliberation as tentative and
ermits, nay encourages the coming into view of con-
equences which will transform it and create a new
urpose and plan. Now business calculation is obvi-
usly of the kind where the end is taken for granted
nd does not enter into deliberation. It resembles the
ase in which a man has already made his final decision,
ay to take a walk, and deliberates only upon what
alk to take. His end-in-view already exists; it is not
uestioned. The question is as to comparative advan-
ages of this tramp or that. Deliberation is not free
ut occurs within the limits of a decision reached by
me prior deliberation or else fixed by unthinking rou-
ne. Suppose, however, that a man's question is not
hich path to walk upon, but whether to walk or to
ay with a friend whom continued confinement has ren-
ered peevish and uninteresting as a companion. The
ilitarian theory demands that in the latter case the
vo alternatives still be of the same kind, alike in qual-

ity, that their only difference be a quantitative one, o plus or minus in pleasure. This assumption that al desires and dispositions, all habits and impulses, ar the same in quality is equivalent to the assertion tha no real or significant conflict among them is possible and hence there is no need of discovering an object an an activity which will bring them into unity. It assert by implication that there is no genuine doubt or sus pense as to the meaning of any impulse or habit. Thei meaning is ready-made, fixed: pleasure. The onl "problem" or doubt is as to the *amount* of pleasur (or pain) that is involved.

This assumption does violence to fact. The poign ancy of situations that evoke reflection lies in the fac that we really do not know the meaning of the ten dencies that are pressing for action. We have t search, to experiment. Deliberation is a work of dis covery. Conflict is acute; one impulse carries us on way into one situation, and another impulse takes u another way to a radically different objective result Deliberation is not an attempt to do away with thi opposition of quality by reducing it to one of amount It is an attempt to *uncover* the conflict in its full scop and bearing. What we want to find out is what differ ence each impulse and habit imports, to reveal qual tative incompatibilities by detecting the differer courses to which they commit us, the different dispo sitions they form and foster, the different situatior into which they plunge us.

In short, the thing actually at stake in any seriou

deliberation is not a difference of quantity, but what kind of person one is to become, what sort of self is in the making, what kind of a world is making. This is plain enough in those crucial decisions where the course of life is thrown into widely different channels, where the pattern of life is rendered different and diversely dyed according as this alternative or that is chosen. Deliberation as to whether to be a merchant or a school teacher, a physician or a politician is not a choice of quantities. It is just what it appears to be, a choice of careers which are incompatible with one another, within each of which definitive inclusions and rejections are involved. With the difference in career belongs a difference in the constitution of the self, of habits of thought and feeling as well as of outward action. With it comes profound differences in all future objective relationships. Our minor decisions differ in acuteness and range, but not in principle. Our world does not so obviously hang upon any one of them; but put together they make the world what it is in meaning for each one of us. Crucial decisions can hardly be more than a disclosure of the cumulative force of trivial choices.

A radical distinction thus exists between deliberation where the only question is whether to invest money in this bond or that stock, and deliberation where the primary decision is as to the *kind* of activity which is to be engaged in. Definite quantitative calculation is possible in the former case because a decision as to kind or direction of action does not have to be made. It has

been decided already, whether by persistence of habi
or prior deliberation, that the man is to be an investo
The significant thing in decisions proper, the cours
of action, the kind of a self simply, doesn't enter in
it isn't in question. To reduce all cases of judgment o
action to this simplified and comparatively unimpor
tant case of calculation of quantities, is to miss th
whole point of deliberation.*

It is another way of saying the same thing to not
that business calculations about pecuniary gain neve
concern direct use in experience. They are, as such
not deliberations about good or satisfaction at all. Th
man who decides to put business activity before all othe
claims whatsoever, before that of family or country o
art or science, does make a choice about satisfactio
or good. But he makes it as a man, not as a busines
man. On the other hand, what is to be *done* with busi
ness profit when it accrues (except to invest it in sim
ilar undertakings) does not enter at all into a strictl
business deliberation. Its use, in which alone good o
satisfaction is found, is left indeterminate, contingen
upon further deliberation, or else is left matter of rou
tine habit. We do not eat money, or wear it, or marr
it, or listen for musical strains to issue from it. If b
any chance a man prefers a less amount of money t
a greater amount, it is not for economic reasons. Pe
cuniary profit in itself, in other words, is always strictl

* So far as I am aware Dr. H. W. Stuart was the first to poi
out this difference between economic and moral valuations in h
essay in *Studies in Logical Theory*.

strumental, and it is of the nature of this instrument be effective in proportion to size. In choosing with spect to it, we are not making a significant choice, choice of ends.

We have already seen, however, there is something normal and in the strict sense impossible in mere eans, in, that is, instruments totally dissevered from ds. We may view economic activity in abstraction, t it does not *exist* by itself. Business takes for anted non-business uses to which its results are to put. The stimuli for economic activity (in the sense which business means activity subject to monetary ckoning) are found in non-pecuniary, non-economic tivities. Taken by itself then economic action throws light upon the nature of satisfaction and the rela- on of intelligence to it, because the whole question of tisfaction is either taken for granted or else is ig- red by it. Only when money-making is itself taken as good does it exhibit anything pertinent to the ques- on. And when it is so taken, then the question is not e of future gain but of present activity and its mean- g. Business then becomes an activity carried on for own sake. It is then a career, a continuous oc- pation in which are developed daring, adventure, wer, rivalry, overcoming of competitors, conspicuous hievement which attracts admiration, play of im- ination, technical knowledge, skill in foresight and king combinations, management of men and goods d so on. In this case, it exemplifies what has been d about good or happiness as incorporating in itself

at *present* the foreseen future consequences that resu
from intelligent action. The problem concerns th
quality of such a good.

In short the attempt to assimilate other activiti
to the model of economic activity (defined as a calcu
lated pursuit of gain) reverses the state of the fact
The "economic man" defined as a creature devoted t
an enlightened or calculating pursuit of gain is mo
ally objectionable because the conception of such a b
ing empirically falsifies empirical facts. Love of p
cuniary gain is an undoubted and powerful fact. Bu
it and its importance are affairs of social not of psy
chological nature. It is not a primary fact which ca
be used to account for other phenomena. It depend
upon other impulses and habits. It expresses and o
ganizes the use to which they are put. It cannot b
used to define the nature of desire, effort and satisfa
tion, because it embodies a socially selected type of d
sire and satisfaction. It affords, like steeple-chasin
or collecting postage stamps, seeking political office, a
tronomical observation of the heavens, a special case
desire, effort, and happiness. And like them it is su
ject to examination, criticism and valuation in the ligh
of the place it occupies in the system of developin
activities.

The reason that it is so easy and for specific pu
poses so useful to select economic activities and subje
them to separate scientific treatment is because the m
who engage in it are men who are also more than bu
ness men, whose usual habits may be more or less safe

uessed at. As human beings they have desires and oc-
upations which are affected by social custom, expecta-
on and admiration. The uses to which gains will be
ut, that is the current scheme of activities into which
ney enter as factors, are passed over only because they
re so inevitably present. Support of family, of church,
hilanthropic benefactions, political influence, automo-
iling, command of luxuries, freedom of movement, re-
pect from others, are in general terms some of the
bvious activities into which economic activity fits.
his context of activities enters into the real make-up
nd meaning of economic activity. Calculated pursuit
f gain is in fact never what it is made out to be when
conomic action is separated from the rest of life, for
n fact it is what it is because of a complex social en-
ironment involving scientific, legal, political and do-
nestic conditions.

A certain tragic fate seems to attend all intellectual
novements. That of utilitarianism is suggested in the
ot infrequent criticism that it exaggerated the rôle of
ational thought in human conduct, that it assumed
nat everybody is moved by conscious considerations
nd that all that is really necessary is to make the pro-
ess of consideration sufficiently enlightened. Then it
objected that a better psychology reveals that men
re not moved by thought but rather by instinct and
abit. Thus a partially sound criticism is employed to
onceal the one factor in utilitarianism from which we
ught to learn something; is used to foster an obscuran-
st doctrine of trusting to impulse, instinct or intui-

tion. Neither the utilitarians nor any one else can ex aggerate the proper office of reflection, of intelligenc in conduct. The mistake lay not here but in a fals conception of what constitutes reflection, deliberatio The truth that men are not moved by consideration c self-interest, that men are not good judges of whe their interests lie and are not moved to act by thes judgments, cannot properly be converted into the beli that consideration of consequences is a negligible facto in conduct. So far as it is negligible in fact it evinc the rudimentary character of civilization. We ma indeed safely start from the assumption that impul and habit, not thought, are the primary determinan of conduct. But the conclusion to be drawn from the facts is that the need is therefore the greater for cult vation of thought. The error of utilitarianism is n at this point. It is found in its wrong conception what thought, deliberation, is and does.

VI

Our problem now concerns the nature of ends, that s ends-in-view or aims. The essential elements in the roblem have already been stated. It has been pointed ut that the ends, objectives, of conduct are those fore- een consequences which influence present deliberation nd which finally bring it to rest by furnishing an ade- uate stimulus to overt action. Consequently ends arise nd function within action. They are not, as current heories too often imply, things lying beyond activity t which the latter is directed. They are not strictly peaking ends or termini of action at all. They are erminals of deliberation, and so turning points *in* activ- ty. Many opposed moral theories agree however in lacing ends beyond action, although they differ in heir notions of what the ends are. The utilitarian sets p pleasure as such an outside-and-beyond, as some- hing necessary to induce action and in which it termi- ates. Many harsh critics of utilitarianism have how- ver agreed that there is some end in which action termi- ates, a final goal. They have denied that pleasure is uch an outside aim, and put perfection or self-realiza- ion in its place. The entire popular notion of ideals" is infected with this conception of some fixed nd beyond activity at which we should aim. Accord- ng to this view ends-in-themselves come before aims.

We have a moral aim only as our purpose coincides with some end-in-itself. We *ought* to aim at the latter whether we actually do or not.

When men believed that fixed ends existed for all normal changes in nature, the conception of similar ends for men was but a special case of a general belief. If the changes in a tree from acorn to full-grown oak were regulated by an end which was somehow immanent or potential in all the less perfect forms, and if change was simply the effort to realize a perfect or complete form, then the acceptance of a like view for human conduct was consonant with the rest of what passed for science. Such a view, consistent and systematic, was foisted by Aristotle upon western culture and endured for two thousand years. When the notion was expelled from natural science by the intellectual revolution of the seventeenth century, logically it should also have disappeared from the theory of human action. But man is not logical and his intellectual history is a record of mental reserves and compromises. He hangs on to what he can in his old beliefs even when he is compelled to surrender their logical basis. So the doctrine of fixed ends-in-themselves at which human acts are—or should be—directed and by which they are regulated if they are regulated at all persisted in morals, and was made the cornerstone of orthodox moral theory. The immediate effect was to dislocate moral from natural science, to divide man's world as it never had been divided in prior culture. One point of view, one method and spirit animated inquiry into natural occurrences

radically opposite set of ideas prevailed about man's fairs. Completion of the scientific change begun in e seventeenth century thus depends upon a revision f the current notion of ends of action as fixed limits nd conclusions.

In fact, ends are ends-in-view or aims. They arise t of natural effects or consequences which in the ginning are hit upon, stumbled upon so far as any urpose is concerned. Men *like* some of the conse- uences and *dislike* others. Henceforth (or till attrac- on and repulsion alter) attaining or averting similar nsequences are aims or ends. These consequences nstitute the meaning and value of an activity as it mes under deliberation. Meantime of course imagi- ation is busy. Old consequences are enhanced, recom- ned, modified in imagination. Invention operates. ctual consequences, that is effects which have hap- ened in the past, become possible future consequences f acts still to be performed. This operation of im- ginative thought complicates the relation of ends to ctivity, but it does not alter the substantial fact: Ends e foreseen consequences which arise in the course of tivity and which are employed to give activity added eaning and to direct its further course. They are in o sense ends *of* action. In being ends of *deliberation* ey are redirecting pivots *in* action.

Men shoot and throw. At first this is done as an instinctive" or natural reaction to some situation. he result when it is observed gives a new meaning to e activity. Henceforth men in throwing and shooting

think of it in terms of its outcome; they act intell
gently or have an end. Liking the activity in its a
quired meaning, they not only "take aim" when the
throw instead of throwing at random, but they find
make targets at which to aim. This is the origin an
nature of "goals" of action. They are ways of d
fining and deepening the meaning of activity. Havin
an end or aim is thus a characteristic of *present* acti
ity. It is the means by which an activity becom
adapted when otherwise it would be blind and diso
derly, or by which it gets meaning when otherwise
would be mechanical. In a strict sense an end-in-vie
is a *means* in present action: present action is not
means to a remote end. Men do not shoot because ta
gets exist, but they set up targets in order that thro
ing and shooting may be more effective and significant

A mariner does not sail towards the stars, but
noting the stars he is aided in conducting his prese
activity of sailing. A port or harbor is his objecti
but only in the sense of *reaching* it not of taking po
session of it. The harbor stands in his thought as
significant point at which his activity will need re-dire
tion. Activity will not cease when the port is attain
but merely the *present direction* of activity. The po
is as truly the beginning of another mode of activity
it is the termination of the present one. The or
reason we ignore this fact is because it is empirica
taken for granted. We know without thinking that o
"ends" are perforce beginnings. But theories of en
and ideals have converted a theoretical ignoring whi

equivalent to practical acknowledgment into an in-llectual denial, and have thereby confused and per-rted the nature of ends.

Even the most important among all the consequences f an act is not necessarily its aim. Results which re objectively most important may not even be thought f at all; ordinarily a man does not think in connection ith exercise of his profession that it will sustain him nd his family in existence. The end-thought-of is niquely important, but it is indispensable to state the spect in which it is important. It gives the decisive ew to the act to be performed under the existing cir-mstances. It is that particular foreseen object that ill stimulate the act which relieves existing troubles, raightens out existing entanglements. In a tempo-ary annoyance, even if only that caused by the singing f a mosquito, the thought of that which gives relief ay engross the mind in spite of consequences much ore important, objectively speaking. Moralists have eplored such facts as evidence of levity. But the rem-dy, if a remedy be needed, is not found in insisting oon the importance of ends in general. It is found in change of the dispositions which make things either mediately troublesome or tolerable or agreeable.

When ends are regarded as literally ends to action ather than as directive stimuli to present choice they re frozen and isolated. It makes no difference whether he " end " is " natural " good like health or a " moral " od like honesty. Set up as complete and exclusive, demanding and justifying action as a means to itself,

it leads to narrowness; in extreme cases fanaticism, in considerateness, arrogance and hypocrisy. Joshua's reputed success in getting the sun to stand still to serv his desire is recognized to have involved a miracle. Bu moral theorists constantly assume that the continuou course of events can be arrested at the point of a par ticular object; that men can plunge with their ow desires into the unceasing flow of changes, an seize upon some object as their end irrespective o everything else. The use of intelligence to discover th object that will best operate as a releasing and unifyin stimulus in the existing situation is discounted. On reminds one's self that one's end is justice or charit or professional achievement or putting over a deal fo a needed public improvement, and further questioning and qualms are stilled.

It is customary to suppose that such methods merel ignore the question of the morality of the means whic are used to secure the end desired. Common sense r volts against the maxim, conveniently laid off upo Jesuits or other far-away people, that the end justifi the means. There is no incorrectness in saying that th question of means employed is overlooked in such case But analysis would go further if it were also point out that overlooking means is only a device for failin to note those ends, or consequences, which, if they we noted would be seen to be so evil that action would b estopped. Certainly nothing can justify or conden means except ends, results. But we have to inclu consequences impartially. Even admitting that lyi

ill save a man's soul, whatever that may mean, it ould still be true that lying will have other conse- uences, namely, the usual consequences that follow rom tampering with good faith and that lead lying to condemned. It is wilful folly to fasten upon some ngle end or consequence which is liked, and permit ie view of that to blot from perception all other un- sired and undesirable consequences. It is like sup- osing that when a finger held close to the eye covers p a distant mountain the finger is really larger than ie mountain. Not *the* end—in the singular—justifies ie means; for there is no such thing as the single all- portant end. To suppose that there is such an end like working over again, in behalf of our private ishes, the miracle of Joshua in arresting the course of ature. It is not possible adequately to characterize ie presumption, the falsity and the deliberate perver- on of intelligence involved in refusal to note the plural ffects that flow from any act, a refusal adopted in rder that we may justify an act by picking out that ne consequence which will enable us to do what we wish o do and for which we feel the need of justification.

Yet this assumption is continually made. It is made implication in the current view of purposes or ends- view as objects in themselves, instead of means to nification and liberation of present conflicting, con- sed habits and impulses. There is something almost nister in the desire to label the doctrine that the end stifies the means with the name of some one obnoxious hool. Politicians, especially if they have to do with

the foreign affairs of a nation and are called states
men, almost uniformly act upon the doctrine that th
welfare of their own country justifies any measure i
respective of all the demoralization it works. Captair
of industry, great executives in all lines, usually wor
upon this plan. But they are not the original offende
by any means. Every man works upon it so far as h
permits himself to become so absorbed in one aspect
what he is doing that he loses a view of its varied co
sequences, hypnotizing his attention by considerati
of just those consequences which in the abstract a
desirable and slurring over other consequences equal
real. Every man works upon this principle who b
comes over-interested in any cause or project, and wh
uses its desirability in the abstract to justify himse
in employing any means that will assist him in arrivin
ignoring all the collateral "ends" of his behavior.
is frequently pointed out that there is a type of exec
tive-man whose conduct seems to be as non-moral
the action of the forces of nature. We all tend
relapse into this non-moral condition whenever we wa
any one thing intensely. In general, the identificati
of the end prominent in conscious desire and effort wi
the end is part of the technique of avoiding a reaso
able survey of consequences. The survey is avoid
because of a subconscious recognition that it would
veal desire in its true worth and thus preclude action
satisfy it—or at all events give us an uneasy conscie
in striving to realize it. Thus the doctrine of the i
lated, complete or fixed end limits intelligent exami

on, encourages insincerity, and puts a pseudo-stamp
moral justification upon success at any price.

Moralistic persons are given to escaping this evil
falling into another pit. They deny that conse-
iences have anything at all to do with the morality
acts. Not ends but motives they say justify or con-
mn acts. The thing to do, accordingly, is to culti-
te certain motives or dispositions, benevolence, pur-
y, love of perfection, loyalty. The denial of conse-
iences thus turns out formal, verbal. In reality a
nsequence is set up at which to aim, only it is a sub-
ctive consequence. "Meaning well" is selected as *the*
nsequence or end to be cultivated at all hazards, an
d which is all-justifying and to which everything else
offered up in sacrifice. The result is a sentimental
tile complacency rather than the brutal efficiency of
e executive. But the root of both evils is the same.
ne man selects some external consequence, the other
an a state of internal feeling, to serve as the end. The
ctrine of meaning well as *the* end is if anything the
re contemptible of the two, for it shrinks from ac-
pting any responsibility for actual results. It is neg-
ive, self-protective and sloppy. It lends itself to com-
te self-deception.

Why have men become so attached to fixed, external
ds? Why is it not universally recognized that an end
a device of intelligence in guiding action, instrumental
freeing and harmonizing troubled and divided ten-
ncies? The answer is virtually contained in what was
rlier said about rigid habits and their effect upon in-

telligence. Ends are, in fact, literally endless, forev coming into existence as new activities occasion ne consequences. "Endless ends" is a way of saying tha there are no ends—that is no fixed self-enclosed final ties. While however we cannot actually prevent chang from occurring we can and do regard it as evil. W strive to retain action in ditches already dug. We r gard novelties as dangerous, experiments as illicit an deviations as forbidden. Fixed and separate ends r flect a projection of our own fixed and non-interactin compartmental habits. We see only consequences whi correspond to our habitual courses. As we have sai men did not begin to shoot because there were read made targets to aim at. They made things into targe by shooting at them, and then made special targets make shooting more significantly interesting. But generation after generation were shown targets th had had no part in constructing, if bows and arro were thrust into their hands, and pressure were broug to bear upon them to keep them shooting in season an out, some wearied soul would soon propound to willi listeners the theory that shooting was unnatural, th man was naturally wholly at rest, and that targets e isted in order that men might be forced to be activ that the duty of shooting and the virtue of hitting a externally imposed and fostered, and that otherwi there would be no such thing as a shooting-activity that is, morality.

The doctrine of fixed ends not only diverts attenti from examination of consequences and the intellige

ation of purpose, but, since means and ends are two
ys of regarding the same actuality, it also renders
n careless in their inspection of existing conditions.
aim not framed on the basis of a survey of those
sent conditions which are to be employed as means
its realization simply throws us back upon past hab-
. We then do not do what we intended to do but
at we have got used to doing, or else we thrash about
a blind ineffectual way. The result is failure. Dis-
uragement follows, assuaged perhaps by the thought
it in any case the end is too ideal, too noble and
note, to be capable of realization. We fall back on
consoling thought that our moral ideals are too
od for this world and that we must accustom our-
ves to a gap between aim and execution. Actual
e is then thought of as a compromise with the best,
enforced second or third best, a dreary exile from
r true home in the ideal, or a temporary period of
ubled probation to be followed by a period of un-
ding attainment and peace. At the same time, as has
n repeatedly pointed out, persons of a more practi-
turn of mind accept the world "as it is," that is as
st customs have made it to be, and consider what
vantages for themselves may be extracted from it.
ey form aims on the basis of existing habits of life
ich may be turned to their own private account.
ey employ intelligence in framing ends and selecting
l arranging means. But intelligence is confined to
nipulation; it does not extend to construction. It is
intelligence of the politician, administrator and pro-

fessional executive—the kind of intelligence which h
given a bad meaning to a word that ought to have a fi
meaning, opportunism. For the highest task of intel
gence is to grasp and realize genuine opportunit
possibility.

Roughly speaking, the course of forming aims is
follows. The beginning is with a wish, an emotion
reaction against the present state of things and a ho
for something different. Action fails to connect sa
isfactorily with surrounding conditions. Thrown ba
upon itself, it projects itself in an imagination of
scene which if it were present would afford satisfactio
This picture is often called an aim, more often an ide
But in itself it is a fancy which may be only a pha
tasy, a dream, a castle in the air. In itself it is a r
mantic embellishment of the present; at its best it
material for poetry or the novel. Its natural home
not in the future but in the dim past or in some dista
and supposedly better part of the present world. Eve
such idealized object is suggested by something actual
experienced, as the flight of birds suggests the liber
tion of human beings from the restrictions of sl
locomotion on dull earth. It becomes an aim or e
only when it is worked out in terms of concrete con
tions available for its realization, that is in terms
"means."

This transformation depends upon study of the co
ditions which generate or make possible the fact o
served to exist already. The fancy of the delight
moving at will through the air became an actuali

ly after men carefully studied the way in which a bird though heavier than air actually sustains itself in r. A fancy becomes an aim, in short, when some past quence of known cause-and-effect is projected into the ture, and when by assembling its causal conditions strive to generate a like result. We have to fall back on what has already happened naturally without de-gn, and study it to see *how* it happened, which is what meant by causation. This knowledge joined to wish eates a purpose. Many men have doubtless dreamed ability to have light in darkness without the trouble oil, lamps and friction. Glow-worms, lightning, the arks of cut electric conductors suggest such a pos-ibility. But the picture remained a dream until an lison studied all that could be found out about such sual phenomena of light, and then set to work to arch out and gather together the means for reproduc-g their operation. The great trouble with what sses for moral ends and ideals is that they do not t beyond the stage of fancy of something agreeable d desirable based upon an emotional wish; very often, that, not even an original wish, but the wish of some der which has been conventionalized and transmitted rough channels of authority. Every gain in natural ence makes possible new aims. That is, the discovery how things *do* occur makes it possible to conceive their happening at will, and gives us a start on se-ting and combining the conditions, the means, to mmand their happening. In technical matters, this son has been fairly well learned. But in moral mat-

ters, men still largely neglect the need of studying t
way in which results similar to those which we desi
actually happen. Mechanism is despised as of impo
tance only in low material things. The conseque
divorce of moral ends from scientific study of natur
events renders the former impotent wishes, compens
tory dreams in consciousness. In *fact* ends
consequences are still determined by fixed habit a
the force of circumstance. The evils of idle drea
ing and of routine are experienced in conjunctio
"Idealism" must indeed come first—the imagination
some better state generated by desire. But unless ide
are to be dreams and idealism a synonym for roma
ticism and phantasy-building, there must be a m
realistic study of actual conditions and of the mode
law of natural events, in order to give the imagined
ideal object definite form and solid substance—to g
it, in short, practicality and constitute it a worki
end.

The acceptance of fixed ends in themselves is
aspect of man's devotion to an ideal of certainty. T
affection was inevitably cherished as long as men
lieved that the highest things in physical nature are
rest, and that science is possible only by grasping i
mutable forms and species: in other words, for mu
the greater part of the intellectual history of manki
Only reckless sceptics would have dared entertain a
idea of ends except as fixed in themselves as lo
as the whole structure of science was erected upon
immobile. Behind however the conception of fix

ether in science or morals lay adherence to certainty
" truth," a clinging to something fixed, born of fear
the new and of attachment to possessions. When
classicist condemns concession to impulse and holds
to admiration the patterns tested in tradition, he
le suspects how much he is himself affected by un-
owed impulses—timidity which makes him cling to
thority, conceit which moves him to be himself the
thority who speaks in the name of authority,
ssessive impulse which fears to risk acquisition in
w adventures. Love of certainty is a demand for
arantees in advance of action. Ignoring the fact
it truth can be bought only by the adventure of
periment, dogmatism turns truth into an insurance
mpany. Fixed ends upon one side and fixed " prin-
les "—that is authoritative rules—on the other, are
ops for a feeling of safety, the refuge of the timid
d the means by which the bold prey upon the timid.

VII

Intelligence is concerned with foreseeing the futu
so that action may have order and direction. It is al
concerned with principles and criteria of judgmer
The diffused or wide applicability of habits is reflect
in the *general* character of principles: a principle
intellectually what a habit is for direct action.
habits set in grooves dominate activity and swerve
from conditions instead of increasing its adaptabilit
so principles treated as fixed rules instead of as helpf
methods take men away from experience. The mo
complicated the situation, and the less we really kn
about it, the more insistent is the orthodox type
moral theory upon the prior existence of some fix
and universal principle or law which is to be direct
applied and followed. Ready-made rules available
a moment's notice for settling any kind of moral d
ficulty and resolving every species of moral doubt ha
been the chief object of the ambition of moralists.
the much less complicated and less changing matters
bodily health such pretensions are known as quacke
But in morals a hankering for certainty, born of ti
idity and nourished by love of authoritative presti
has led to the idea that absence of immutably fixed a
universally applicable ready-made principles is equ
alent to moral chaos.

In fact, situations into which change and the unexected enter are a challenge to intelligence to create w principles. Morals must be a growing science if is to be a science at all, not merely because all truth s not yet been appropriated by the mind of man, but cause life is a moving affair in which old moral truth ises to apply. Principles are methods of inquiry and recast which require verification by the event; and the ie honored effort to assimilate morals to mathematics only a way of bolstering up an old dogmatic author-, or putting a new one upon the throne of the old. t the experimental character of moral judgments es not mean complete uncertainty and fluidity. Prinples exist as hypotheses with which to experiment. man history is long. There is a long record of past perimentation in conduct, and there are cumulative rifications which give many principles a well earned estige. Lightly to disregard them is the height of olishness. But social situations alter; and it is also olish not to observe how old principles actually work der new conditions, and not to modify them so that y will be more effectual instruments in judging new ses. Many men are now aware of the harm done in al matters by assuming the antecedent existence of ed principles under which every new case may be ought. They recognize that this assumption merely ts an artificial premium on ideas developed under bygone conditions, and that their perpetuation in the esent works inequity. Yet the choice is not between owing away rules previously developed and sticking

obstinately by them. The intelligent alternative is
revise, adapt, expand and alter them. The problem
one of continuous, vital readaptation.

The popular objection to casuistry is similar to t
popular objection to the maxim that the end justif
the means. It is creditable to practical moral sen
but not to popular logical consistency. For recou
to casuistry is the only conclusion which can be dra
from belief in fixed universal principles, just as t
Jesuit maxim is the only conclusion proper to be dra
from belief in fixed ends. Every act, every deed is
dividual. What is the sense in having fixed gene
rules, commandments, laws, unless they are such as
confer upon individual cases of action (where alone
struction is finally needed) something of their own
fallible certainty? Casuistry, so-called, is simply t
systematic effort to secure for particular instances
conduct the advantage of general rules which are
serted and believed in. By those who accept the noti
of immutable regulating principles, casuistry ought
be lauded for sincerity and helpfulness, not disprais
as it usually is. Or else men ought to carry back th
aversion to manipulation of particular cases, until th
will fit into the procrustean beds of fixed rules, to
point where it is clear that all principles are empiri
generalizations from the ways in which previous juc
ments of conduct have practically worked out. Wh
this fact is apparent, these generalizations will be s
to be not fixed rules for deciding doubtful cases, b
instrumentalities for their investigation, methods

hich the net value of past experience is rendered avail-
ble for present scrutiny of new perplexities. Then it
ill also follow that they are hypotheses to be tested
nd revised by their further working.*

Every such statement meets with prompt objection.
Ve are told that in deliberation rival goods present
iemselves. We are faced by competing desires and
ids which are incompatible with one another. They
re all attractive, seductive. How then shall we choose
nong them? We can choose rationally among values,
ie argument continues, only if we have some fixed
easure of values, just as we decide the respective
ngths of physical things by recourse to the fixed foot-
ile. One might reply that after all there is no fixed
ot-rule, no fixed foot "in itself" and that the stand-
d length or weight of measure is only another special
ortion of matter, subject to change from heat, mois-
ire and gravitational position, defined only by condi-
ons, relations. One might reply that the foot-rule is
tool which has been worked out in actual prior com-
arisons of concrete things for use in facilitating fur-
ier comparisons. But we content ourselves with re-
arking that we find in this conception of a fixed ante-
dent standard another manifestation of the desire to
cape the strain of the actual moral situation, its
enuine uncertainty of possibilities and consequences.

* Among contemporary moralists, Mr. G. E. Moore may be
ted as almost alone in having the courage of the convictions
ared by many. He insists that it is the true business of moral
eory to enable men to arrive at precise and sure judgments in
ncrete cases of moral perplexity.

We are confronted with another case of the all to human love of certainty, a case of the wish for an intel lectual patent issued by authority. The issue after a is one of fact. The critic is not entitled to enforc against the facts his private wish for a ready-mad standard which will relieve him from the burden of ex amination, observation and continuing generalizatio and test.

The worth of this private wish is moreover open t question in the light of the history of the developmer of natural science. There was a time when in astron omy, chemistry and biology men claimed that judgmer of individual phenomena was possible only because th mind was already in possession of fixed truths, unive sal principles, pre-ordained axioms. Only by the means could contingent, varying particular events b truly known. There was, it was argued, no way t judge the truth of any particular statement about particular plant, heavenly body, or case of combustio unless there was a general truth already in hand wit which to compare a particular empirical occurrenc The contention was successful, that is for a long tin it maintained its hold upon men's minds. But its e fect was merely to encourage intellectual laziness, r liance upon authority and blind acceptance of conce tions that had somehow become traditional. The a tual advance of science did not begin till men bro away from this method. When men insisted upon jud ing astronomical phenomena by bringing them direct under established truths, those of geometry, they h

o astronomy, but only a private esthetic construction. Astronomy began when men trusted themselves to embarking upon the uncertain sea of events and were willing to be instructed by changes in the concrete. Then antecedent principles were tentatively employed as methods for conducting observations and experiments, and for organizing special facts: as hypotheses.

In morals now, as in physical science then, the work of intelligence in reaching such relative certainty, or tested probability, as is open to man is retarded by the false notion of fixed antecedent truths. Prejudice is confirmed. Rules formed accidentally or under the pressure of conditions long past, are protected from criticism and thus perpetuated. Every group and person vested with authority strengthens possessed power by harping upon the sacredness of immutable principle. Moral facts, that is the concrete careers of special courses of action, are not studied. There is no counterpart to clinical medicine. Rigid classifications forced upon facts are relied upon. And all is done, as it used to be done in natural science, in praise of Reason and in fear of the variety and fluctuation of actual happenings.

The hypothesis that each moral situation is unique and that consequently general moral principles are instrumental to developing the individualized meaning of situations is declared to be anarchic. It is said to be ethical atomism, pulverizing the order and dignity of morals. The question, again is not what our inherited habits lead us to prefer, but where the facts take us.

But in this instance the facts do not take us into atomism and anarchy. These things are specters seen by the critic when he is suddenly confused by the loss of customary spectacles. He takes his own confusion due to loss of artificial aids for an objective situation. *Because* situations in which deliberation is evoked are new, and therefore unique, general principles are needed. Only an uncritical vagueness will assume that the sole alternative to fixed generality is absence of continuity. Rigid habits insist upon duplication, repetition, recurrence; in their case there is accordingly fixed principles. Only there is no *principle* at all, that is, no conscious intellectual rule, for thought is not needed. But all habit has *continuity*, and while a flexible habit does not secure in its operation bare recurrence nor absolute assurance neither does it plunge us into the hopeless confusion of the absolutely different. To insist upon change and the new is to insist upon alteration *of* the old. In denying that the meaning of any genuine case of deliberation can be exhausted by treating it as a mere case of an established classification the value of classification is not denied. It is shown where its value lies, namely, in directing attention to resemblances and differences in the new case, in economizing effort in foresight. To call a generalization a tool is not to say it is useless; the contrary is patently the case. A tool is something to use. Hence it is also something to be improved by noting how it works. The need of such noting and improving is indispensable if, as is the case with moral principles, the tool has to be used in unwonted

ircumstances. Continuity of growth not atomism is hus the alternative to fixity of principles and aims. his is no Bergsonian plea for dividing the universe nto two portions, one all of fixed, recurrent habits, and he other all spontaneity of flux. Only in such a uni- erse would reason in morals have to take its choice be- ween absolute fixity and absolute looseness.

Nothing is more instructive about the genuine value f generalization in conduct than the errors of Kant. Ie took the doctrine that the essence of reason is com- lete universality (and hence necessity and immuta- ility), with the seriousness becoming the professor of ogic. Applying the doctrine to morality he saw that his conception severed morals from connection with xperience. Other moralists had gone that far before is day. But none of them had done what Kant pro- ceeded to do: carry this separation of moral principles nd ideals from experience to its logical conclusion. Ie saw that to exclude from principles all onnection with empirical details meant to ex- lude all reference of any kind to consequences. Ie then saw with a clearness which does his ogic credit that with such exclusion, reason becomes ntirely empty: nothing is left except the universality f the universal. He was then confronted by the seem- gly insoluble problem of getting moral instruction re- arding special cases out of a principle that having orsworn intercourse with experience was barren and npty. His ingenious method was as follows. Formal niversality means at least logical identity; it means

self-consistency or absence of contradiction. Hence follows the method by which a would-be truly moral agent will proceed in judging the rightness of any proposed act. He will ask: Can its motive be made universal for all cases? How would one like it if by one's act one's motive in that act were to be erected into a universal law of actual nature? Would one then be willing to make the same choice?

Surely a man would hesitate to steal if by his choice to make stealing the motive of his act he were also to erect it into such a fixed law of nature that henceforth he and everybody else would always steal whenever property was in question. No stealing without property, and with universal stealing also no property; a clear self-contradiction. Looked at in the light of reason every mean, insincere, inconsiderate motive of action shrivels into a private exception which a person wants to take advantage of in his own favor, and which he would be horrified to have others act upon. It violates the great principle of logic that A is A. Kindly decent acts, on the contrary, extend and multiply themselves in a continuing harmony.

This treatment by Kant evinces deep insight into the office of intelligence and principle in conduct. But it involves flat contradiction of Kant's own original intention to exclude consideration of concrete consequences. It turns out to be a method of recommending a broad impartial view of consequences. Our forecast of consequences is always subject, as we have noted, to the bias of impulse and habit. We see what we want to

ce, we obscure what is unfavorable to a cherished, prob bly unavowed, wish. We dwell upon favoring circum tances till they become weighted with reinforcing con iderations. We don't give opposing consequences half chance to develop in thought. Deliberation needs very possible help it can get against the twisting, ex ggerating and slighting tendency of passion and habit. To form the habit of asking how we should be willing o be treated in a similar case—which is what Kant's axim amounts to—is to gain an ally for impartial and incere deliberation and judgment. It is a safeguard gainst our tendency to regard our own case as excep ional in comparison with the case of others. "Just his once," a plea for isolation; secrecy—a plea for on-inspection, are forces which operate in every pas ionate desire. Demand for consistency, for "univer ality," far from implying a rejection of all conse uences, is a demand to survey consequences broadly, o link effect to effect in a chain of continuity. What ver force works to this end *is* reason. For reason, let be repeated is an outcome, a function, not a primitive orce. What we need are those habits, dispositions hich lead to impartial and consistent foresight of con equences. Then our judgments are reasonable; we are hen reasonable creatures.

VIII

Certain critics in sympathy with at least the negative contention, the critical side, of such a theory as has been advanced, regard it as placing too much emphasis upon intelligence. They find it intellectualistic, cold-blooded. They say we must change desire, love, aspiration, admiration, and then action will be transformed. A new affection, a changed appreciation, brings with it a revaluation of life and insists upon its realization. A refinement of intellect at most only figures out better ways of reaching old and accustomed ends. In fact we are lucky if intellect does not freeze the ardor of generous desire and paralyze creative endeavor. Intellect is critical, unproductive while desire is generative. In its dispassionateness intellect is aloof from humanity and its needs. It fosters detachment where sympathy is needed. It cultivates contemplation when salvation lies in liberating desire. Intellect is analytic, taking things to pieces; its devices are the scalpel and test-tube. Affection is synthetic, unifying. This argument affords an opportunity for making more explicit those respective offices of wish and thought in forming ends which have already been touched upon.

First we must undertake an independent analysis of desire. It is customary to describe desires in terms of their objects, meaning by objects the things which

gure as in imagination their goals. As the object is ble or base, so, it is thought, is desire. In any case, notions rise and cluster about the object. This stands it so conspicuously in immediate experience that it onopolizes the central position in the traditional psy- ological theory of desire. Barring gross self-decep- on or the frustration of external circumstance, the tcome, or end-result, of desire is regarded by this eory as similar to the end-in-view or object con- iously desired. Such, however, is not the case, as adily appears from the analysis of deliberation. In ying that the actual outcome of desire is different in nd from the object upon which desire consciously stens, I do not mean to repeat the old complaint out the fallibility and feebleness of mortals in virtue which man's hopes are frustrated and twisted in real- ation. The difference is one of diverse dimensions, t of degree or amount.

The object desired and the attainment of desire are more alike than a signboard on the road is like the arage to which it points and which it recommends to e traveler. Desire is the forward urge of living crea- ures. When the push and drive of life meets no ob- acle, there is nothing which we call desire. There is st life-activity. But obstructions present themselves, d activity is dispersed and divided. Desire is the out- me. It is activity surging forward to break through at dams it up. The "object" which then presents elf in thought as the goal of desire is the object of e environment *which, if it were present*, would secure

a re-unification of activity and the restoration of it ongoing unity. The end-in-view of desire is that objec which were it present would link into an organize whole activities which are now partial and competing It is no more like the actual end of desire, or th resulting state attained, than the coupling of car which have been separated is like an ongoing singl train. Yet the train cannot go on without the coupling

Such statements may seem contrary to common sens The pertinency of the illustration used will be denied No man desires the signboard which he sees, he desire the garage, the objective, the ulterior thing. But doe he? Or is the garage simply a means by which a divide body of activities is redintegrated or coordinated Is it desired in any sense for itself, or only because it the means of effective adjustment of a whole set of un derlying habits? While common sense responds to th ordinary statement of the end of desire, it also re sponds to a statement that no one desires the objec for its own sake, but only for what can be got out of i Here is just the point at which the theory that pleasu is the real objective of desire makes its appeal. I points out that not the physical object nor even i possession is really wanted; that they are only mean to something personal and experiential. And hence is argued that they are means to pleasure. The pre ent hypothesis offers an alternative: it says that the are means of removal of obstructions to an ongoin unified system of activities. It is easy to see why a objective looms so large and why emotional sur

nd stress gather about it and lift it high above the oor of consciousness. The objective is (or is taken to e) the key to the situation. If we can attain it, lay old of it, the trick is turned. It is like the piece of aper which carries the reprieve a condemned man aits for. Issues of life hang upon it. The desired ob-ect is in no sense the end or goal of desire, but it is ne *sine qua non* of that end. A practical man will fix is attention upon it, and not dream about eventuali-es which are only dreams if the objective is not at-ained, but which will follow in their own natural course it is reached. For then it becomes a factor in the ystem of activities. Hence the truth in the various so-alled paradoxes of desire. If pleasure or perfection ere the true end of desire, it would still be true that ne way to attainment is not to think of them. For bject thought of and object achieved exist in different imensions.

In addition to the popular notions that either the ob-ect in view or else pleasure is the end of desire, there a less popular theory that quiescence is the actual utcome or true terminal of desire. The theory finds s most complete practical statement in Buddhism. It nearer the psychological truth than either of the ther notions. But it views the attained outcome sim-ly in its negative aspect. The end reached quiets the ash and removes the discomfort attendant upon di-ded and obstructed activity. The uneasiness, unrest, naracteristic of desire is put to sleep. For this reason, me persons resort to intoxicants and anodynes. If

quiescence were the end and it could be perpetuated this way of removing disagreeable uneasiness would b as satisfactory a way out as the way of objective effort But in fact desire satisfied does not bring quiescenc unqualifiedly, but that *kind* of quiescence which mark the recovery of unified activity: the absence of interna strife among habits and instincts. Equilibration of ac tivities rather than quiescence is the actual result o satisfied desire. This names the outcome positively rather than comparatively and negatively.

This disparity of dimensions in desire between th object thought of and the outcome reached is the ex planation of those self-deceptions which psycho-analy sis has brought home to us so forcibly, but of which i gives elaborately cumbrous accounts. The objec thought of and the outcome *never* agree. There is n self-deceit in this fact. What, then, really happen when the actual outcome of satisfied revenge figures i thought as virtuous eagerness for justice? Or whe the tickled vanity of social admiration is masked a pure love of learning? The trouble lies in the refusa of a person to note the quality of the outcome, not i the unavoidable disparity of desire's object and the out come. The honest or integral mind attends to the re sult, and sees what it really is. For no terminal con dition is exclusively terminal. Since it exists in time i has consequences as well as antecedents. In being consummation it is also a force having causal poter tialities. It is initial as well as terminal.

Self-deception originates in looking at an outcome i

ne direction only—as a satisfaction of what has gone efore, ignoring the fact that what is attained is a state f habits which will continue in action and which will etermine future results. Outcomes of desire are also eginnings of new acts and hence are portentous. Satfied revenge may *feel* like justice vindicated; the restige of learning may *feel* like an enlargement and ctification of an objective outlook. But since different instincts and habits have entered into them, they re actually, that is dynamically, unlike. The function f moral judgment is to detect this unlikeness. Here, gain, the belief that we can know ourselves immediately as disastrous to moral science as the corresponding lea regarding knowledge of nature was to physical cience. Obnoxious "subjectivity" of moral judgment due to the fact that the immediate or esthetic quality vells and swells and displaces the thought of the active otency which gives activity its moral quality.

We are all natural Jack Horners. If the plum comes hen we put in and pull out our thumb we attribute ne satisfactory result to personal virtue. The plum obtained, and it is not easy to distinguish obtaining rom attaining, acquisition from achieving. Jack Horer, Esq., put forth *some* effort; and results and efforts re always more or less incommensurate. For the esult is always dependent to some extent upon the avor or disfavor of circumstance. Why then should ot the satisfactory plum shed its halo retrospectively pon what precedes and be taken as a sign of virtue? n this way heroes and leaders are constructed. Such

is the worship of success. And the evil of success worship is precisely the evil with which we have been dealing. "Success" is never merely final or terminal. Something else succeeds it, and its successors are influenced by its nature, that is by the persisting habits and impulses that enter into it. The world does not stop when the successful person pulls out his plum, nor does he stop, and the kind of success he obtains and his attitude toward it, is a factor in what comes afterwards. By a strange turn of the wheel, the success of the ultra-practical man is psychologically like the refined enjoyment of the ultra-esthetic person. Both ignore the eventualities with which every state of experience is charged. There is no reason for not enjoying the present, but there is every reason for examination of the objective factors of *what* is enjoyed before we translate enjoyment into a belief in excellence. There is every reason in other words for cultivating another enjoyment, that of the habit of examining the productive potentialities of the objects enjoyed.

Analysis of desire thus reveals the falsity of theories which magnify it at the expense of intelligence. Impulse is primary and intelligence is secondary and in some sense derivative. There should be no blinking of this fact. But recognition of it as a fact exalts intelligence. For thought is not the slave of impulse to do its bidding. Impulse does not know what it is after, it cannot give orders, not even if it wants to. It rushes blindly into any opening it chances to find. Anything that expends it, satisfies it. One outlet is like another

n it. It is indiscriminate. Its vagaries and excesses re the stock theme of classical moralists; and while hey point the wrong moral in urging the abdication f impulse in favor of reason, their characterization of npulse is not wholly wrong. What intelligence has to o in the service of impulse is to act not as its obedient ervant but as its clarifier and liberator. And this can e accomplished only by a study of the conditions and auses, the workings and consequences of the greatest ossible variety of desires and combinations of desire. ntelligence converts desire into plans, systematic plans ased on assembling facts, reporting events as they hap- en, keeping tab on them and analyzing them.

Nothing is so easy to fool as impulse and no one is eceived so readily as a person under strong emotion. Hence the idealism of man is easily brought to naught. enerous impulses are aroused; there is a vague antici- ation, a burning hope, of a marvelous future. Old ings are to pass speedily away and a new heavens nd earth are to come into existence. But impulse burns self up. Emotion cannot be kept at its full tide. Ob- tacles are encountered upon which action dashes itself to ineffectual spray. Or if it achieves, by luck, a ransitory success, it is intoxicated, and plumes itself n victory while it is on the road to sudden defeat. Meantime, other men, not carried away by impulse, use tablished habits and a shrewd cold intellect that ma- pulates them. The outcome is the victory of baser esire directed by insight and cunning over generous esire which does not know its way.

The realistic man of the world has evolved a regular technique for dealing with idealistic outbursts that threaten his supremacy. His aims are low, but he knows the means by which they are to be executed. His knowledge of conditions is narrow but it is effective within its confines. His foresight is limited to results that concern personal success, but is sharp, clearcut. He has no great difficulty in drafting the idealistic desire of others with its vague enthusiasms and its cloudy perceptions into canals where it will serve his own purposes. The energies excited by emotional idealism run into the materialistic reservoirs provided by the contriving thought of those who have not surrendered their minds to their sentiment.

The glorification of affection and aspiration at the expense of thought is a survival of romantic optimism. It assumes a pre-established harmony between natural impulse and natural objects. Only such a harmony justifies the belief that generous feeling will find its way illuminated by the sheer nobility of its own quality. Persons of a literary turn of mind are as subject to this fallacy as intellectual specialists are apt to the contrary fallacy that theorizing apart from force or impulse and habit will get affairs forward. They tend to fancy that things are as pliant to imagination as are words, that an emotion can compose affairs as if they were materials for a lyric poem. But if the objects of the environment were only as plastic as the materials of poetic art, men would never have been obliged to have recourse to creation in the medium of

words. We idealize in fancy because our idealizations n fact are balked. And while the latter must start with imaginative idealizations instigated by release of generous impulse, they can be carried through only when the hard labor of observation, memory and foresight weds the vision of imagination to the organized efficiencies of habit.

Sometimes desire means not bare impulse but impulse which has sense of an objective. In this case desire and thought cannot be opposed, for desire includes thought within itself. The question is now how far the work of thought has been done, how adequate is its perception of its directing object. For the moving force may be a shadowy presentiment constructed by wishful hope rather than by study of conditions; it may be an emotional indulgence rather than a solid plan built upon the rocks of actuality discovered by accurate inquiries. There is no thought without the impeding of impulse. But the obstruction may merely intensify its blind surge forward; or it may divert the force of forward impulse into observation of existing conditions and forecast of their future consequences. This long way around is the short way home for desire.

No issue of morals is more far-reaching than the one herewith sketched. Historically speaking, there is point in the attacks of those who speak slightingly of science and intellect, and who would limit their moral significance to supplying incidental help to execution of purposes born of affection. Thought too often is specialized in a remote and separate pursuit, or em-

ployed in a hard way to contrive the instrumentalities of "success." Intellect is too often made a tool for a systematized apology for things as "they are," that is for customs that benefit the class in power, or else a road to an interesting occupation which accumulates facts and ideas as other men gather dollars, while priding itself on its ideal quality. No wonder that at times catastrophes that affect men in common are welcomed. For the moment they turn science away from its abstract technicalities into a servant of some human aspiration; the hard, chilly calculations of intellect are swept away by floods of sympathy and common loyalties.

But, alas, emotion without thought is unstable. It rises like the tide and subsides like the tide irrespective of what it has accomplished. It is easily diverted into any side channel dug by old habits or provided by cool cunning, or it disperses itself aimlessly. Then comes the reaction of disillusionment, and men turn all the more fiercely to the pursuit of narrow ends where they are habituated to use observation and planning and where they have acquired some control of conditions. The separation of warm emotion and cool intelligence is the great moral tragedy. This division is perpetuated by those who deprecate science and foresight in behalf of affection as it is by those who in the name of an idol labeled reason would quench passion. The intellect is always inspired by some impulse. Even the most case-hardened scientific specialist, the most abstract philosopher, is moved by some passion. But

n actuating impulse easily hardens into isolated habit. t is unavowed and disconnected. The remedy not lapse of thought, but its quickening and xtension to contemplate the continuities of existence, nd restore the connection of the isolated desire to ie companionship of its fellows. The glorification of will" apart from thought turns out either a com- itment to blind action which serves the purpose of iose who guide their deeds by narrow plans, or else sentimental, romantic faith in the harmonies of na- ire leading straight to disaster.

In words at least, the association of idealism with notion and impulse has been repeatedly implied in ie foregoing. The connection is more than verbal. very end that man holds up, every project he enter- ins is ideal. It marks something wanted, rather than omething existing. It is wanted because existence as it ow is does not furnish it. It carries with itself, then, sense of contrast to the achieved, to the existent. outruns the seen and touched. It is the work of ith and hope even when it is the plan of the most rd-headed "practical" man. But though ideal in is sense it is not *an* ideal. Common sense revolts at lling every project, every design, every contrivance of nning, ideal, because common sense includes above all its conception of the ideal the *quality* of the plan oposed.

Idealistic revolt is blind and like every blind reaction eeps us away. The quality of the ideal is exalted till is something beyond all possibility of definite plan and

execution. Its sublimity renders it inaccessibly remote. An ideal becomes a synonym for whatever is inspiring —and impossible. Then, since intelligence cannot be wholly suppressed, the ideal is hardened by thought into some high, far-away object. It is so elevated and so distant that it does not belong to this world or to experience. It is in technical language, transcendental; in common speech, supernatural, of heaven not of earth. The ideal is then a goal of final exhaustive comprehensive perfection which can be defined only by complete contrast with the actual. Although impossible of realization and of conception, it is still regarded as the source of all generous discontent with actualities and of all inspiration to progress.

This notion of the nature and office of ideals combines in one contradictory whole all that is vicious in the separation of desire and thought. It strives while retaining the vagueness of emotion to simulate the objective definiteness of thought. It follows the natural course of intelligence in demanding an object which will unify and fulfil desire, and then cancels the work of thought by treating the object as ineffable and unrelated to present action and experience. It converts the surge of present impulse into a future end only to swamp the endeavor to clarify this end in a gush of unconsidered feeling. It is supposed that the thought of the ideal is necessary to arouse dissatisfaction with the present and to arouse effort to change it. But in reality the ideal is itself the product of discontent with conditions. Instead however of serving to organize and

irect effort, it operates as a compensatory dream. It ecomes another ready-made world. Instead of pro- noting effort at concrete transformations of what ex- sts, it constitutes another kind of existence already omewhere in being. It is a refuge, an asylum from ffort. Thus the energy that might be spent in trans- orming present ills goes into oscillating flights into a ar away perfect world and the tedium of enforced re- urns into the necessities of the present evil world.

We can recover the genuine import of ideals and dealism only by disentangling this unreal mixture of hought and emotion. The action of deliberation, as e have seen, consists in selecting some foreseen con- equence to serve as a stimulus to present action. It rings future possibilities into the present scene and hereby frees and expands present tendencies. But the elected consequence is set in an indefinite context of ther consequences just as real as it is, and many of hem much more certain in fact. The "ends" that re foreseen and utilized mark out a little island in an nfinite sea. This limitation would be fatal were the roper function of ends anything else than to liberate nd guide present action out of its perplexities and onfusions. But this service constitutes the sole mean- ng of aims and purposes. Hence their slight extent n comparison with ignored and unforeseen conse- uences is of no import in itself. The "ideal" as it tands in popular thought, the notion of a complete nd exhaustive realization, is remote from the true unctions of ends, and would only embarrass us if it

could be embraced in thought instead of being, as it is a comment by the emotions.

For the sense of an indefinite context of consequences from among which the aim is selected enters into the *present* meaning of activity. The "end" is the figured pattern at the center of the field through which runs the axis of conduct. About this central figuration extends infinitely a supporting background in a vague whole, undefined and undiscriminated. At most intelligence but throws a spotlight on that little part of the whole which marks out the axis of movement. Even if the light is flickering and the illuminated portion stands forth only dimly from the shadowy background it suffices if we are shown the way to move. To the rest of the consequences, collateral and remote, correspond a background of feeling, of diffused emotion. This forms the stuff of the ideal.

From the standpoint of its *definite* aim any act is petty in comparison with the totality of natural events. What is accomplished directly as the outcome of a turn which our action gives the course of events is infinitesimal in comparison with their total sweep. Only an illusion of conceit persuades us that cosmic difference hangs upon even our wisest and most strenuous effort. Yet discontent with this limitation is as unreasonable as relying upon an illusion of external importance to keep ourselves going. In a genuine sense every act is already possessed of infinite import. The little part of the scheme of affairs which is modifiable by our efforts is continuous with the rest of the world. The boundari

of our garden plot join it to the world of our neighbors and our neighbors' neighbors. That small effort which we can put forth is in turn connected with an infinity of events that sustain and support it. The consciousness of this encompassing infinity of connections is ideal. When a sense of the infinite reach of an act physically occurring in a small point of space and occupying a petty instant of times comes home to us, the *meaning* of present act is seen to be vast, immeasurable, unthinkable. This ideal is not a goal to be attained. It a significance to be felt, appreciated. Though consciousness of it cannot become intellectualized (identified in objects of a distinct character) yet emotional appreciation of it is won only by those willing to think. "It is the office of art and religion to evoke such appreciations and intimations; to enhance and steady them all they are wrought into the texture of our lives. Some philosophers define religious consciousness as beginning where moral and intellectual consciousness leave off. In the sense that definite purposes and methods shade off of necessity into a vast whole which is incapable of objective presentation this view is correct. But they have falsified the conception by treating the religious consciousness as something that comes *after* an experience in which striving, resolution and foresight are found. To them morality and science are a striving; when striving ceases a moral holiday begins, an excursion beyond the utmost flight of legitimate thought and endeavor. But there is a point in *every* intelligent activity where effort ceases; where thought and doing fall back upon a

course of events which effort and reflection cannot touch. There is a point *in* deliberate action where definite thought fades into the ineffable and undefinable—into emotion. If the sense of this effortless and unfathomable whole comes only in alternation with the sense of strain in action and labor in thought, then we spend our lives in oscillating between what is cramped and enforced and a brief transitory escape. The function of religion is then caricatured rather than realized. Morals, like war, is thought of as hell, and religion, like peace, as a respite. The religious experience is a reality in so far as in the midst of effort to foresee and regulate future objects we are sustained and expanded in feebleness and failure by the sense of an enveloping whole. Peace in action not after it is the contribution of the ideal to conduct.

IX

Over and over again, one point has recurred for criti-m;—the subordination of activity to a result outside elf. Whether that goal be thought of as pleasure, as rtue, as perfection, as final enjoyment of salvation, secondary to the fact that the moralists who ve asserted fixed ends have in all their differences om one another agreed in the basic idea that present tivity is but a means. We have insisted that hap-ness, reasonableness, virtue, perfecting, are on the ntrary parts of the present significance of present tion. Memory of the past, observation of the pres-t, foresight of the future are indispensable. But they e indispensable *to* a present liberation, an enriching owth of action. Happiness is fundamental in morals ly because happiness is not something to be sought r, but is something now attained, even in the midst of in and trouble, whenever recognition of our ties with ture and with fellow-men releases and informs our tion. Reasonableness is a necessity because it is the rception of the continuities that take action out of immediateness and isolation into connection with e past and future.

Perhaps the criticism and insistence have been too essant. They may have provoked the reader to re-tion. He may readily concede that orthodox theo-

ries have been onesided in sacrificing the present t
future good, making of the present but an onerou
obligation or a sacrifice endured for future gain. Bu
why, he may protest, go to an opposite extreme an
make the future but a means to the significance of th
present? Why should the power of foresight and effo
to shape the future, to regulate what is to happen, b
slighted? Is not the effect of such a doctrine to weake
putting forth of endeavor in order to make the futu
better than the present? Control of the future may b
limited in extent, but it is correspondingly precious
we should jealously cherish whatever encourages an
sustains effort to that end. To make little of this po
sibility, in effect, it will be argued, is to decrease th
care and endeavor upon which progress depends.

Control of the future is indeed precious in exa
proportion to its difficulty, its moderate degree of a
tainability. Anything that actually tends to make th
control less than it now is would be a movement bac
ward into sloth and triviality. But there is a diffe
ence between future improvement as a result and as
direct aim. To make it an aim is to throw away t
surest means of attaining it, namely attention to t
full use of present resources in the present situatio
Forecast of future conditions, scientific study of pa
and present in order that the forecast may be intel
gent, are indeed necessities. Concentration of int
lectual concern upon the future, solicitude for scope a
precision of estimate characteristic of any well co
ducted affair, naturally give the impression that th

imating purpose is control of the future. But ought about future happenings is the only way we n judge the present; it is the only way to appraise significance. Without such projection, there can be projects, no plans for administering present energs, overcoming present obstacles. Deliberately to bordinate the present to the future is to subject the mparatively secure to the precarious, exchange resurces for liabilities, surrender what is under control what is, relatively, incapable of control.

The *amount* of control which will come into existce in the future is not within control. But such amount as turns out to be practicable accrues only consequence of the best possible management of esent means and obstacles. Dominating *intellectual* e-occupation with the future is the way by which ciency in dealing with the present is attained. It is way, not a goal. And, upon the very most hopeful tlook, study and planning are more important in the aning, the enrichment of content, which they add to esent activity than is the increase of external conol they effect. Nor is this doctrine passivistic in idency. What sense is there in increased external ntrol except to increase the intrinsic significance of ing? The future that is foreseen is a future that is netime to be a present. Is the value of *that* present o to be postponed to a future date, and so on indefely? Or, if the good we are struggling to attain in future is one to be actually realized when that fue becomes present, why should not the good of *this*

present be equally precious? And is there, again, an intelligent way of modifying the future except to a tend to the full possibilities of the present? Scampin the present in behalf of the future leads only to rende ing the future less manageable. It increases the probs bility of molestation by future events.

Remarks cast in this form probably seem too muc like a logical manipulation of the concepts of prese and future to be convincing. Building a house is typical instance of an intelligent activity. It is a activity directed by a plan, a design. The plan itself based upon a foresight of future uses. This for sight is in turn dependent upon an organized surv of past experiences and of present conditions, a rec lection of former experiences of living in houses and acquaintance with present materials, prices, resource etc. Now if a legitimate case of subordination of pre ent to regulation of the future may anywhere be foun it is in such a case as this. For a man usually buil a house for the sake of the comfort and security, t "control," thereby afforded to future living rather tha just for the fun—or the trouble—of building. If such a case inspection shows that, after all, intellectu concern with the past and future is for the sake directing present activity and giving it meaning, t conclusion may be accepted for other cases.

Note that the present activity is the only one real under control. The man may die before the house built, or his financial conditions may change, or he m need to remove to another place. If he attempts

rovide for all contingencies, he will never do anything; he allows his attention to be much distracted by them, won't do well his present planning and execution. ne more he considers the future uses to which the house ll probably be put the better he will do his present b which is the activity of building. Control of fu- re living, such as it may turn out to be, is wholly pendent upon taking his present activity, seriously id devotedly, as an end, not a means. And a man has s hands full in doing well what now needs to be done. ntil men have formed the habit of using intelligence lly as a guide to present action they will never find t how much control of future contingencies is pos- ble. As things are, men so habitually scamp present tion in behalf of future "ends" that the facts for timating the extent of the possibility of reduction of ture contingencies have not been disclosed. What a an *is* doing limits both his direct control and his re- onsibility. We must not confuse the act of building th the house when built. The latter *is* a means, not fulfilment. But it is such only because it enters into new activity which is present not future. Life is con- nuous. The act of building in time gives way to the ts connected with a domicile. But everywhere the od, the fulfilment, the meaning of activity, resides in present made possible by judging existing conditions their connections.

If we seek for an illustration on a larger scale, educa- n furnishes us with a poignant example. As tradi- nally conducted, it strikingly exhibits a subordina-

tion of the living present to a remote and precariou
future. To prepare, to get ready, is its key-note. Th
actual outcome is lack of adequate preparation, of in
telligent adaptation. The professed exaltation of th
future turns out in practice a blind following of tra
dition, a rule of thumb muddling along from day t
day; or, as in some of the projects called industria
education, a determined effort on the part of one clas
of the community to secure *its* future at the expens
of another class. If education were conducted as
process of fullest utilization of present resources, lib
erating and guiding capacities that are now urgent,
goes without saying that the lives of the young woul
be much richer in meaning than they are now. It als
follows that intelligence would be kept busy in studyin
all indications of power, all obstacles and perversion
all products of the past that throw light upon preser
capacity, and in forecasting the future career of in
pulse and habit now active—not for the sake of sub
ordinating the latter but in order to treat them in
telligently. As a consequence whatever fortificatio
and expansion of the future that is possible will b
achieved—as it is now dismally unattained.

A more complicated instance is found in the dom
nant quality of our industrial activity. It may be do
matically declared that the roots of its evils are fou
in the separation of production from consumption-
that is, actual consummation, fulfilment. A norm
case of their relationship is found in the taking
food. Food is consumed and vigor is produced. T

fference between the two is one of directions or di-
ensions distinguished by intellect. In reality there is
mply conversion of energy from one form to another
herein it is more available—of greater significance.
he activity of the artist, the sportsman, the scientific
quirer exemplifies the same balance. Activity should
e productive. This is to say it should have a bearing
n the future, should effect control of it. But so far as
productive action is intrinsically creative, it has its
vn intrinsic value. Reference to future products and
ture enjoyments is but a way of enhancing percep-
on of an immanent meaning. A skilled artisan who
joys his work is aware that what he is making is made
r future use. Externally his action is one technically
beled "production." It seems to illustrate the sub-
ction of present activity to remote ends. But actu-
ly, morally, psychologically, the sense of the utility
the article produced is a factor in the present sig-
ficance of action due to the present utilization of
ilities, giving play to taste and skill, accomplishing
mething now. The moment production is severed
om immediate satisfaction, it becomes "labor,"
udgery, a task reluctantly performed.

Yet the whole tendency of modern economic life has
en to assume that consumption will take care of itself
ovided only production is grossly and intensely at-
nded to. Making things is frantically accelerated;
d every mechanical device used to swell the senseless
lk. As a result most workers find no replenishment,
renewal and growth of mind, no fulfilment in work.

They labor to get mere means of later satisfactio
This when procured is isolated in turn from productic
and is reduced to a barren physical affair or a sensuou
compensation for normal goods denied. Meantime th
fatuity of severing production from consumption, fro
present enriching of life, is made evident by econom
crises, by periods of unemployment alternating wit
periods of exercise, work or "over-production." Pr
duction apart from fulfilment becomes purely a matt
of quantity; for distinction, quality, is a matter of pre
ent meaning. Esthetic elements being excluded, th
mechanical reign. Production lacks criteria; one thin
is better than another if it can be made faster or
greater mass. Leisure is not the nourishment of min
in work, nor a recreation; it is a feverish hurry fo
diversion, excitement, display, otherwise there is n
leisure except a sodden torpor. Fatigue due for son
to monotony and for others to overstrain in mai
taining the pace is inevitable. Socially, the separatio
of production and consumption, means and ends, is th
root of the most profound division of classes. Tho
who fix the "ends" for production are in control, tho
who engage in isolated productive activity are the su
ject-class. But if the latter are oppressed the form
are not truly free. Their consumptions are acc
dental ostentation and extravagance, not a normal co
summation or fulfilment of activity. The remainder
their lives is spent in enslavement to keeping the m
chinery going at an increasingly rapid rate.

Meantime class struggle grows between those who

roductive labor is enforced by necessity and those who re privileged consumers. And the exaggeration of roduction due to its isolation from ignored consumption so hypnotizes attention that even would-be reformers, like Marxian socialists, assert that the entire cial problem focuses at the point of production. nce this separation of means from ends signifies an ection of means into ends, it is no wonder that a materialistic conception of history" emerges. It is t an invention of Marx; it is a record of fact so far the separation in question obtains. For practicable ealism is found only in a fulfilment, a consumption hich is a replenishing, growth, renewal of mind and dy. Harmony of social interests is found in the de-spread sharing of activities significant in themlves, that is to say, at the point of *consumption*.* But e forcing of production apart from consumption leads the monstrous belief that class-struggle civil war is means of social progress, instead of a register of the rriers to its attainment. Yet here too the Marxian ads aright the character of most current economic tivity.

The history of economic activity thus exemplifies the oral consequences of the separation of present activ- and future "ends" from each other. It also emdies the difficulty of the problem—the tax placed by upon thought and good will. For the professed ideal- and the hard-headed materialist or "practical" an, have conspired together to sustain this situation.

* Acknowledgment is due "The Social Interpretation of History" by Maurice William.

The "idealist" sets up as the ideal not fullness of meaning of the present but a remote goal. Hence the present is evacuated of meaning. It is reduced to being a mere external instrument, an evil necessity due to the distance between us and significant valid satisfaction. Appreciation, joy, peace in present activity are suspect. They are regarded as diversions, temptations, unworthy relaxations. Then since human nature *must* have present realization, a sentimental, romantic enjoyment of the ideal becomes a substitute for intelligent and rewarding activity. The utopia cannot be realized in fact but it may be appropriated in fantasy and serve as an anodyne to blunt the sense of a misery which after all endures. Some private key to a present entering upon remote and superior bliss is sought, just as the evangelical enjoys a complacent and superior sense of a salvation unobtained by fellow mortals. Thus the normal demand for realization, for satisfaction in the present, is abnormally met.

Meantime the practical man wants something definite, tangible and presumably obtainable for which to work. He is looking after "a good thing" as the average man is looking after a "good time," that natural caricature of an intrinsically significant activity. Yet his activity is impractical. He is looking for satisfaction somewhere else than where it can be found. In his utopian search for a future good he neglects the only place where good can be found. He empties present activity of meaning by making it a mere instrumentality. When the future arrives it is only after all another

despised present. By habit as well as by definition it is still a means to something which has yet to come. Again human nature must have its claims satisfied, and sensuality is the inevitable recourse. Usually a compromise is worked out, by which a man for his working-hours accepts the philosophy of activity for some future result, while at odd leisure times he enters by conventionally recognized channels upon an enjoyment of "spiritual" blessings and "ideal" refinements. The problem of serving God and Mammon is thus solved. The situation exemplifies the concrete meaning of the separation of means from ends which is the intellectual reflex of the divorce of theory and practice, intelligence and habit, foresight and present impulse. Moralists have spent time and energy in showing what happens when appetite, impulse, is indulged without reference to consequences and reason. But they have mostly ignored the counterpart evils of an intelligence that conceives ideals and goods which do not enter into present impulse and habit. The life of reason has been specialized, romanticized, or made a heavy burden. This situation embodies the import of the problem of actualizing the place of intelligence in conduct.

Our whole account of the place of intelligence in conduct is exposed however to the charge of being itself romantic, a compensatory idealization. The history of mind is a record of intellect which registers, with more or less inaccuracy, what has happened after it has happened. The crisis in which the intervention of foreseeing and directing mind is needed passes unnoted,

with attention directed toward incidentals and irrelevancies. The work of intellect is *post mortem*. The rise of social science, it will be pointed out, has increased the amount of registering that occurs. Social post mortems occur much more frequently than they used to. But one of the things which the unbiased mind will register is the impotency of discussion, analysis and reporting in modifying the course of events. The latter goes its way unheeding. The reply that this condition of matters shows not the impotency of intelligence but that what passes for science is not science is too easy a retort to be satisfactory. We must have recourse to some concrete facts or surrender our doctrine just at the moment when we have formulated it.

Technical affairs give evidence that the work of inquiry, reporting an analysis is not always ineffectual. The development of a chain of "nation-wide" tobacco shops, of a well managed national telephone system, of the extension of the service of an electric-light plant testify to the fact that study, reflection and the formation of plans do in some instances determine a course of events. The effect is seen in both engineering management and in national commercial expansion. Such potency however, it must be admitted, is limited to just those matters that are called technical in contrast with the larger affairs of humanity. But if we seek, as we should, for a definition of "technical," we can hardly find any save one that goes in a circle: Affairs are technical in which observation, analysis and intellectual organization are determining factors. Is the conclusion

o be drawn a conviction that our wider social interests .re so different from those in which intelligence is a irecting factor that in the former science must always emain a belated visitor coming upon the scene after iatters are settled? No, the logical conclusion is that s yet we have no technique in important economic, olitical and international affairs. Complexity of conitions render the difficulties in the way of the developient of a technique enormous. It is imaginable they ill never be overcome. But our choice is between the evelopment of a technique by which intelligence will ecome an intervening partner and a continuation of a egime of accident, waste and distress.

PART FOUR

CONCLUSION

CONDUCT when distributed under heads like habit, impulse and intelligence gets artificially shredded. In discussing each of these topics we have run into the others. We conclude, then, with an attempt to gather together some outstanding considerations about conduct as a whole.

I

The foremost conclusion is that morals has to do with all activity into which alternative possibilities enter. For wherever they enter a difference between better and worse arises. Reflection upon action means uncertainty and consequent need of decision as to which course is better. The better is the good; the best is not better than the good but is simply the discovered good. Comparative and superlative degrees are only paths to the positive degree of action. The worse or evil is a rejected good. In deliberation and before choice no evil presents itself as evil. Until it is rejected it is a competing good. After rejection, it figures not as a lesser good, but as the bad of that situation.

Actually then only deliberate action, conduct into which reflective choice enters, is distinctively moral, for only then does there enter the question of better and worse. Yet it is a perilous error to draw a hard and fast line between action into which deliberation and choice enter and activity due to impulse and matter-of-fact habit. One of the consequences of action is to involve us in predicaments where we have to reflect upon things formerly done as matter of course. One of the chief problems of our dealings with others is to induce them to reflect upon affairs which they usually perform from unreflective habit. On the other hand, every reflective choice tends to relegate some conscious issue into a deed or habit henceforth taken for granted and not thought upon. Potentially therefore every and any act is within the scope of morals, being a candidate for possible judgment with respect to its better-or-worse quality. It thus becomes one of the most perplexing problems of reflection to discover just how far to carry it, what to bring under examination and what to leave to unscrutinized habit. Because there is no final recipe by which to decide this question all moral judgment is experimental and subject to revision by its issue.

The recognition that conduct covers every act that is judged with reference to better and worse and that the need of this judgment is potentially coextensive with all portions of conduct, saves us from the mistake which makes morality a separate department of life. Potentially conduct is one hundred per cent of our acts.

Hence we must decline to admit theories which identify morals with the purification of motives, edifying character, pursuing remote and elusive perfection, obeying supernatural command, acknowledging the authority of duty. Such notions have a dual bad effect. First they get in the way of observation of conditions and consequences. They divert thought into side issues. Secondly, while they confer a morbid exaggerated quality upon things which are viewed under the aspect of morality, they release the larger part of the acts of life from serious, that is moral, survey. Anxious solicitude for the few acts which are deemed moral is accompanied by edicts of exemption and baths of immunity for most acts. A moral moratorium prevails for everyday affairs.

When we observe that morals is at home wherever considerations of the worse and better are involved, we are committed to noting that morality is a continuing process not a fixed achievement. Morals means growth of conduct in meaning; at least it means that kind of expansion in meaning which is consequent upon observations of the conditions and outcome of conduct. It is all one with growing. Growing and growth are the same fact expanded in actuality or telescoped in thought. In the largest sense of the word, morals is education. It is learning the meaning of what we are about and employing that meaning in action. The good, satisfaction, "end," of growth of present action in shades and scope of meaning is the only good within our control, and the only one, accordingly, for which

esponsibility exists. The rest is luck, fortune. And he tragedy of the moral notions most insisted upon by he morally self-conscious is the relegation of the only ood which can fully engage thought, namely present eaning of action, to the rank of an incident of a re- ote good, whether that future good be defined as leasure, or perfection, or salvation, or attainment of irtuous character.

"Present" activity is not a sharp narrow knife- lade in time. The present is complex, containing ithin itself a multitude of habits and impulses. It is nduring, a course of action, a process including mem- ry, observation and foresight, a pressure forward, a lance backward and a look outward. It is of *moral* ioment because it marks a transition in the direction f breadth and clarity of action or in that of triviality nd confusion. Progress is present reconstruction add- ng fullness and distinctness of meaning, and retrogres- ion is a present slipping away of significance, deter- inations, grasp. Those who hold that progress can e perceived and measured only by reference to a remote oal, first confuse meaning with space, and then treat patial position as absolute, as limiting movement in- tead of being bounded in and by movement. There are lenty of negative elements, due to conflict, entangle- ent and obscurity, in most of the situations of life, nd we do not require a revelation of some supreme erfection to inform us whether or no we are making eadway in present rectification. We move on from he worse and into, not just towards, the better, which

is authenticated not by comparison with the foreign but in what is indigenous. Unless progress is a present reconstructing, it is nothing; if it cannot be told by qualities belonging to the movement of transition it can never be judged.

Men have constructed a strange dream-world when they have supposed that without a fixed ideal of a remote good to inspire them, they have no inducement to get relief from present troubles, no desires for liberation from what oppresses and for clearing-up what confuses present action. The world in which we could get enlightenment and instruction about the direction in which we are moving only from a vague conception of an unattainable perfection would be totally unlike our present world. Sufficient unto the day is the evil thereof. Sufficient it is to stimulate us to remedial action, to endeavor in order to convert strife into harmony, monotony into a variegated scene, and limitation into expansion. The converting is progress, the only progress conceivable or attainable by man. Hence every situation has its own measure and quality of progress, and the need for progress is recurrent, constant. If it is better to travel than to arrive, it is because traveling is a constant arriving, while arrival that precludes further traveling is most easily attained by going to sleep or dying. We find our clews to direction in the projected recollections of definite experienced goods not in vague anticipations, even when we label the vagueness perfection, the Ideal, and proceed to manipulate its definition with dry dialectic logic

"rogress means increase of present meaning, which in olves multiplication of sensed distinctions as well as armony, unification. This statement may, perhaps, be ade generally, in application to the experience of umanity. If history shows progress it can hardly be ound elsewhere than in this complication and extension f the significance found within experience. It is clear hat such progress brings no surcease, no immunity rom perplexity and trouble. If we wished to trans- ute this generalization into a categorical imperative e should say: "So act as to increase the meaning of resent experience." But even then in order to get in- truction about the concrete quality of such increased eaning we should have to run away from the law and tudy the needs and alternative possibilities lying with- n a unique and localized situation. The imperative, ike everything absolute, is sterile. Till men give up he search for a general formula of progress they will ot know where to look to find it.

A business man proceeds by comparing today's lia- ilities and assets with yesterday's, and projects plans or tomorrow by a study of the movement thus indi- ated in conjunction with study of the conditions of he environment now existing. It is not otherwise with he business of living. The future is a projection of the ubject-matter of the present, a projection which is not rbitrary in the extent in which it divines the movement f the moving present. The physician is lost who would uide his activities of healing by building up a picture f perfect health, the same for all and in its nature

complete and self-enclosed once for all. He employs what he has discovered about actual cases of good health and ill health and their causes to investigate the present ailing individual, so as to further his recovering; recovering, an intrinsic and living process rather than recovery, which is comparative and static. Moral theories, which however have not remained mere theories but which have found their way into the opinions of the common man, have reversed the situation and made the present subservient to a rigid yet abstract future.

The ethical import of the doctrine of evolution is enormous. But its import has been misconstrued because the doctrine has been appropriated by the very traditional notions which in truth it subverts. It has been thought that the doctrine of evolution means the complete subordination of present change to a future goal. It has been constrained to teach a futile dogma of approximation, instead of a gospel of present growth. The usufruct of the new science has been seized upon by the old tradition of fixed and external ends. In fact evolution means continuity of change and the fact that change may take the form of present growth of complexity and interaction. Significant stages in change are found not in access of fixity or attainment but in those crises in which a seeming fixity of habits gives way to a release of capacities that have not previously functioned: in times that is of readjustment and redirection.

No matter what the present success in straightening out difficulties and harmonizing conflicts, it is certain

hat problems will recur in the future in a new form r on a different plane. Indeed every genuine accomlishment instead of winding up an affair and enclosg it as a jewel in a casket for future contemplation, omplicates the practical situation. It effects a new istribution of energies which have henceforth to be nployed in ways for which past experience gives no xact instruction. Every important satisfaction of an ld want creates a new one; and this new one has to nter upon an experimental adventure to find its satsfaction. From the side of what has gone before chievement settles something. From the side of what omes after, it complicates, introducing new problems, nsettling factors. There is something pitifully juvenle in the idea that "evolution," progress, means a efinite sum of accomplishment which will forever stay one, and which by an exact amount lessens the amount till to be done, disposing once and for all of just so nany perplexities and advancing us just so far on our oad to a final stable and unperplexed goal. Yet the ypical nineteenth century, mid-victorian conception of volution was precisely a formulation of such a consumnate juvenilism.

If the true ideal is that of a stable condition free rom conflict and disturbance, then there are a number f theories whose claims are superior to those of the opular doctrine of evolution. Logic points rather in he direction of Rousseau and Tolstoi who would recur o some primitive simplicity, who would return from omplicated and troubled civilization to a state of na-

ture. For certainly progress in civilization has not only meant increase in the scope and intricacy of problems to be dealt with, but it entails increasing instability. For in multiplying wants, instruments and possibilities, it increases the variety of forces which enter into relations with one another and which have to be intelligently directed. Or again, Stoic indifference or Buddhist calm have greater claims. For, it may be argued, since all objective achievement only complicates the situation, the victory of a final stability can be secured only by renunciation of desire. Since every satisfaction of desire increases force, and this in turn creates new desires, withdrawal into an inner passionless state indifference to action and attainment, is the sole road to possession of the eternal, stable and final reality.

Again, from the standpoint of definite approximation to an ultimate goal, the balance falls heavily on the side of pessimism. The more striving the more attainments perhaps; but also assuredly the more needs and the more disappointments. The more we do and the more we accomplish, the more the end is vanity and vexation. From the standpoint of attainment of good that stays put, that constitutes a definite sum performed which lessens the amount of effort required in order to reach the ultimate goal of final good, progress *is* an illusion. But we are looking for it in the wrong place. The world war is a bitter commentary on the nineteenth century misconception of moral achievement—a misconception however which it only inherited from the traditional theory of fixed ends, attempting to bolster

p that doctrine with aid from the "scientific" theory f evolution. The doctrine of progress is not yet bankupt. The bankruptcy of the notion of fixed goods to e attained and stably possessed may possibly be the neans of turning the mind of man to a tenable theory f progress—to attention to present troubles and posibilities.

Adherents of the idea that betterment, growth in goodness, consists in approximation to an exhaustive, table, immutable end or good, have been compelled to ecognize the truth that in fact we envisage the good n specific terms that are relative to existing needs, and hat the attainment of every specific good merges insensibly into a new condition of maladjustment with its ieed of a new end and a renewed effort. But they have elaborated an ingenious dialectical theory to account for the facts while maintaining their theory inact. The goal, the ideal, is infinite; man is finite, subject to conditions imposed by space and time. The pecific character of the ends which man entertains nd of the satisfaction he achieves is due therefore precisely to his empirical and finite nature in its contrast with the infinite and complete character of the rue reality, the end. Consequently when man reaches hat he had taken to be the destination of his journey e finds that he has only gone a piece on the road. Infinite vistas still stretch before him. Again he sets his nark a little way further ahead, and again when he eaches the station set, he finds the road opening before im in unexpected ways, and sees new distant objects

beckoning him forward. Such is the popular doctrine.

By some strange perversion this theory passes for moral idealism. An office of inspiration and guidance is attributed to the thought of the goal of ultimate completeness or perfection. As matter of fact, the idea sincerely held brings discouragement and despair not inspiration or hopefulness. There is something either ludicrous or tragic in the notion that inspiration to continued progress is had in telling man that no matter what he does or what he achieves, the outcome is negligible in comparison with what he set out to achieve, that every endeavor he makes is bound to turn out a failure compared with what should be done, that every attained satisfaction is only forever bound to be only a disappointment. The honest conclusion is pessimism. All is vexation, and the greater the effort the greater the vexation. But the fact is that it is not the negative aspect of an outcome, its failure to reach infinity, which renews courage and hope. Positive attainment, actual enrichment of meaning and powers opens new vistas and sets new tasks, creates new aims and stimulates new efforts. The facts are not such as to yield unthinking optimism and consolation; for they render it impossible to rest upon attained goods. New struggles and failures are inevitable. The total scene of action remains as before, only for us more complex, and more subtly unstable. But this very situation is a consequence of expansion, not of failures of power, and when grasped and admitted it is a challenge to intelligence. Instruction in what to do next can never come

from an infinite goal, which for us is bound to be empty. It can be derived only from study of the deficiencies, irregularities and possibilities of the actual situation.

In any case, however, arguments about pessimism and optimism based upon considerations regarding fixed attainment of good and evil are mainly literary in quality. Man continues to live because he is a living creature not because reason convinces him of the certainty or probability of future satisfactions and achievements. He is instinct with activities that carry him on. Individuals here and there cave in, and most individuals sag, withdraw and seek refuge at this and that point. But man as man still has the dumb pluck of the animal. He has endurance, hope, curiosity, eagerness, love of action. These traits belong to him by structure, not by taking thought. Memory of past and foresight of future convert dumbness to some degree of articulateness. They illumine curiosity and steady courage. Then when the future arrives with its inevitable disappointments as well as fulfilments, and with new sources of trouble, failure loses something of its fatality, and suffering yields fruit of instruction not of bitterness. Humility is more demanded at our moments of triumph than at those of failure. For humility is not a caddish self-depreciation. It is the sense of our slight inability even with our best intelligence and effort to command events; a sense of our dependence upon forces that go their way without our wish and plan. Its purport is not to relax effort but to make us prize every opportunity of present growth. In

morals, the infinitive and the imperative develop from the participle, present tense. Perfection means perfecting, fulfilment, fulfilling, and the good is now or never.

Idealistic philosophies, those of Plato, Aristotle, Spinoza, like the hypothesis now offered, have found the good in meanings belonging to a conscious life, a life of reason, not in external achievement. Like it, they have exalted the place of intelligence in securing fulfilment of conscious life. These theories have at least not subordinated conscious life to external obedience, not thought of virtue as something different from excellence of life. But they set up a transcendental meaning and reason, remote from present experience and opposed to it; or they insist upon a special form of meaning and consciousness to be attained by peculiar modes of knowledge inaccessible to the common man, involving not continuous reconstruction of ordinary experience, but its wholesale reversal. They have treated regeneration, change of heart, as wholesale and self-enclosed, not as continuous.

The utilitarians also made good and evil, right and wrong, matters of conscious experience. In addition they brought them down to earth, to everyday experience. They strove to humanize other-worldly goods. But they retained the notion that the good is future and hence outside the meaning of present activity. In so far it is sporadic, exceptional, subject to accident, passive, an enjoyment not a joy, something hit upon not a fulfilling. The future end is for them not *s*

remote from present action as the Platonic realm of deals, or as the Aristotelian rational thought, or the Christian heaven, or Spinoza's conception of the universal whole. But still it is separate in principle and n fact from present activity. The next step is to identify the sought for good with the meaning of our mpulses and our habits, and the specific *moral* good or virtue with *learning* this meaning, a learning that akes us back not into an isolated self but out into the pen-air world of objects and social ties, terminating n an increment of present significance.

Doubtless there are those who will think that we hus escape from remote and external ends only to fall nto an Epicureanism which teaches us to subordinate verything else to present satisfactions. The hypothesis preferred may seem to some to advise a subjective, elf-centered life of intensified consciousness, an esthetically dilettante type of egoism. For is not its lesson hat we should concentrate attention, each upon the consciousness accompanying his action so as to refine and develop it? Is not this, like all subjective morals, an anti-social doctrine, instructing us to subordinate the objective consequences of our acts, those which promote the welfare of others, to an enrichment of our private conscious lives?

It can hardly be denied that as compared with the dogmas against which it reacted there is an element of truth in Epicureanism. It strove to center attention upon what is actually within control and to find the good in the present instead of in a contingent uncer-

tain future. The trouble with it lies in its account of present good. It failed to connect this good with the full reach of activities. It contemplated good of withdrawal rather than of active participation. That is to say, the objection to Epicureanism lies in its conception of what constitutes present good, not in its emphasis upon satisfaction as at present. The same remark may be made about every theory which recognizes the individual self. If any such theory is objectionable, the objection is against the character or quality assigned to the self. Of course an individual is the bearer or carrier of experience. What of that? Everything depends upon the kind of experience that centers in him. Not the residence of experience counts, but its contents, what's in the house. The center is not in the abstract amenable to our control, but what gathers about it is our affair. We can't help being individual selves, each one of us. If selfhood as such is a bad thing, the blame lies not with the self but with the universe, with providence. But in fact the distinction between a selfishness with which we find fault and an unselfishness which we esteem is found in the quality of the activities which proceed from and enter into the self, according as they are contractive, exclusive, or expansive, outreaching. Meaning exists for some self, but this truistic fact doesn't fix the quality of any particular meaning. It may be such as to make the self small, or such as to exalt and dignify the self. It is as impertinent to decry the worth of experience because it is connected with a self as it is fantastic to

idealize personality just as personality aside from the question what sort of a person one is.

Other persons are selves too. If one's own present experience is to be depreciated in its meaning because it centers in a self, why act for the welfare of others? Selfishness for selfishness, one is as good as another; our own is worth as much as another's. But the recognition that good is always found in a present growth of significance in activity protects us from thinking that welfare can consist in a soup-kitchen happiness, in pleasures we can confer upon others from without. It shows that good is the same in quality wherever it is found, whether in some other self or in one's own. An activity has meaning in the degree in which it establishes and acknowledges variety and intimacy of connections. As long as any social impulse endures, so long an activity that shuts itself off will bring inward dissatisfaction and entail a struggle for compensatory goods, no matter what pleasures or external successes acclaim its course.

To say that the welfare of others, like our own, consists in a widening and deepening of the perceptions that give activity its meaning, in an educative growth, is to set forth a proposition of political import. To "make others happy" except through liberating their powers and engaging them in activities that enlarge the meaning of life is to harm them and to indulge ourselves under cover of exercising a special virtue. Our moral measure for estimating any existing arrangement or any proposed reform is its effect upon

impulse and habits. Does it liberate or suppress, ossify or render flexible, divide or unify interest? Is perception quickened or dulled? Is memory made apt and extensive or narrow and diffusely irrelevant? Is imagination diverted to fantasy and compensatory dreams, or does it add fertility to life? Is thought creative or pushed one side into pedantic specialisms? There is a sense in which to set up social welfare as an end of action only promotes an offensive condescension, a harsh interference, or an oleaginous display of complacent kindliness. It always tends in this direction when it is aimed at giving happiness to others directly, that is, as we can hand a physical thing to another. To foster conditions that widen the horizon of others and give them command of their own powers, so that they can find their own happiness in their own fashion, is the way of "social" action. Otherwise the prayer of a freeman would be to be left alone, and to be delivered, above all, from "reformers" and "kind" people.

II

Since morals is concerned with conduct, it grows out of specific empirical facts. Almost all influential moral theories, with the exception of the utilitarian, have refused to admit this idea. For Christendom as a whole, morality has been connected with supernatural commands, rewards and penalties. Those who have escaped this superstition have contented themselves with converting the difference between this world and the next into a distinction between the actual and the ideal, what is and what should be. The actual world has not been surrendered to the devil in name, but it is treated as a display of physical forces incapable of generating moral values. Consequently, moral considerations must come introduced from above. Human nature may not be officially declared to be infected because of some aboriginal sin, but it is said to be sensuous, impulsive, subjected to necessity, while natural intelligence is such that it cannot rise above a reckoning of private expediency.

But in fact morals is the most humane of all subjects. It is that which is closest to human nature; it is ineradicably empirical, not theological nor metaphysical nor mathematical. Since it directly concerns human nature, everything that can be known of the human mind and body in physiology, medicine, anthro-

pology, and psychology is pertinent to moral inquiry. Human nature exists and operates in an environment. And it is not "in" that environment as coins are in a box, but as a plant is in the sunlight and soil. It is of them, continuous with their energies, dependent upon their support, capable of increase only as it utilizes them, and as it gradually rebuilds from their crude indifference an environment genially civilized. Hence physics, chemistry, history, statistics, engineering science, are a part of disciplined moral knowledge so far as they enable us to understand the conditions and agencies through which man lives, and on account of which he forms and executes his plans. Moral science is not something with a separate province. It is physical, biological and historic knowledge placed in a human context where it will illuminate and guide the activities of men.

The path of truth is narrow and straitened. It is only too easy to wander beyond the course from this side to that. In a reaction from that error which has made morals fanatic or fantastic, sentimental or authoritative by severing them from actual facts and forces, theorists have gone to the other extreme. They have insisted that natural laws are themselves moral laws, so that it remains, after noting them, only to conform to them. This doctrine of accord with nature has usually marked a transition period. When mythology is dying in its open forms, and when social life is so disturbed that custom and tradition fail to supply their wonted control, men resort to Nature as a norm

They apply to Nature all the eulogistic predicates previously associated with divine law; or natural law is conceived of as the only true divine law. This happened in one form in Stoicism. It happened in another form in the deism of the eighteenth century with its notion of a benevolent, harmonious, wholly rational order of Nature.

In our time this notion has been perpetuated in connection with a laissez-faire social philosophy and the theory of evolution. Human intelligence is thought to mark an artificial interference if it does more than register fixed natural laws as rules of human action. The process of natural evolution is conceived as the exact model of human endeavor. The two ideas met in Spencer. To the "enlightened" of a former generation, Spencer's evolutionary philosophy seemed to afford a scientific sanction for the necessity of moral progress, while it also proved, up to the hilt, the futility of deliberate "interference" with the benevolent operations of nature. The idea of justice was identified with the law of cause and effect. Transgression of natural law brought in the struggle for existence its own penalty of elimination, and conformity with it brought the reward of increased vitality and happiness. By this process egoistic desire is gradually coming into harmony with the necessity of the environment, till at last the individual automatically finds happiness in doing what the natural and social environment demands, and serves himself in serving others. From this point of view, earlier "scientific" philosophers made a mistake, but

only the mistake of anticipating the date of complete natural harmony. All that reason can do is to acknowledge the evolutionary forces, and thereby refrain from retarding the arrival of the happy day of perfect harmony. Meantime justice demands that the weak and ignorant suffer the effect of violation of natural law while the wise and able reap the rewards of their superiority.

The fundamental defect of such views is that they fail to see the difference made in conditions and energies by perception of them. It is the first business of mind to be "realistic," to see things "as they are." If, for example, biology can give us knowledge of the causes of competency and incompetency, strength and weakness, that knowledge is all to the good. A non-sentimental morals will seek for all the instruction natural science can give concerning the biological conditions and consequences of inferiority and superiority. But knowledge of facts does not entail conformity and acquiescence. The contrary is the case. Perception of things as they are is but a stage in the process of making them different. They have already begun to be different in being known, for by that fact they enter into a different context, a context of foresight and judgment of better and worse. A false psychology of a separate realm of consciousness is the only reason this fact is not generally acknowledged. Morality resides not in perception of fact, but in the *use* made of its perception. It is a monstrous assumption that its sole use is to utter benedictions upon fact and it

ffspring. It is the part of intelligence to tell when o use the fact to conform and perpetuate, and when o use it to vary conditions and consequences.

It is absurd to suppose that knowledge about the connection between inferiority and its consequences prescribes adherence to that connection. It is like supposing that knowledge of the connection between maaria and mosquitoes enjoins breeding mosquitoes. The act when it is known enters into a new environment. Without ceasing to belong to the physical environment enters also into a medium of human activities, of esires and aversions, habits and instincts. It thereby ains new potencies, new capacities. Gunpowder in ater does not act the same as gunpowder next a flame. fact known does not operate the same as a fact unerceived. When it is known it comes into contact with he flame of desire and the cold bath of antipathy. Knowledge of the conditions that breed incapacity may t into some desire to maintain others in that state hile averting it for one's self. Or it may fall in with character which finds itself blocked by such facts, and herefore strives to use knowledge of causes to make a hange in effects. Morality begins at this point of use f knowledge of natural law, a use varying with the ctive system of dispositions and desires. Intelligent ction is not concerned with the bare consequences of he thing known, but with consequences *to be* brought nto existence by action conditioned on the knowledge. Men may use their knowledge to induce conformity or xaggeration, or to effect change and abolition of con-

ditions. The quality of these consequences determine the question of better or worse.

The exaggeration of the harmony attributed to Na ture aroused men to note its disharmonies. An optimis tic view of natural benevolence was followed by a mor honest, less romantic view of struggle and conflict i nature. After Helvetius and Bentham came Malthu and Darwin. The problem of morals is the problem o desire and intelligence. What is to be done with thes facts of disharmony and conflict? After we have dis covered the place and consequences of conflict in na ture, we have still to discover its place and working i human need and thought. What is its office, its functio its *possibility*, or use? In general, the answer is simpl Conflict is the gadfly of thought. It stirs us to ob servation and memory. It instigates to invention. I shocks us out of sheep-like passivity, and sets us a noting and contriving. Not that it always effects thi result; but that conflict is a *sine qua non* of reflectio and ingenuity. When this possibility of making use o conflict has once been noted, it is possible to utilize i systematically to substitute the arbitration of mind fo that of brutal attack and brute collapse. But th tendency to take natural law for a norm of action whic the supposedly scientific have inherited from eighteent century rationalism leads to an idealization of the prin ciple of conflict itself. Its office in promoting progres through arousing intelligence is overlooked, and it erected into the generator of progress. Karl Mar borrowed from the dialectic of Hegel the idea of th

ecessity of a negative element, of opposition, for ad-
ance. He projected it into social affairs and reached
he conclusion that all social development comes from
onflict between classes, and that therefore class-war-
are is to be cultivated. Hence a supposedly scientific
orm of the doctrine of social evolution preaches social
ostility as the road to social harmony. It would be
ifficult to find a more striking instance of what happens
hen natural events are given a social and practical
anctification. Darwinism has been similarly used
o justify war and the brutalities of competition for
ealth and power.

The excuse, the provocation, though not the justifica-
ion for such a doctrine is found in the actions of those
ho say peace, peace, when there is no peace, who refuse
o recognize facts as they are, who proclaim a natural
armony of wealth and merit, of capital and labor, and
he natural justice, in the main, of existing conditions.
here is something horrible, something that makes one
ear for civilization, in denunciations of class-differ-
nces and class struggles which proceed from a class in
ower, one that is seizing every means, even to a mo-
opoly of moral ideals, to carry on its struggle for
lass-power. This class adds hypocrisy to conflict and
rings all idealism into disrepute. It does everything
hich ingenuity and prestige can do to give color to
he assertions of those who say that all moral consid-
rations are irrelevant, and that the issue is one of
rute trial of forces between this side and that. The
lternative, here as elsewhere, is not between denying

facts in behalf of something termed moral ideals an accepting facts as final. There remains the possibi ity of recognizing facts and using them as a challeng to intelligence to modify the environment and chang habits.

III

The place of natural fact and law in morals brings us o the problem of freedom. We are told that seriously o import empirical facts into morals is equivalent to n abrogation of freedom. Facts and laws mean ne- essity we are told. The way to freedom is to turn our ack upon them and take flight to a separate ideal alm. Even if the flight could be successfully accom- lished, the efficacy of the prescription may be oubted. For we need freedom in and among ctual events, not apart from them. It is to e hoped therefore that there remains an alter- ative; that the road to freedom may be found in that nowledge of facts which enables us to employ them in onnection with desires and aims. A physician or en- ineer is free in his thought and his action in the degree n which he knows what he deals with. Possibly we find ere the key to any freedom.

What men have esteemed and fought for in the name f liberty is varied and complex—but certainly it has ever been a metaphysical freedom of will. It seems o contain three elements of importance, though on heir face not all of them are directly compatible with ne another. (i) It includes efficiency in action, abil- y to carry out plans, the absence of cramping and warting obstacles. (ii) It also includes capacity to

vary plans, to change the course of action, to exper
ence novelties. And again (iii) it signifies the power
desire and choice to be factors in events.

Few men would purchase even a high amount of e
ficient action along definite lines at the price of mono
ony, or if success in action were bought by all abando
ment of personal preference. They would probably fe
that a more precious freedom was possessed in a li
of ill-assured objective achievement that contain
undertaking of risks, adventuring in new fields, a pi
ting of personal choice against the odds of events, a
a mixture of success and failures, provided choice ha
a career. The slave is a man who executes the wish
others, one doomed to act along lines predetermined
regularity. Those who have defined freedom as abilit
to act have unconsciously assumed that this ability
exercised in accord with desire, and that its operatio
introduces the agent into fields previously unexplore
Hence the conception of freedom as involving thr
factors.

Yet efficiency in execution cannot be ignored. To sa
that a man is free to choose to walk while the only wa
he can take will lead him over a precipice is to stra
words as well as facts. Intelligence is the key to fre
dom in act. We are likely to be able to go ahead pro
perously in the degree in which we have consulted co
ditions and formed a plan which enlists their consen
ing cooperation. The gratuitous help of unforese
circumstance we cannot afford to despise. Luck, ba
if not good, will always be with us. But it has a wa

f favoring the intelligent and showing its back to the tupid. And the gifts of fortune when they come are eeting except when they are made taut by intelligent daptation of conditions. In neutral and adverse cir-umstances, study and foresight are the only roads to nimpeded action. Insistence upon a metaphysical reedom of will is generally at its most strident pitch ith those who despise knowledge of matters-of-fact. hey pay for their contempt by halting and confined ction. Glorification of freedom in general at the ex-ense of positive abilities in particular has often char-cterized the official creed of historic liberalism. Its itward sign is the separation of politics and law from conomics. Much of what is called the "individual-m" of the early nineteenth century has in truth little do with the nature of individuals. It goes back to a etaphysics which held that harmony between man and ature can be taken for granted, if once certain arti-cial restrictions upon man are removed. Hence it eglected the necessity of studying and regulating in-ustrial conditions so that a nominal freedom can e made an actuality. Find a man who believes that all en need is freedom *from* oppressive legal and political easures, and you have found a man who, unless he is erely obstinately maintaining his own private privi-ges, carries at the back of his head some heritage of e metaphysical doctrine of free-will, plus an opti-istic confidence in natural harmony. He needs a phi-sophy that recognizes the objective character of free-om and its dependence upon a congruity of environ-

ment with human wants, an agreement which can be obtained only by profound thought and unremitting application. For freedom as a fact depends upon conditions of work which are socially and scientifically buttressed. Since industry covers the most pervasive relations of man with his environment, freedom is unreal which does not have as its basis an economic command of environment.

I have no desire to add another to the cheap and easy solutions which exist of the seeming conflict between freedom and organization. It is reasonably obvious that organization may become a hindrance to freedom; it does not take us far to say that the trouble lies not in organization but in over-organization. At the same time, it must be admitted that there is no effective or objective freedom without organization. It is easy to criticize the contract theory of the state which states that individuals surrender some at least of their natural liberties in order to make secure as civil liberties what they retain. Nevertheless there is some truth in the idea of surrender and exchange. A certain natural freedom is possessed by man. That is to say, in some respects harmony exists between a man's energies and his surroundings such that the latter support and execute his purposes. In so far he is free; without such a basic natural support, conscious contrivances of legislation, administration and deliberate human institution of social arrangements cannot take place. In this sense natural freedom is prior to political freedom and is its condition. But we cannot trust wholly to a free

dom thus procured. It is at the mercy of accident. Conscious agreements among men must supplement and in some degree supplant freedom of action which is the gift of nature. In order to arrive at these agreements, individuals have to make concessions. They must consent to curtailment of some natural liberties in order that any of them may be rendered secure and enduring. They must, in short, enter into an organization with other human beings so that the activities of others may be permanently counted upon to assure regularity of action and far-reaching scope of plans and courses of action. The procedure is not, in so far, unlike surrendering a portion of one's income in order to buy insurance against future contingencies, and thus to render the future course of life more equably secure. It would be folly to maintain that there is no sacrifice; we can however contend that the sacrifice is a reasonable one, justified by results.

Viewed in this light, the relation of individual freedom to organization is seen to be an experimental affair. It is not capable of being settled by abstract theory. Take the question of labor unions and the closed or open shop. It is folly to fancy that no restrictions and surrenders of prior freedoms and possibilities of future freedoms are involved in the extension of this particular form of organization. But to condemn such organization on the theoretical ground that a restriction of liberty is entailed is to adopt a position which would have been fatal to every advance step in civilization, and to every net gain in effective

freedom. Every such question is to be judged not on the basis of antecedent theory but on the basis of concrete consequences. The question is to the balance of freedom and security achieved, as compared with practicable alternatives. Even the question of the point where membership in an organization ceases to be a voluntary matter and becomes coercive or required, is also an experimental matter, a thing to be decided by scientifically conducted study of consequences, of pros and cons. It is definitely an affair of specific detail, not of wholesale theory. It is equally amusing to see one man denouncing on grounds of pure theory the coercion of workers by a labor union while he avails himself of the increased power due to corporate action in business and praises the coercion of the political state; and to see another man denouncing the latter as pure tyranny, while lauding the power of industrial labor organizations. The position of one or the other may be justified in particular cases, but justification is due to results in practice not to general theory.

Organization tends, however, to become rigid and to limit freedom. In addition to security and energy in action, novelty, risk, change are ingredients of the freedom which men desire. Variety is more than the spice of life; it is largely of its essence, making a difference between the free and the enslaved. Invariant virtue appears to be as mechanical as uninterrupted vice, for true excellence changes with conditions. Unless character rises to overcome some new difficulty or conquer some temptation from an unexpected quarter

we suspect its grain is only a veneer. Choice is an element in freedom and there can be no choice without unrealized and precarious possibilities. It is this demand for genuine contingency which is caricatured in the orthodox doctrine of a freedom of indifference, a power to choose this way or that apart from any habit or impulse, without even a desire on the part of will to show off. Such an indetermination of choice is not desired by the lover of either reason or excitement. The theory of arbitrary free choice represents indeterminateness of conditions grasped in a vague and lazy fashion and hardened into a desirable attribute of will. Under the title of freedom men prize such uncertainty of conditions as give deliberation and choice an opportunity. But uncertainty of volition which is more than a reflection of uncertainty of conditions is the mark of a person who has acquired imbecility of character through permanent weakening of his springs of action.

Whether or not indeterminateness, uncertainty, actually exists in the world is a difficult question. It is easier to think of the world as fixed, settled once for all, and man as accumulating all the uncertainty there is in his will and all the doubt there is in his intellect. The rise of natural science has facilitated this dualistic partitioning, making nature wholly fixed and mind wholly open and empty. Fortunately for us we do not have to settle the question. A hypothetical answer is enough. *If* the world is already done and done for, if its character is entirely achieved so that its behavior is like that of a man lost in routine, then the only free-

dom for which man can hope is one of efficiency in overt action. But *if* change is genuine, if accounts are still in process of making, and if objective uncertainty is the stimulus to reflection, then variation in action, novelty and experiment, have a true meaning. In any case the question is an objective one. It concerns not man in isolation from the world but man in his connection with it. A world that is at points and times indeterminate enough to call out deliberation and to give play to choice to shape its future is a world in which will is free, not because it is inherently vacillating and unstable, but because deliberation and choice are determining and stabilizing factors.

Upon an empirical view, uncertainty, doubt, hesitation, contingency and novelty, genuine change which is not mere disguised repetition, are facts. Only deductive reasoning from certain fixed premisses creates a bias in favor of complete determination and finality. To say that these things exist only in human experience not in the world, and exist there only because of our "finitude" is dangerously like paying ourselves with words. Empirically the life of man seems in these respects as in others to express a culmination of facts in nature. To admit ignorance and uncertainty in man while denying them to nature involves a curious dualism. Variability, initiative, innovation, departure from routine, experimentation are empirically the manifestation of a genuine nisus in things. At all events it is these things that are precious to us under the name of freedom. It is their elimination from the life of a

slave which makes his life servile, intolerable to the freeman who has once been on his own, no matter what his animal comfort and security. A free man would rather take his chance in an open world than be guaranteed in a closed world.

These considerations give point to the third factor in love of freedom: the desire to have desire count as a factor, a force. Even if will chooses unaccountably, even if it be a capricious impulse, it does not follow that there are real alternatives, genuine possibilities, open in the future. What we want is possibilities open in the *world* not in the will, except as will or deliberate activity reflects the world. To foresee future objective alternatives and to be able by deliberation to choose one of them and thereby weight its chances in the struggle for future existence, measures our freedom. It is assumed sometimes that if it can be shown that deliberation determines choice and deliberation is determined by character and conditions, there is no freedom. This is like saying that because a flower comes from root and stem it cannot bear fruit. The question is not what are the antecedents of deliberation and choice, but what are their consequences. What do they do that is distinctive? The answer is that they give us all the control of future possibilities which is open to us. And this control is the crux of our freedom. Without it, we are pushed from behind. With it we walk in the light.

The doctrine that knowledge, intelligence rather than will, constitutes freedom is not new. It has been

preached by moralists of many a school. All rationalists have identified freedom with action emancipated by insight into truth. But insight into necessity has by them been substituted for foresight of possibilities. Tolstoi for example expressed the idea of Spinoza and Hegel when he said that the ox is a slave as long as he refuses to recognize the yoke and chafes under it, while if he identifies himself with its necessity and draws willingly instead of rebelliously, he is free. But as long as the yoke is a yoke it is impossible that voluntary identification with it should occur. Conscious submission is then either fatalistic submissiveness or cowardice. The ox accepts in fact not the yoke but the stall and the hay to which the yoke is a necessary incident. But if the ox foresees the consequences of the use of the yoke, if he anticipates the possibility of harvest, and identifies himself not with the yoke but with the realization of its possibilities, he acts freely, voluntarily. He hasn't accepted a necessity as unavoidable; he has welcomed a possibility as a desirability.

Perception of necessary law plays, indeed, a part. But no amount of insight into necessity brings with it, as such, anything but a consciousness of necessity. Freedom is the "truth of necessity" only when we use one "necessity" to alter another. When we use the law to foresee consequences and to consider how they may be averted or secured, then freedom begins. Employing knowledge of law to enforce desire in execution gives power to the engineer. Employing knowledge of law in order to submit to it without further action con-

titutes fatalism, no matter how it be dressed up. Thus re recur to our main contention. Morality depends upon events, not upon commands and ideals alien to nature. But intelligence treats events as moving, as raught with possibilities, not as ended, final. In fore-asting their possibilities, the distinction between bet-er and worse arises. Human desire and ability cooper-tes with this or that natural force according as this r that eventuality is judged better. We do not use he present to control the future. We use the fore-ight of the future to refine and expand present activ-ty. In this use of desire, deliberation and choice, free-lom is actualized.

IV

Intelligence becomes ours in the degree in which we use it and accept responsibility for consequences. It is not ours originally or by production. "It thinks" is a truer psychological statement than "I think." Thoughts sprout and vegetate; ideas proliferate. They come from deep unconscious sources. "I think" is a statement about voluntary action. Some suggestion surges from the unknown. Our active body of habits appropriates it. The suggestion then becomes an assertion. It no longer merely comes to us. It is accepted and uttered by us. We act upon it and thereby assume, by implication, its consequences. The stuff of belief and proposition is not originated by us. It comes to us from others, by education, tradition and the suggestion of the environment. Our intelligence is bound up, so far as its materials are concerned, with the community life of which we are a part. We know what it communicates to us, and know according to the habits it forms in us. Science is an affair of civilization not of individual intellect.

So with conscience. When a child acts, those about him re-act. They shower encouragement upon him, visit him with approval, or they bestow frowns and rebuke. What others do to us when we act is as natural a consequence of our action as what the fire does

o us when we plunge our hands in it. The social en-ironment may be as artificial as you please. But its ction in response to ours is natural not artificial. In anguage and imagination we rehearse the responses of thers just as we dramatically enact other consequences. Ve foreknow how others will act, and the foreknowl-dge is the beginning of judgment passed on action. We now *with* them; there is conscience. An assembly is ormed within our breast which discusses and appraises roposed and performed acts. The community with-ut becomes a forum and tribunal within, a judgment-eat of charges, assessments and exculpations. Our houghts of our own actions are saturated with the deas that others entertain about them, ideas which ave been expressed not only in explicit instruction but till more effectively in reaction to our acts.

Liability is the beginning of responsibility. We are eld accountable by others for the consequences of our cts. They visit their like and dislike of these con-equences upon us. In vain do we claim that these are ot ours; that they are products of ignorance not lesign, or are incidents in the execution of a most laud-ble scheme. Their authorship is imputed to us. We re disapproved, and disapproval is not an inner state f mind but a most definite act. Others say to us by heir deeds we do not care a fig whether you did this eliberately or not. We intend that you *shall* deliber-te before you do it again, and that if possible your eliberation shall prevent a repetition of this act we bject to. The reference in blame and every unfavor-

able judgment is prospective, not retrospective. Theories about responsibility may become confused, but in practice no one is stupid enough to try to change the past. Approbation and disapprobation are ways of influencing the formation of habits and aims; that is, of influencing future acts. The individual is *held* accountable for what he *has* done in order that he may be responsive in what he is *going* to do. Gradually persons learn by dramatic imitation to hold themselves accountable, and liability becomes a voluntary deliberate acknowledgment that deeds are our own, that their consequences come from us.

These two facts, that moral judgment and moral responsibility are the work wrought in us by the social environment, signify that all morality is social; not because we *ought* to take into account the effect of our acts upon the welfare of others, but because of facts. Others *do* take account of what we do, and they respond accordingly to our acts. Their responses actually *do* affect the meaning of what we do. The significance thus contributed is as inevitable as is the effect of interaction with the physical environment. In fact as civilization advances the physical environment gets itself more and more humanized, for the meaning of physical energies and events becomes involved with the part they play in human activities. Our conduct *is* socially conditioned whether we perceive the fact or not.

The effect of custom on habit, and of habit upon thought is enough to prove this statement. When we

begin to forecast consequences, the consequences that most stand out are those which will proceed from other people. The resistance and the cooperation of others is the central fact in the furtherance or failure of our schemes. Connections with our fellows furnish both the opportunities for action and the instrumentalities by which we take advantage of opportunity. All of the actions of an individual bear the stamp of his community as assuredly as does the language he speaks. Difficulty in reading the stamp is due to variety of impressions in consequence of membership in many groups. This social saturation is, I repeat, a matter of fact, not of what should be, not of what is desirable or undesirable. It does not guarantee the rightness of goodness of an act; there is no excuse for thinking of evil action as individualistic and right action as social. Deliberate unscrupulous pursuit of self-interest is as much conditioned upon social opportunities, training and assistance as is the course of action prompted by a beaming benevolence. The difference lies in the quality and degree of the perception of ties and interdependencies; in the use to which they are put. Consider the form commonly assumed today by self-seeking; namely command of money and economic power. Money is a social institution; property is a legal custom; economic opportunities are dependent upon the state of society; the objects aimed at, the rewards sought for, are what they are because of social admiration, prestige, competition and power. If money-making is morally obnoxious it is because of the way these

social facts are handled, not because a money-making man has withdrawn from society into an isolated selfhood or turned his back upon society. His "individualism" is not found in his original nature but in his habits acquired under social influences. It is found in his concrete aims, and these are reflexes of social conditions. Well-grounded moral objection to a mode of conduct rests upon the kind of social connections that figure, not upon lack of social aim. A man may attempt to utilize social relationships for his own advantage in an inequitable way; he may intentionally or unconsciously try to make them feed one of his own appetites. Then he is denounced as egoistic. But both his course of action and the disapproval he is subject to are facts *within* society. They are social phenomena. He pursues his unjust advantage as a social asset.

Explicit recognition of this fact is a prerequisite of improvement in moral education and of an intelligent understanding of the chief ideas or "categories" of morals. Morals is as much a matter of interaction of a person with his social environment as walking is an interaction of legs with a physical environment. The character of walking depends upon the strength and competency of legs. But it also depends upon whether a man is walking in a bog or on a paved street, upon whether there is a safeguarded path set aside or whether he has to walk amid dangerous vehicles. If the standard of morals is low it is because the education given by the interaction of the individual with his social en-

vironment is defective. Of what avail is it to preach unassuming simplicity and contentment of life when communal admiration goes to the man who "succeeds" —who makes himself conspicuous and envied because of command of money and other forms of power? If a child gets on by peevishness or intrigue, then others are his accomplices who assist in the habits which are built up. The notion that an abstract ready-made conscience exists in individuals and that it is only necessary to make an occasional appeal to it and to indulge in occasional crude rebukes and punishments, is associated with the causes of lack of definitive and orderly moral advance. For it is associated with lack of attention to social forces.

There is a peculiar inconsistency in the current idea that morals *ought* to be social. The introduction of the moral "ought" into the idea contains an implicit assertion that morals depend upon something apart from social relations. Morals *are* social. The question of ought, should be, is a question of better and worse *in* social affairs. The extent to which the weight of theories has been thrown against the perception of the place of social ties and connections in moral activity is a fair measure of the extent to which social forces work blindly and develop an accidental morality. The chief obstacle for example to recognizing the truth of a proposition frequently set forth in these pages to the effect that all conduct is potential, if not actual, matter of moral judgment is the habit of identifying moral judgment with praise and blame. So great is the in-

fluence of this habit that it is safe to say that every professed moralist when he leaves the pages of theory and faces some actual item of his own or others' behavior, first or "instinctively" thinks of acts as moral or non-moral in the degree in which they are exposed to condemnation or approval. Now this kind of judgment is certainly not one which could profitably be dispensed with. Its influence is much needed. But the tendency to equate it with all moral judgment is largely responsible for the current idea that there is a sharp line between moral conduct and a larger region of non-moral conduct which is a matter of expediency, shrewdness, success or manners.

Moreover this tendency is a chief reason why the social forces effective in shaping actual morality work blindly and unsatisfactorily. Judgment in which the emphasis falls upon blame and approbation has more heat than light. It is more emotional than intellectual. It is guided by custom, personal convenience and resentment rather than by insight into causes and consequences. It makes toward reducing moral instruction, the educative influence of social opinion, to an immediate personal matter, that is to say, to an adjustment of personal likes and dislikes. Fault-finding creates resentment in the one blamed, and approval, complacency, rather than a habit of scrutinizing conduct objectively. It puts those who are sensitive to the judgments of others in a standing defensive attitude, creating an apologetic, self-accusing and self-exculpating habit of mind when what is needed is an impersonal

impartial habit of observation. "Moral" persons get so occupied with defending their conduct from real and imagined criticism that they have little time left to see what their acts really amount to, and the habit of self-blame inevitably extends to include others since it is a habit.

Now it is a wholesome thing for any one to be made aware that thoughtless, self-centered action on his part exposes him to the indignation and dislike of others. There is no one who can be safely trusted to be exempt from immediate reactions of criticism, and there are few who do not need to be braced by occasional expressions of approval. But these influences are immensely overdone in comparison with the assistance that might be given by the influence of social judgments which operate without accompaniments of praise and blame; which enable an individual to see for himself what he is doing, and which put him in command of a method of analyzing the obscure and usually unavowed forces which move him to act. We need a permeation of judgments on conduct by the method and materials of a science of human nature. Without such enlightenment even the best-intentioned attempts at the moral guidance and improvement of others often eventuate in tragedies of misunderstanding and division, as is so often seen in the relations of parents and children.

The development therefore of a more adequate science of human nature is a matter of first-rate importance. The present revolt against the notion that psy-

chology is a science of consciousness may well turn out in the future to be the beginning of a definitive turn in thought and action. Historically there are good reasons for the isolation and exaggeration of the conscious phase of human action, an isolation which forgot that "conscious" is an adjective of some acts and which erected the resulting abstraction, "consciousness," into a noun, an existence separate and complete. These reasons are interesting not only to the student of technical philosophy but also to the student of the history of culture and even of politics. They have to do with the attempt to drag realities out of occult essences and hidden forces and get them into the light of day. They were part of the general movement called phenomenalism, and of the growing importance of individual life and private voluntary concerns. But the effect was to isolate the individual from his connections both with his fellows and with nature, and thus to create an artificial human nature, one not capable of being understood and effectively directed on the basis of analytic understanding. It shut out from view, not to say from scientific examination, the forces which really move human nature. It took a few surface phenomena for the whole story of significant human motive-forces and acts.

As a consequence physical science and its technological applications were highly developed while the science of man, moral science, is backward. I believe that it is not possible to estimate how much of the difficulties of the present world situation are due to the

disproportion and unbalance thus introduced into affairs. It would have seemed absurd to say in the seventeenth century that in the end the alteration in methods of physical investigation which was then beginning would prove more important than the religious wars of that century. Yet the wars marked the end of one era; the dawn of physical science the beginning of a new one. And a trained imagination may discover that the nationalistic and economic wars which are the chief outward mark of the present are in the end to be less significant than the development of a science of human nature now inchoate.

It sounds academic to say that substantial bettering of social relations waits upon the growth of a scientific social psychology. For the term suggests something specialized and remote. But the formation of habits of belief, desire and judgment is going on at every instant under the influence of the conditions set by men's contact, intercourse and associations with one another. This is the fundamental fact in social life and in personal character. It is the fact about which traditional human science gives no enlightenment—a fact which this traditional science blurs and virtually denies. The enormous rôle played in popular morals by appeal to the supernatural and quasi-magical is in effect a desperate admission of the futility of our science. Consequently the whole matter of the formation of the predispositions which effectively control human relationships is left to accident, to custom and immediate personal likings, resentments and ambitions. It is a com-

monplace that modern industry and commerce are conditioned upon a control of physical energies due to proper methods of physical inquiry and analysis. We have no social arts which are comparable because we have so nearly nothing in the way of psychological science. Yet through the development of physical science, and especially of chemistry, biology, physiology, medicine and anthropology we now have the basis for the development of such a science of man. Signs of its coming into existence are present in the movements in clinical, behavioristic and social (in its narrower sense) psychology.

At present we not only have no assured means of forming character except crude devices of blame, praise, exhortation and punishment, but the very meaning of the general notions of moral inquiry is matter of doubt and dispute. The reason is that these notions are discussed in isolation from the concrete facts of the interactions of human beings with one another—an abstraction as fatal as was the old discussion of phlogiston, gravity and vital force apart from concrete correlations of changing events with one another. Take for example such a basic conception as that of Right involving the nature of authority in conduct. There is no need here to rehearse the multitude of contending views which give evidence that discussion of this matter is still in the realm of opinion. We content ourselves with pointing out that this notion is the last resort of the anti-empirical school in morals and that it proves the effect of neglect of social conditions.

In effect its adherents argue as follows: "Let us concede that concrete ideas about right and wrong and particular notions of what is obligatory have grown up within experience. But we cannot admit this about the idea of Right, of Obligation itself. Why does moral authority exist at all? Why is the claim of the Right recognized in conscience even by those who violate it in deed? Our opponents say that such and such a course is wise, expedient, better. But *why* act for the wise, or good, or better? Why not follow our own immediate devices if we are so inclined? There is only one answer: We have a moral nature, a conscience, call it what you will. And this nature responds directly in acknowledgment of the supreme authority of the Right over all claims of inclination and habit. We may not act in accordance with this acknowledgment, but we still know that the authority of the moral law, although not its power, is unquestionable. Men may differ indefinitely according to what their experience has been as to just *what* is Right, what its contents are. But they all spontaneously agree in recognizing the supremacy of the claims of whatever is thought of as Right. Otherwise there would be no such thing as morality, but merely calculations of how to satisfy desire.

Grant the foregoing argument, and all the apparatus of abstract moralism follows in its wake. A remote goal of perfection, ideals that are contrary in a wholesale way to what is actual, a free will of arbitrary choice; all of these conceptions band themselves together with that of a non-empirical authority of Right

and a non-empirical conscience which acknowledges it. They constitute its ceremonial or formal train.

Why, indeed, acknowledge the authority of Right? That many persons do not acknowledge it in fact, in action, and that all persons ignore it at times, is assumed by the argument. Just what is the significance of an alleged recognition of a supremacy which is continually denied in fact? How much would be lost if it were dropped out, and we were left face to face with actual facts? If a man lived alone in the world there might be some sense in the question "Why be moral?" were it not for one thing: No such question would then arise. As it is, we live in a world where other persons live too. Our acts affect them. They perceive these effects, and react upon us in consequence. Because they are living beings they make demands upon us for certain things from us. They approve and condemn—not in abstract theory but in what they do to us. The answer to the question "Why not put your hand in the fire?" is the answer of fact. If you do your hand will be burnt. The answer to the question why acknowledge the right is of the same sort. For Right is only an abstract name for the multitude of concrete demands in action which others impress upon us, and of which we are obliged, if we would live, to take some account. Its authority is the exigency of their demands, the efficacy of their insistencies. There may be good ground for the contention that in theory the idea of the right is subordinate to that of the good, being a statement of the course proper to attain good. But in fact it

signifies the totality of social pressures exercised upon us to induce us to think and desire in certain ways. Hence the right can in fact become the road to the good only as the elements that compose this unremitting pressure are enlightened, only as social relationships become themselves reasonable.

It will be retorted that all pressure is a non-moral affair partaking of force, not of right; that right must be ideal. Thus we are invited to enter again the circle in which the ideal has no force and social actualities no ideal quality. We refuse the invitation because social pressure is involved in our own lives, as much so as the air we breathe and the ground we walk upon. If we had desires, judgments, plans, in short a mind, apart from social connections, then the latter would be external and their action might be regarded as that of a non-moral force. But we live mentally as physically only *in* and *because* of our environment. Social pressure is but a name for the interactions which are always going on and in which we participate, living so far as we partake and dying so far as we do not. The pressure is not ideal but empirical, yet empirical here means only actual. It calls attention to the fact that considerations of right are claims originating not outside of life, but within it. They are "ideal" in precisely the degree in which we intelligently recognize and act upon them, just as colors and canvas become ideal when used in ways that give an added meaning to life.

Accordingly failure to recognize the authority of right means defect in effective apprehension of the real-

ities of human association, not an arbitrary exercise of free will. This deficiency and perversion in apprehension indicates a defect in education—that is to say, in the operation of actual conditions, in the consequences upon desire and thought of existing interactions and interdependencies. It is false that every person has a consciousness of the supreme authority of right and then misconceives it or ignores it in action. One has such a sense of the claims of social relationships as those relationships enforce in one's desires and observations. The belief in a separate, ideal or transcendental, practically ineffectual Right is a reflex of the inadequacy with which existing institutions perform their educative office—their office in generating observation of social continuities. It is an endeavor to "rationalize" this defect. Like all rationalizations, it operates to divert attention from the real state of affairs. Thus it helps maintain the conditions which created it, standing in the way of effort to make our institutions more humane and equitable. A theoretical acknowledgment of the supreme authority of Right, of moral law, gets twisted into an effectual substitute for acts which would better the customs which now produce vague, dull, halting and evasive observation of actual social ties. We are not caught in a circle; we traverse a spiral in which social customs generate some consciousness of interdependencies, and this consciousness is embodied in acts which in improving the environment generate new perceptions of social ties, and so on forever. The relationships, the interactions are for-

ever there as fact, but they acquire meaning only in the desires, judgments and purposes they awaken.

We recur to our fundamental propositions. Morals is connected with actualities of existence, not with ideals, ends and obligations independent of concrete actualities. The facts upon which it depends are those which arise out of active connections of human beings with one another, the consequences of their mutually intertwined activities in the life of desire, belief, judgment, satisfaction and dissatisfaction. In this sense conduct and hence morals are social: they are not just things which *ought* to be social and which fail to come up to the scratch. But there are enormous differences of better and worse in the quality of what is social. Ideal morals begin with the perception of these differences. Human interaction and ties are there, are operative in any case. But they can be regulated, employed in an orderly way for good only as we know how to observe them. And they cannot be observed aright, they cannot be understood and utilized, when the mind is left to itself to work without the aid of science. For the natural unaided mind means precisely the habits of belief, thought and desire which have been accidentally generated and confirmed by social institutions or customs. But with all their admixture of accident and unreasonableness we have at last reached a point where social conditions create a mind capable of scientific outlook and inquiry. To foster and develop this spirit is the social obligation of the present because it is its urgent need.

Yet the last word is not with obligation nor with the future. Infinite relationships of man with his fellows and with nature already exist. The ideal means, as we have seen, a sense of these encompassing continuities with their infinite reach. This meaning even now attaches to present activities because they are set in a whole to which they belong and which belongs to them. Even in the midst of conflict, struggle and defeat a consciousness is possible of the enduring and comprehending whole.

To be grasped and held this consciousness needs, like every form of consciousness, objects, symbols. In the past men have sought many symbols which no longer serve, especially since men have been idolators worshiping symbols as things. Yet within these symbols which have so often claimed to be realities and which have imposed themselves as dogmas and intolerances, there has rarely been absent some trace of a vital and enduring reality, that of a community of life in which continuities of existence are consummated. Consciousness of the whole has been connected with reverences, affections, and loyalties which are communal. But special ways of expressing the communal sense have been established. They have been limited to a select social group; they have hardened into obligatory rites and been imposed as conditions of salvation. Religion has lost itself in cults, dogmas and myths. Consequently the office of religion as sense of community and one's place in it has been lost. In effect religion has been distorted into a possession—or burden—of a limited part of

human nature, of a limited portion of humanity which finds no way to universalize religion except by imposing its own dogmas and ceremonies upon others; of a limited class within a partial group; priests, saints, a church. Thus other gods have been set up before the one God. Religion as a sense of the whole is the most individualized of all things, the most spontaneous, undefinable and varied. For individuality signifies unique connections in the whole. Yet it has been perverted into something uniform and immutable. It has been formulated into fixed and defined beliefs expressed in required acts and ceremonies. Instead of marking the freedom and peace of the individual as a member of an infinite whole, it has been petrified into a slavery of thought and sentiment, an intolerant superiority on the part of the few and an intolerable burden on the part of the many.

Yet every act may carry within itself a consoling and supporting consciousness of the whole to which it belongs and which in some sense belongs to it. With responsibility for the intelligent determination of particular acts may go a joyful emancipation from the burden for responsibility for the whole which sustains them, giving them their final outcome and quality. There is a conceit fostered by perversion of religion which assimilates the universe to our personal desires; but there is also a conceit of carrying the load of the universe from which religion liberates us. Within the flickering inconsequential acts of separate selves dwells a sense of the whole which claims and dignifies them

In its presence we put off mortality and live in the universal. The life of the community in which we live and have our being is the fit symbol of this relationship. The acts in which we express our perception of the ties which bind us to others are its only rites and ceremonies.

INDEX

Absentmindedness, 173
Accidents, in history, 101; in consequences, 49, 51, 206-208, 241, 253, 304, 309
Acquisition, 116-118, 143-148
Activity is natural, 118-123, 160, 226, 293
Aims, *see* Consequences, Ends
Alexander M., 28, 36
Altruism, 133, 293
Analysis, 183
Anger, 90, 152
Appetite, 7, 275; *see* Impulse
Aristotle, 33, 109, 174, 224, 290
Arts, 15, 23, 71, 159-164, 263
Atomism moral, 243
Attitude, 41; *see* Habit
Authority, 2, 65, 72, 79, 187, 324

Benevolence, 133
Bergson, 73, 178, 245
Blame, 18, 121, 320

Causation, 18, 44
Calculation, 189, 199-209; *see* Deliberation
Casuistry, 240
Certainty, love of, 236
Character, defined, 38; and consequences, 47
Childhood, 2, 64, 89, 96, 99
Choice, 192, 304, 311
Classes, 2, 82, 270
Classification, 131, 244
Codes, 103
Compensatory, 8, 30, 33, 257, 275
Conduct, *see* Character, Habit, Impulse, Intelligence
Confidence, 139
Conflict, 12, 39, 66, 82, 194, 208, 217, 300
Conscience, 184-188, 314
Consciousness, 62, 179, 184, 208
Consequences, and motives, 45-47; and aims, 225-229, 245-247
Conservatism, 66, 106, 168
Continuity, 12, 232, 239, 244, 259
Control, 21, 23, 37, 101, 139, 148, 266-270; *see* Accident
Conventions, 6, 97, 166
Crowd psychology, 60
Creative and acquisitive, 143-148
Customs and habits, 58-69; and standards, 75-85; rigidity, 103-105

Deliberation, 189-209; as discovery, 216
Democracy, 61n, 66, 72
Desire, 24, 33, 194, 234, 299, 304; and intelligence, 248-264; object of, 249-252
Disposition, 41; *see* Habit
Docility, 64, 97
Dualism, 8, 12, 40, 55, 67, 71, 147, 275, 309

Economic man, 220
Economics, 9, 12, 120-124, 132, 143-148, 212-221, 270-273, 305
Education, 64, 72, 91, 107, 270, 320
Egotism, 7
Emerson, 100, 144
Emotion, 75, 83, 255, 264

End, 28, 34-37; knowledge as, 187, 215; nature of, 223-237; of desire, 250, 261; and means, 269-272; *see* Consequences, Means
Environments, 2, 10, 15, 18, 21, 51, 151, 159, 179, 316
Epicureanism, 205, 291
Equilibration, 179, 252
Evolution, 284-287, 297
Execution, of desires, 33-35
Expediency, 49, 189, 210; *see* Deliberation
Experience, 31, 245
Experimentation, moral, 56, 307

Fallacy, philosophic, 175
Fanaticism, 228
Fear, 111, 132-133, 154-155, 237
Fiat of will, 29
Foresight, 204-206, 238, 265-270; *see* Deliberation, Ends
Freedom, 8, 165; three phases of, 303-313; *see* Will
Functions, 18

Gain, 117
Goal, 260, 265, 274, 281, 287-289; *see* Evolution, Perfection
Good, 2, 44, 210-222, 274, 278
Goodness, 4-8, 16, 43-45, 48, 67, 227
Good-will, 44

Habits, place in conduct, 14-88; and desire, 24; as functions, 14; as arts or abilities, 15, 64, 66, 71, 170; and thought, 31-33, 66-69, 172-180, 182; definition, 41; and impulses, 90-98, 107-111; and principles, 238
Harmony, natural, 159, 167, 298
Hedonistic calculus, 204
Hegel, 312
Helvetius, 106, 300
Herd-instinct, 4
History, 101, 110
Hobbes, 133
Human nature, 1; and morals, 1-13, 295; alterability, 106-124
Humility, 289
Hypocrisy, 6
Hypothesis, moral, 239, 243

Ideas, *see* Ends, Thought
Ideals and Idealism, 2, 8, 50, 68, 77, 81, 99, 157, 166, 184, 233, 236, 255, 259-264, 274, 282-288, 301, 331
Imagination, 52, 163, 190-192, 204, 225, 234
Imitation, 66, 97, 132
Impulse, place in conduct, 89-171; secondary, 89; intermediary, 169-170; as means of reorganization, 93, 102, 104, 179; plastic, 95; same as human instincts, 105n; and habit, 107-111; false simplification, 131-149; and reason, 196, 254
Individualism, 7, 85, 93
Industry, 11
Infantilisms, 98
Instinct, not fixed, 149-168; and knowledge, 178; *see* Impulse
Institutions, 9, 80, 102, 111, 166
Intelligence, 10, 13, 51, 299, 312; place of, in conduct, 172-277; relation to habits, 172-180, 228; and desire, 248-264, 276
Interpenetration of habits, 37-39
Intuitions, 33, 188

James, Wm., 112, 179, 195
Justice, 18, 52, 198

Kant, 44, 49, 55, 245
Knowledge, moral, 181-188; *see* Conscience, Intelligence

Labor, 121, 144
Language, 58, 79, 95

Le Bon, 61
Liberalism, 305
Locke, 106

Marx, 154, 273, 300
Magic, 20, 26
Meaning, 37, 90, 151, 207, 262, 271, 280
Means, 20; relation to ends, 25-36, 218-220, 251; *see* Habit
Mechanization, 28, 70, 96, 144
Mediation, 197
Mind, 61, 95; and habit, 175-180
Mind and body, 30, 67, 71
Mitchell, W. C., 213
Moore, G. E., 241n
Morals, introduction, 40; conclusion, as objective, 52; of art, 167; scope, 278-281
Motives, 43-45, 118-122, 213, 231, 329

Natural law and morals, 296-300
Necessity, 312
Nirvana, 175, 286
Non-moral, 8, 27, 40, 188, 230

Occult, 11
Oligarchy, 2-3
Optimism, 286-288
Organization, 306

Passion, 9, 193-196
Pathology, 4, 50
Perfection, 173-175, 223, 282
Pessimism, 286
Phantasies, 158, 164, 236
Plato, 50, 78, 134, 290
Play, 159-164
Pleasure, 158, 200-205, 250
Posture, 32
Potentiality, 37
Power, will to, 140-142
Pragmatic knowing, 181-188
Principles, 2; and tendencies, 49; nature of, 238-247
Private, 9, 16, 43, 85
Process and product, 142-143, 280
Progress, 10, 21, 93, 96, 101, 105n; in science, 149; nature of, 281-288
Property, 116-118; *see* Economics
Psycho-analysis, 34, 86, 133, 153, 252
Psychology and moral theory, 12, 46, 91; social, 60-63, 84-88; current, 118, 135, 147, 155; and scientific method, 150, 322-324
Punishment, 18
Puritanism, 5, 157
Purpose, *see* Ends

Radicalism, 168
Reactions, 157
Realism, 176, 256, 298
Reason, pure, 31; reasonableness, 67, 77, 193-198, 215
Rebellion, 166
Reconstruction, 164
Religion, 5, 263, 330-332
Responsibility, 315
Revolution, 10, 108
Right, 324-328
Romanticism, 6, 100, 166, 256
Routine, 42, 66, 70, 98, 211, 232, 238

Satisfaction, 140, 158, 175, 210, 213, 265, 285
Savagery, 93, 101, 103
Science of morals, 3, 11-12, 18, 56, 224, 243, 296, 321
Self, 16, 55, 85-87, 136-139, 217, 292, 314
Self-deception, 152, 252
Self-love, 134-139, 293
Sensations, 18, 31, 189
Sentimentalism, 17
Sex, 133, 150, 153, 164-165
Social, *see* Environments
Social mind, 60-63

Socrates, 56
Soul, 85, 94, 138, 176
Spencer, 175, 297
Standards, 75-82, 241
Stimulation, 157
Stimulus and response, 199-207
Stuart, H. W., 218
Subjective, 16, 22, 27, 52, 54, 85, 202; *see* Dualism
Sublimation, 141, 156, 164, 194
Success, 6, 173, 254
Sumner, 77
Suppression, 156, 166
Synthesis, 183-184

Tendency, 49
Thought, 30, 67, 98, 108, 171, 190, 200, 222, 258; vices of, 197
Tolstoi, 285, 312
Tools, 25, 32; intellectual, 244
Transcendentalism, 50-52, 54, 81

Universality, 245-247
Utilitarianism, 50, 189, 199-209, 211, 221-222, 291

Virtues, 4, 16, 22; *see* Goodness

War, 110-115
Westermarck, 76
Will, and habits, 25, 29, 40-44, 259; will to power, 140-143; freedom of, 9
Williams, M., 273n

DISCHARGED
RESERVE
RESERVE
DISCHARGED
DISCHARGED

B
5
.D
C.

UW-STEVENS POINT
3 1775 194738 9